STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1981
Renee Hogendorf, Respondent,
vs.
James J. Green, Jr., et al., Appellants.
Filed September 15, 2025 Affirmed Wheelock, Judge
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CV-22-678
William A. Cumming, Laura H. Lindsay, William M. Florek, Hessian & McKasy, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cara C. Passaro, Stephen P. Couillard, Stich Angell, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. The state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a released
hazardous substance does not preclude a claim under the Minnesota Environmental
Response and Liability Act (MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-.20 (2024).
2. As it appears in the definition of “release” under Minn. Stat. § 115B.02,
subd. 15(b)(4), the term “residue” does not include “rinsate” as defined by Minn. Stat.
§ 18B.01, subd. 25 (2024). 3. Whether damages awarded under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04 are “reasonable and
necessary” is a factual determination for the district court.
4. A party may be awarded damages for the diminution of value of their
property under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05.
OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s entry of judgment and award of damages
in favor of respondent under the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act
(MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-.20, based on appellants’ discharge of contaminating
substances from their commercial landscaping workshop onto respondent’s neighboring
property. Appellants assert that the district court erred under MERLA’s definitions by
(1) concluding that disposal of pesticide rinsate is a “release . . . of a hazardous substance,”
(2) determining that appellant James J. Green Jr. was a “responsible person,” (3) awarding
damages that were not “reasonable and necessary,” and (4) awarding diminution-of-value
damages. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Green and respondent Renee Hogendorf are neighboring landowners in
the City of Andover in Anoka County. Green owns and operates appellant Well Groomed
Lawns Inc. (WGL), a landscaping business, on his property. This litigation stems from
Hogendorf’s discovery of a pipe that carried rinsate from WGL’s workshop on Green’s
2 property and discharged onto Hogendorf’s property. Hogendorf sued WGL and Green 1
under MERLA and obtained a damages judgment following a bench trial. Appellants
challenge both the district court’s determination of liability under MERLA and its award
of damages. The following summarizes the facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal,
based on the evidence presented at trial and viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment. See Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999).
In May 2021, Hogendorf was walking on her property when she saw something
white sticking out of the ground. Hogendorf spotted a four-inch pipe covered in dirt and
vegetation and observed fluid streaming from the pipe. The fluid “had a horrible, foul
stench to it.” Hogendorf contacted Landmark Environmental, an environmental consulting
firm, and it collected soil samples from her property around the discharge pipe. The
samples revealed the presence of many contaminating substances in Hogendorf’s soil,
including triclopyr, 2,4-D, and dicamba—chemicals found in common pesticides.
Landmark then notified the state, and an environmental health inspector for Anoka County
scheduled a visit to Hogendorf’s and Green’s properties.
Green owns property next to Hogendorf’s from which he operates WGL. Green
built a garage workshop on his property for WGL and ran a pipe from the floor of the
workshop to a drain field that he constructed on his property; WGL used this pipe for about
20 years until it became clogged. When it became clogged, Green directed WGL’s general
1 Green and WGL each had their own counsel, but throughout most of the proceedings in district court and in most of the district court’s order, they are treated as one. In this opinion, we address them together as appellants unless explicitly differentiated.
3 foreman to install a new pipe that discharged near the property line. Green told the foreman
where on his property to place the pipe. The new pipe extended approximately 47 feet past
the property line onto Hogendorf’s property. Inside the workshop, WGL performed
mechanical repairs and maintenance on its mowers and the tools it used to apply various
chemicals, including pesticides and herbicides. WGL also cleaned its vehicles, mowers,
and tools in the garage, washing the chemicals and grime from them down the drain and
through the pipe that ultimately discharged rinsate onto Hogendorf’s property.
After the environmental health inspector’s visits to Hogendorf’s and Green’s
properties, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) issued a notice of violation
to WGL and later issued a special order for compliance, requiring WGL to conduct a
remedial investigation and take corrective action as to the areas that had been affected by
WGL’s actions. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) also issued a notice of
violation to WGL and ordered WGL to remove or seal the pipe and develop plans to
investigate and remove the contamination. Notwithstanding these orders, WGL did not
change its practices and continued to allow its discharge to flow onto Hogendorf’s
property. Eventually, WGL hired an environmental consultant, Pinnacle Engineering,
which drafted an investigation-and-work plan for the contamination. The parties, the
MDA, and the MPCA agreed that Landmark would assist in the investigation of and
planning to remove the contamination from Hogendorf’s property.
Pinnacle’s investigation began more than a year after Hogendorf discovered the
discharge pipe on her property and took several months to complete. During and after the
investigation, Pinnacle and Landmark collaborated to develop a work plan to remove the
4 contamination from Hogendorf’s property and manage appellants’ continued discharge of
rinsate. The MDA ultimately approved the plan. Data from soil samples established that
a large quantity of soil would need to be removed to a depth of nine feet in some places
and replaced in the area where the pipe discharged. At some point during the fall of 2023,
Pinnacle completed its work under the work plan, and in 2024, both the MDA and the
MPCA issued approval letters to Green and WGL.
Hogendorf filed her initial complaint in February 2022 and an amended complaint
in March 2023. Hogendorf brought a MERLA claim, common-law claims for negligence,
negligence per se, nuisance, and trespass, and various equitable claims. Appellants moved
for summary judgment on Hogendorf’s MERLA claims, arguing that the claims were
superfluous after the state became involved in the investigation that there was no release
of a hazardous substance. Hogendorf opposed the motion, and the district court denied it.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, after which the district court ordered judgment
against appellants on the MERLA claim. The district court determined that appellants
owned and operated the workshop and the pipe. The district court further determined that
WGL’s employees regularly rinsed pesticides containing 2,4-D and dicamba from the
equipment and vehicles at the workshop and that Green directed WGL’s employees to
install the pipe in the location where it discharged the resulting rinsate onto Hogendorf’s
property. Thus, the district court determined that appellants were responsible for the
release of hazardous substances from their facility onto Hogendorf’s property.
Based on its determination that, under MERLA, Green and WGL were responsible
for the contamination of Hogendorf’s property, the district court awarded Hogendorf
5 declaratory relief, monetary damages for economic loss totaling $331,295.84, and
reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party. The district court did not decide
Hogendorf’s common-law claims because Hogendorf had succeeded in her MERLA
claims and MERLA does not permit double recovery. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.13.
This appeal follows.
ISSUES
I. Does the state’s involvement in investigation or cleanup of a hazardous substance
after a release preclude a MERLA claim?
II. Did the district court err in making its liability determinations under the definitions
in MERLA, including that there was a “release,” the release was of a “hazardous
substance,” and Green was a “responsible person”?
III. Did the district court err in awarding damages, including by determining that
Hogendorf’s environmental-consultant costs were “reasonable and necessary” and
that diminution-of-value damages were permitted by MERLA?
ANALYSIS
We begin with an explanation of MERLA, which was enacted by the Minnesota
Legislature in 1983 for three reasons: “(1) to impose strict liability on those responsible for
harm caused by the release of hazardous substances; (2) to allow the state to clean up
contamination and collect costs later; and (3) to fund state cleanup activity.” Musicland
Grp., Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 508 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 27, 1994). MERLA was adapted, in part, from the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). State ex
6 rel. Hatch v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 824, 830 (Minn. App. 2002), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2002). Because MERLA “provides a cause of action for the
recovery of damages for personal injury and economic losses caused by the release of
hazardous chemicals into the environment,” it provides broader protection for individuals
affected by contamination than CERCLA. Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 529.
The objective of MERLA is to go beyond being a “cleanup statute” to “protect the
public health and minimize the harmful effect of hazardous substances in the environment.”
Id. at 530. To that end, MERLA protects against not only actual releases of chemicals but
threatened releases. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1 (“[A]ny person who is
responsible for a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility is
strictly liable . . . .” (emphasis added)). “MERLA is a remedial statute and should therefore
be broadly construed in favor of the government in order to effectuate its remedial
objectives.” Hatch, 644 N.W.2d at 829; see Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 531-32 (broadly
construing both “release” and “facility” as defined in MERLA).
The agencies that administer MERLA are the MDA and the MPCA (collectively,
the agencies). Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 3. The MDA has jurisdiction under MERLA
when the hazardous substances involved are agricultural chemicals, including pesticides
and fertilizers. Id., subds. 3, 3a. Any other hazardous substance falls under the MPCA’s
jurisdiction. Id., subd. 3. Under MERLA, the agencies have authority to “impose a legal
obligation” on property owners and may seek a civil judgment “to compel the [owner] to
conduct the clean up or to compel reimbursement of [the agencies’] expenses in cleaning
up the contamination.” Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
7 175, 183 (Minn. 1990); see also Minn. Stat. § 115B.18 (listing relief available to state for
noncompliance). MERLA did not create a new scheme for liability to address
contamination from pollution; rather, it updated the remedies available under previous
statutes and the common law. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 183.
“On appeal from judgment following a court trial, this court reviews whether the
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous and whether the district court erred as a
matter of law.” In re Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees, 855 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Minn. App. 2014),
aff’d, 870 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts “review a district court’s
application of the law de novo.” Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561,
568 (Minn. 2016). A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, requiring
that there be reasonable evidence in the record to support these findings. Rasmussen v.
Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). When reviewing the findings
of fact, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and
will not determine that the findings are clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court is “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
With these legal standards in mind, we address appellants’ arguments. Appellants
argue that the district court erred (1) when it determined that Hogendorf’s claim was not
superfluous to the agencies’ actions; (2) when it determined that appellants were liable to
Hogendorf under MERLA; (3) when it determined that Green was personally liable as a
“responsible person” under MERLA; and (4) in its calculation of Hogendorf’s damages.
We address these arguments in turn.
8 I. The state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a hazardous substance after a release does not preclude a private cause of action under MERLA.
We first consider appellants’ argument that Hogendorf’s MERLA claim became
superfluous after the agencies took action under the statute. They reason that MERLA acts
as a “whistleblower statute” and that, because the act of notifying the state satisfied the
purpose of bringing a MERLA claim, it was unnecessary and not allowed for Hogendorf
to file a claim under MERLA once the state was notified of the release. We review the
district court’s determination that, “[b]ased upon the unambiguous language of the statute,
[Hogendorf] is entitled to all reasonable and necessary removal costs” and that agency
action does not preclude a private cause of action under MERLA. Statutory interpretation
is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs,
884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
Appellants’ argument directly conflicts with the plain language of MERLA. First,
the purpose of MERLA is to provide any injured party, not only the state, with a cause of
action to recover the costs incurred because of the liable party’s release of a hazardous
substance. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1(2) (permitting recovery of “all reasonable
and necessary removal costs incurred by any person” (emphasis added)); Musicland,
508 N.W.2d at 529 (explaining that MERLA “provides a cause of action for the recovery
of damages for personal injury and economic losses caused by the release of hazardous
chemicals into the environment”). Second, because the agencies investigated the report
and participated in developing the work plan for the environmental consultants to
investigate and remediate the damage to her property, the state’s involvement caused
9 Hogendorf to incur some of the specific removal costs she seeks to recover in this lawsuit.
We thus hold that the state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a hazardous
substance after a release under MERLA does not preclude a private cause of action under
MERLA or make one superfluous.
Next, we turn to appellants’ arguments based on the district court’s interpretation of
MERLA and its determinations that appellants are liable under it.
II. The district court correctly determined that, under MERLA’s definitions, a release of a hazardous substance occurred and Green was a responsible person.
Appellants challenge the district court’s determinations that appellants were liable
under the definitions in MERLA.
To succeed in recovering damages for a claim brought under MERLA, Hogendorf
needed to prove four elements: (1) appellants were responsible (2) for the release (3) of a
hazardous substance (4) from a facility. See Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1, .05, subd. 1.
MERLA defines the terms it uses in each of these elements. Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.02,
subd. 5 (“facility”), subd. 8 (“hazardous substance”), subd. 15 (“release”), .03
(“responsible person”). The district court determined that appellants owned and operated
the workshop and the pipe. The district court further determined that WGL’s employees
regularly rinsed pesticides containing 2,4-D and dicamba from the equipment and vehicles
at the workshop and that Green directed WGL’s employes to install the pipe in the location
where it discharged the resulting rinsate onto Hogendorf’s property. Thus, the district court
determined that appellants were responsible for the release of hazardous substances from
their facility onto Hogendorf’s property.
10 Appellants challenge the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on
each element except the finding and conclusion that appellants’ workshop on Green’s
property and the pipe from it discharging rinsate onto an area of Hogendorf’s property is a
“facility” within the meaning of MERLA. We first consider whether there was a “release”
of a “hazardous substance,” and then we consider whether Green was a “responsible
person.”
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellants’ discharge of pesticide rinsate was a “release” of a “hazardous substance” under MERLA and did not fall within the agricultural exception.
To address appellants’ argument that Hogendorf failed to prove that the discharge
onto her property was a “release” of a “hazardous substance,” we must interpret MERLA.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624.
MERLA defines “release” to mean “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment which occurred at a point in time or which continues to occur.” Minn.
Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(a). This definition includes a number of exceptions. The parties
ask us to interpret clause (b)(4) (the agricultural exception), which excepts “any release
resulting from the application of fertilizer or agricultural or silvicultural chemicals, or
disposal of emptied pesticide containers or residues from a pesticide as defined in section
18B.01, subdivision 18.” Id., subd. 15(b)(4). Chapter 18B relates to pesticide control and
includes a definition of “pesticide”: “a substance or mixture of substances intended to
11 prevent, destroy, repel, or mitigate a pest, and a substance or mixture of substances
intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant.” Minn. Stat. § 18B.01,
subd. 18 (2024).
The parties do not dispute the district court’s findings that the pipe from appellants’
workshop discharged rinsate created by the rinsing of pesticides from appellants’
equipment and vehicles and that the pesticide rinsate contained substances that are defined
as “hazardous substances” under MERLA. 2
Instead, appellants contend that pesticide rinsate from their landscaping equipment
and vehicles falls within the agricultural exception to MERLA’s definition of a “release,”
which exempts the “disposal of emptied pesticide containers or residues from a pesticide.”
Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4). Relying on a definition in chapter 18B, appellants
assert that rinsate is created from the disposal of residues of pesticide within the agricultural
exception, id., because “rinsate” is “a dilute mixture of a pesticide or pesticides with water,
solvents, oils, commercial rinsing agents, or other substances, that is produced by or results
from the cleaning of pesticide application equipment or pesticide containers,” Minn. Stat.
§ 18B.01, subd. 25. Hogendorf argues that appellants’ contention equates “rinsate” from
one chapter of the Minnesota Statutes with “residue” from another, which is contrary to
2 MERLA incorporates as hazardous substances the hazards and pollutants identified by the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2018), and the chemicals identified by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (2018). Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 8. Minnesota Statutes section 115B.02, subdivision 8, refers to the FWPCA, much of which, including section 1321, has been recodified as part of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Dicamba and 2,4-D, which are chemicals found in common pesticides, are included in the list of hazardous substances identified by the CWA and incorporated into MERLA. 40 C.F.R. § 116 (2025).
12 the terms’ distinct meanings and statutory contexts. She also argues that the disposal of
pesticide “residue” within the agricultural exception cannot be so broadly interpreted as to
include appellants’ discharge of pesticide rinsate from cleaning their equipment and
vehicles.
“The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the Legislature,” and if the statute is unambiguous, appellate courts “interpret it
according to the plain meaning of its text.” Pfoser v. Harpstead, 939 N.W.2d 298, 310
(Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 953 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 2021). When a term
is defined in a statute, appellate courts apply the definition provided by the legislature, and
if there is no statutory definition, courts may consider dictionary definitions to determine
the word’s plain meaning. Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279,
286 (Minn. 2016). The interpretation of a statute cannot be “inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08
(2024). Therefore, the “specific meaning of a word depends on how it is being used in
context.” Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts consider a statute to be ambiguous “only if, as applied to the facts
of the particular case, [the words of the statute are] susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” State v. Moore, 10 N.W.3d 676, 680 (Minn. 2024). When a statute is
ambiguous, courts turn to the canons of construction to determine the meaning of the
13 statute. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017). To determine the
legislative intent, courts may consider, among other things, the following:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024); see Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn.
2013) (stating that, if a statute is ambiguous, we “may consider the factors set forth by the
[l]egislature for interpreting a statute.” (quotation omitted)). Additionally, when
interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts presume that the legislature did not intend “a
result that is absurd,” but intended for “the entire statute to be effective” and “to favor the
public interest as against any private interest.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2024). An appellate
court need not fully define an ambiguous term to resolve an appeal. See Moore, 10 N.W.3d
at 681.
Returning to the parties’ arguments, we observe that their disagreement on the
meaning of “residue” as used in the agricultural exception focuses on the origin or quantity
of pesticide contemplated by the term. Appellants’ argument imports limitations from
another chapter of the Minnesota Statutes to assert that any pesticide rinsate that results
from the cleaning of pesticide application equipment or pesticide containers falls within
the agricultural exception as the disposal of pesticide residue; Hogendorf argues that
appellants’ limitation cannot be correct because it does not come from the language or
context of MERLA and that the agricultural exception for disposal of pesticide residue is
14 for a de minimis amount of pesticides and not as broad as the definition of rinsate. The
parties’ arguments in their primary briefs implicitly agree that some limitation on the term
“residues” is necessary for a reasonable interpretation of the agricultural exception. The
term “residues” is not defined in MERLA; we therefore look to dictionary definitions to
determine its plain meaning. See Wayzata Nissan, LLC, 875 N.W.2d at 286.
Dictionary definitions of the term “residue” are nearly uniform: it is “[t]he
remainder of something after removal of parts or a part.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1494 (5th ed. 2018); accord Black’s Law Dictionary
1569 (12th ed. 2024); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1060 (11th ed. 2003).
This is a broad definition that, alone, does not provide a limitation on the origin or quantity
of pesticide contemplated by the word “residues.” It could reasonably accommodate the
limitations appellants offer from the definition of rinsate; but it could also reasonably
accommodate stricter limitations that exclude rinsate, as Hogendorf urges. Because the
text of the agricultural exception does not clearly limit the term “residues” with respect to
origin or quantity of pesticide, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation
and thus is ambiguous.
Because the statute is ambiguous, we consider canons of construction and other
tools to identify the legislative intent of the agricultural exception. When construing
statutory language, we ascertain legislative intent by considering, among other things, the
legislative history of the act under consideration, the subject matter as a whole, the purpose
of the legislation, and the objects intended to be secured thereby.” Staab v. Diocese of St.
Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
15 By reviewing the legislative history and purpose of MERLA as a whole, we can
determine the legislature’s intent with respect to the term “residues.”
Recall that MERLA was enacted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1983 for three
reasons: “(1) to impose strict liability on those responsible for harm caused by the release
of hazardous substances; (2) to allow the state to clean up contamination and collect costs
later; and (3) to fund state cleanup activity.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 529. MERLA was
passed subsequent to other similar legislation Minnesota adopted in the 1970s.
In 1974, the legislature enacted a law directing the MPCA to develop a
comprehensive regulatory system for the storage, transport, treatment, and disposal of
hazardous waste. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 346, at 582 (codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 116.01-.45
(1982)). Then, in 1978, the legislature established the Joint Legislative Committee on
Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 728, at 800, which led to the enactment
of the Waste Management Act of 1980, 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 564, at 786. But neither of
these developments addressed or resolved the issue of legal responsibility for harm caused
by the disposal of hazardous substances that would become the central focus of MERLA.
See id.; 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 728, at 800.
Throughout the two and a half years that the legislature considered the bill that
would become MERLA, the liability sections were consistently debated, and these debates
highlight themes that the legislature considered while crafting MERLA.
The legislature focused on holding responsible the user of the hazardous substance
by preventing the user from avoiding liability for harm resulting from the disposal of the
hazardous substance. Proposed amendments to MERLA that would have allowed people
16 using hazardous substances to limit or avoid liability by arguing that their conduct was
reasonable were defeated. State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 72nd Sess. 4713-14,
4731-32 (Mar. 10, 1982). Even a proposal to lower the standard from strict liability for
certain classes of users, including farmers and small business owners, was defeated. State
of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 73rd Sess. 1758, 1760-61 (Apr. 26, 1983).
The drafters of MERLA were motivated to make recovery for plaintiffs easier.
When determining how an injured party would prove causation under MERLA, the
legislature rejected a requirement that the injured party establish a certain amount and
duration of exposure to prove causation, instead adopting an amendment that required a
plaintiff to show that they were “exposed to the hazardous substance” and that, “under all
the circumstances, the release could reasonably have resulted in plaintiff’s exposure to the
substance in the amount and duration experienced by plaintiff.” State of Minnesota,
Journal of the Senate, 73rd Sess. 266 (Feb. 28, 1983). We see no indication that a minimal
exposure requirement was adopted.
Given the legislature’s reason for enacting MERLA and the themes that are evident
in its debates while drafting MERLA, we determine that the interpretation of “residues”
put forth by Hogendorf is more consistent with the legislative intent. Interpreting
“residues” to exclude rinsate is consistent with the legislature’s concerns at the time of
MERLA’s passage about pollution stemming from the improper disposal of hazardous
substances and its desires to increase access to recovery for plaintiffs by not imposing
quantity requirements for their claims under MERLA. In addition, appellants’
interpretation of “residue” is at odds with MERLA’s objective of imposing liability on the
17 party responsible for contaminating the environment. Under their interpretation, rinsate,
which they suggest is the mixture of pesticide residue with water or another liquid, can be
dumped into the environment at any volume without liability. This would contravene the
objectives and themes illustrated by MERLA’s legislative history.
Based on our statutory interpretation, we hold that the term “residue” as it appears
in the definition of “release” under Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4), does not include
rinsate as defined by Minn. Stat. § 18B.01, subd. 25. Because pesticide rinsate from
cleaning equipment or vehicles is not within the agricultural exception to a release, the
exception does not apply to appellants’ discharge onto Hogendorf’s property, and we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellants’
discharge of pesticide rinsate was a “release” of a “hazardous substance” as defined by
MERLA. 3
B. The district court did not err by finding that Green is a “responsible person” under MERLA.
Green challenges the district court’s determination that he is a “responsible person”
as defined by MERLA in Minn. Stat. § 115B.03.
3 Appellants’ challenge to the “hazardous substance” element for liability under MERLA depended on the exemption of the pesticide chemicals 2,4-D and dicamba under the agricultural exception. Accordingly, we need not reach their arguments with respect to other substances found on Hogendorf’s property.
18 “We review a district court’s application of the law de novo.” Harlow, 883 N.W.2d
at 568. MERLA states that a person is a “responsible person” if they owned or operated
the facility
(i) when the hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, was placed or came to be located in or on the facility; (ii) when the hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, was located in or on the facility but before the release; or (iii) during the time of the release or threatened release.
Minn. Stat. § 115B.03, subd. 1(1).
Green argues that the district court erred by determining that he was a responsible
person under MERLA because it improperly considered him and WGL as a single entity
when reaching this conclusion. He also argues that the district court did not consider the
provision of MERLA that establishes when a property owner may be liable and that, as a
property owner, he bears no liability under MERLA. Hogendorf argues that the record
supports a determination that Green was involved in the release of hazardous substances,
that he was the sole owner of WGL, and that, regardless of whether he is considered a
facility owner or property owner for purposes of the MERLA analysis, he is liable under
MERLA as a responsible person.
“The question of whether [a person] is an ‘owner or operator’ under MERLA hinges
on whether [the person] was in a position of control over the treatment of the hazardous
substances at the time of their release.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 533. A person “could
be found to be an ‘owner or operator’ of the facility from which the hazardous substances
were released if [they] exerted an ample degree of control over the facility.” Id.
19 Green satisfies MERLA’s definition of a responsible person as an “owner or
operator” of the facility. Green exercised ample control over the workshop and pipe at the
time the substances were released. The district court found, and appellants do not
challenge, that “Green admitted being responsible for ordering the installation of the pipe”
and that, at Green’s direction, WGL’s general foreman oversaw the installation of the pipe,
including its placement out to the property line, which ended up extending several feet onto
Hogendorf’s property. Because we conclude that these undisputed facts adequately
establish that Green “was in a position of control over the treatment of the hazardous
substances at the time of their release,” id., the district court did not err by determining that
Green is a responsible person under MERLA as the “owner or operator” of the facility.
Accordingly, we need not reach whether Green is also a responsible person as the owner
of real property.
In conclusion, the district court did not err in finding appellants liable under
MERLA. To succeed on a claim brought under MERLA, Hogendorf needed to prove that
(1) appellants were responsible (2) for the release (3) of a hazardous substance (4) from a
facility. See Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1, .05, subd. 1. Appellants did not challenge
the district court’s finding that the workshop and pipe are a “facility.” As to the first
element, the evidence in the record supports the district court’s determination that Green
was a responsible person as the operator of the facility. As to the second and third elements,
interpreting MERLA reveals that the district court correctly determined that the agricultural
exception to the definition of “release” that applies to pesticide “residue” does not include
pesticide “rinsate” and, therefore, that there was a release of hazardous substances.
20 Because we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that appellants were
liable under MERLA, we now consider appellants’ arguments about the district court’s
damages award to Hogendorf.
III. The district court did not err in awarding damages based on its determinations that Hogendorf’s environmental-consultant costs were “reasonable and necessary” and that diminution-of-value damages are permitted by MERLA.
Appellants argue in the alternative that, even if the district court correctly concluded
that they were liable under MERLA, the district court erred in its calculation of damages.
MERLA authorizes the recovery of damages under sections 115B.04 and 115B.05. Under
section 115B.04, subdivision 1(2), a party may recover damages for costs associated with
removing the contamination, so long as the costs are “reasonable and necessary.” Under
section 115B.05, subdivision 1(1), a party may recover “all damages for actual economic
loss” to real property. The district court awarded Hogendorf damages under each section,
and appellants challenge both awards. We address each in turn.
A. The district court did not err by awarding damages under section 115B.04, subdivision 1, after finding that the costs Hogendorf incurred for Landmark’s work were reasonable and necessary removal costs.
As to the damages awarded pursuant to section 115B.04, appellants argue that the
district court erred because the costs were not “reasonable and necessary removal costs”
recoverable under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1(2). Specifically, appellants challenge the
damages award allowing Hogendorf to recover costs for the work completed by
Landmark—her environmental consultant—asserting that Landmark’s work was merely
supervisory of removal work by other entities and thus was not reasonable and necessary.
21 Hogendorf responds that the district court did not err because it correctly determined that
Landmark’s work was not merely supervisory, based on the court’s specific findings that
Landmark’s work was necessary to hold Green’s environmental consultant, Pinnacle,
accountable.
First, we review the district court’s determination that Landmark’s work fell within
MERLA’s definition of removal. “We review a district court’s application of the law de
novo.” Harlow, 883 N.W.2d at 568. To the extent appellants challenge the district court’s
related findings of fact, we review those “for clear error, requiring that there be reasonable
evidence in the record to support” them. Rasmussen, 832 N.W.2d at 797.
MERLA defines “removal” as
(1) the cleanup or removal of a released hazardous substance, or a pollutant or contaminant, from the environment; . . . (3) actions necessary to monitor, test, analyze, and evaluate a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or contaminant; (4) disposal or processing of removed material; or (5) other actions necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threatened release.
Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 17(a). The district court received evidence that included
Landmark’s notes describing the work it performed on Hogendorf’s property. The notes
explain that Landmark acquired and analyzed soil and water samples, coordinated with the
state and county to conduct inspections, identified and investigated other signs of
contamination, proposed cleanup and management options, and reviewed and provided
input on work plans from the agencies and Pinnacle. The district court determined that
22 Landmark’s work fell within the scope of “removal” and that “Landmark’s involvement in
the investigation was necessary, reasonable, and justifiable,” reasoning that
Landmark safeguarded [Hogendorf] during the process by holding Pinnacle accountable; it provided thoughtful input and critiques throughout the process in a collaborative manner, which produced better results overall. This finding contemplates that Landmark’s duty is to its client, [Hogendorf], which necessarily colors some of its advice as biased in favor of its client; the same, however, can be said of Pinnacle. Moreover, the overall effect of these inherent biases was largely vitiated through agency oversight because the MDA and MPCA acted as arbiters or referees whenever a disagreement occurred with respect to Pinnacle and Landmark. Thus, the Court has high confidence in the fact that this adversarial process produced a prudent, fair, and equitable result that simply would not have occurred without Landmark’s participation.
The district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and the facts found are
consistent with the plain language of MERLA’s definition of “removal.” Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Landmark’s work was
removal as defined in MERLA.
We next consider whether the removal costs were reasonable and necessary. The
phrase “reasonable and necessary” is not defined in MERLA, but caselaw is instructive. In
Musicland, this court interpreted the phrase broadly and reasoned that the costs of an
environmental consultant were reasonable and necessary because its work furthered the
investigation, supported cleanup of the contamination, and did not duplicate other work
being done. 508 N.W.2d at 533. In that case, we affirmed the damages award for costs
resulting from the environmental consultant’s work because the work would “prevent the
contamination from further adversely affecting the environment.” Id.
23 Our review of the caselaw persuades us to hold that whether damages awarded under
Minn. Stat. § 115B.04 are “reasonable and necessary” is a fact determination. Because it
is a fact determination, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
require that reasonable evidence in the record supports the findings. See Rasmussen,
832 N.W.2d at 797. We further hold that it is not clear error for a district court to find that
the work of two or more environmental consultants was reasonable and necessary under
MERLA, so long as the record supports the finding.
Applying that standard of review, we are satisfied that the district court did not
clearly err when it found that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work being
done and was not supervisory, and therefore it did not err when it determined that
Landmark’s work was reasonable and necessary under MERLA.
The district court’s finding that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work
is supported by the record. Landmark’s environmental consultant testified at trial about
the scope of Landmark’s work on this project. In addition to the initial testing and
investigation that Landmark completed for Hogendorf after she discovered the discharge
pipe on her property, Landmark communicated with the MDA and the MPCA to request
that the agencies open an investigation of Hogendorf’s property. Landmark also assisted
with the development of the work plan to remove the contamination from Hogendorf’s
property. During one review of the proposed plan, Landmark identified that no monitoring
well had been installed near Hogendorf’s drinking water well, and Landmark suggested
this modification to the MDA. The MDA then required Pinnacle to install a monitoring
well closer to Hogendorf’s drinking water well to conduct more accurate testing and
24 monitoring of possible contamination. In another instance, Landmark disagreed with
Pinnacle’s conclusion that Hogendorf’s deep groundwater 4 was not affected by the
contamination because of what Pinnacle called a confining layer of silty sand and clay.
The MDA did not originally agree with Landmark, and Landmark performed its own
testing of the deep groundwater, consistent with the MPCA’s recommendation, and
discovered that the deep groundwater was contaminated by the hazardous substances. In
response to Landmark’s findings, the MDA required Pinnacle to investigate the deep
groundwater and modify the work plan to address this contamination. An MDA employee
also testified that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work being done by
Pinnacle or the agencies. All of these actions are consistent with this court’s reasoning in
Musicland that, if an environmental consultant’s work is not duplicative of other work,
furthers the investigation, and supports cleanup of the contamination, then it is a reasonable
and necessary expense under MERLA. 508 N.W.2d at 533.
The district court’s finding that Landmark did not serve in a supervisory role is also
supported by the record. There were multiple instances in which the agencies disagreed
with or did not adopt Landmark’s recommendations. For example, Landmark
recommended that the agencies conduct further investigation of Green’s property due to
possible contamination consistent with Hogendorf’s, but the MDA chose to remain focused
4 About ten feet below the surface of Hogendorf’s property sits a silty sand and clay layer of earth that stretches from ten feet to about 36 feet below the surface, below which is another layer of groundwater. This second layer of groundwater is referred to as the “deep groundwater.” The presence of contaminants in the deep groundwater increases the potential future risk to Hogendorf’s drinking water because it demonstrates the migration of the contaminants further into the property.
25 on Hogendorf’s property. Landmark also recommended that the MDA conduct deep
groundwater testing or direct Pinnacle to do so, but the MDA disagreed and Landmark
conducted the testing itself. An MDA employee who testified also expressed frustrations
with Pinnacle’s work during the project and explained his role to push back against
Pinnacle and ensure that agency requirements were being met. These examples support
the district court’s finding that the agencies supervised the work, not Landmark.
Appellants urge us to follow Kennedy Building Associates v. CBS Corp., a federal
district court decision that limited the recovery of an environmental consultant’s fees for a
MERLA claim. 5 No. 99-CV-1833, 2010 WL 3024714, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2010)
(determining that the costs “incurred to implement the remedy set forth in” the
corrective-action plan were recoverable, but the costs incurred due to “an unhappy
landowner’s unilateral effort to ‘supervise’ the cleanup beyond what [was] required” by
the state were not covered by MERLA). But CBS Corp. is distinguishable, and thus not
persuasive, because the consultant went beyond the corrective-action plan to which the
MPCA agreed, the liable party had already begun enacting the plan, and the environmental
consultant’s continued testing revealed no further contamination for the MPCA to address.
Id. at *3.
5 “Federal caselaw does not bind Minnesota courts,” but when federal courts have addressed similar issues and facts, they may be persuasive. Hinckley Square Assocs. v. Cervene, 871 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 2015); see also Hatch, 644 N.W.2d at 830 (stating that federal caselaw interpreting MERLA is persuasive but not binding on this court).
26 The district court did not clearly err by determining that Landmark’s work was
consistent with MERLA’s definition of “removal” and that Landmark’s costs were
reasonable and necessary because the record supports the district court’s findings.
Therefore, the district court did not err in awarding Hogendorf damages to recover costs
for Landmark’s work under section 115B.04, subdivision 1(2).
B. The district court did not err in awarding diminution-of-value damages under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1, or by relying on Hogendorf’s expert and his appraisal.
In addition to the damages under section 115B.04, the district court awarded
Hogendorf damages under section 115B.05, subdivision 1, which allows an individual to
recover “all damages for actual economic loss” after the release of a hazardous substance.
Specifically, an individual may recover damages for “(i) any injury to, destruction of, or
loss of any real or personal property . . . ; (ii) any loss of use of real or personal property;
[and] (iii) any loss of past or future income or profits resulting from injury to, destruction
of, or loss of real or personal property.” Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1(1). To calculate
Hogendorf’s damages under this section, the district court determined the diminished value
of Hogendorf’s property because of the contamination caused by appellants’ release of
hazardous substances. And the district court calculated the diminished value by relying on
Hogendorf’s expert. Appellants argue that both decisions were erroneous.
1. The district court did not err by calculating damages under section 115B.05, subdivision 1, using diminution of value.
Appellants argue that MERLA does not contemplate diminution-of-value damages
because they are speculative, conjectural, and remote, and therefore, they cannot be
27 considered “actual economic loss” under the statute. They also argue that, because
Hogendorf does not intend to sell her property, there is no loss. Hogendorf argues that
diminution of value is the standard process used to measure property damages and may be
awarded regardless of a person’s intent to sell their property.
Appellants’ argument requires us to interpret MERLA. Because we provide the
rules for statutory interpretation in section I above, we do not repeat them here. This
section of MERLA allows recovery for “actual economic loss,” Minn. Stat. § 115B.05,
subd. 1(1), but MERLA does not define this phrase. Turning to dictionary definitions to
determine a term’s plain meaning, see Wayzata Nissan, LLC, 875 N.W.2d at 286, we
determine that the definitions provided in Black’s Law Dictionary convey the plain
meaning of the phrase. “Actual” means “existing in fact; real.” Black’s, supra, at 44.
“Actual loss” means “[a] loss resulting from the real and substantial destruction of insured
property.” Id. at 1129. “Loss” means “the disappearance or diminution of value,” and the
entry explains that, “[w]hen the loss is a decrease in value, the usual method of calculating
the loss is to ascertain the amount by which a thing’s original cost exceeds its later selling
price.” Id. “Economic loss” refers to “a type of damages recoverable in a lawsuit.” Id. at
647.
We determine that the phrase “actual economic loss” is not ambiguous under
MERLA and that each word is necessary—none is superfluous. 6 By synthesizing the
6 During oral argument, counsel argued that not all words in this phrase are necessary and that one or more are superfluous. We note that this is contrary to our caselaw directing how we interpret statutes, and therefore, we reject this assertion. See Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t
28 definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, we conclude that “actual economic loss” means
the monetary damages that may be recovered from the real and substantial destruction or
diminution of value of property. Diminution-of-value damages are consistent with the
plain meaning of “actual economic loss” because they account for the loss in value of the
property by considering the original value of the property and its later prospective selling
price.
This determination is supported by caselaw. First, diminution of value is the most
common way to measure damages for injury to real property or the interference with a
property right. See Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 422 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Minn. App. 1988)
(“[T]he measure of damages for tortious injury to property is the diminution in value
resulting from the wrongful act and damages proximately flowing from the tort.”); see also
Beer v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 400 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. 1987) (explaining that the
interference with a property right is “measured by the diminution in the market value of
the property,” which “is the difference between the market value of the property before and
after” the interference with the right (quotation omitted)).
Because diminution-of-value damages are the common remedy for tortious injury
to property, awarding these damages is consistent with the supreme court’s explanation
that MERLA updated “the old statutory and common law liabilities” and did not change
the liability or the remedies available. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 183. In
of Corrs., 8 N.W.3d 224, 233 (Minn. 2024) (“[U]nder the canon against surplusage, we avoid statutory interpretations that make words or phrases superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).
29 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, insurance companies argued that their insurance
policies should not be interpreted to require them to pay for cleanup of the contaminated
property owned by the liable party (the insured) under MERLA. Id. at 178. The supreme
court explained that damages of this nature are not new and therefore should have been
contemplated by the insurance companies when drafting their policies, even before the
passage of MERLA, because they have been consistently recognized under common law:
“Under the common law, damages [to real property] are typically limited to the diminution
in the value of the damaged property if the cost of restoring the property to its original
condition would exceed that value.” Id. at 183. In its opinion, the supreme court identified
the two types of damages that are recognized under common law for injuries to real
property: diminution-of-value damages and damages equal to the cost of restoring the
property to its original condition. Id. The supreme court’s statement in Minnesota Mining
& Manufacturing explained that, under the common law, the liable party would pay the
lower of the two values. Id. However, the plain language of MERLA demonstrates that it
removed the alternative offered by the common law and provided that an injured party may
recover both types of damages: cleanup costs, under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1, and
diminution-of-value damages, under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1.
Because diminution-of-value damages are consistent with the plain meaning of
“actual economic loss” and have long been recognized under common law as a way to
calculate damages for injuries to real property, we hold that a party may be awarded
damages for the diminution of their property’s value under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05,
subd. 1(1).
30 2. The district court did not err by considering the stigma of contamination and relying on Hogendorf’s expert and appraisal.
Appellants argue that the district court’s findings of fact in support of its damages
award were clearly erroneous because it relied on Hogendorf’s expert and the expert’s
appraisal. As to the expert, appellants argue that the district court should not have
determined that their expert was less credible than Hogendorf’s because Hogendorf’s
expert considered the stigma of contamination, among other things. 7 As to the damages
awarded, appellants argue that the district court improperly considered the stigma of
contamination when evaluating the property’s value because the property had been cleaned
up and therefore the award of diminution of value was a double recovery. Hogendorf
contends that the district court’s determination that her expert was more credible is
supported by the record because appellants’ expert acted as an advocate rather than a
neutral and her expert acted consistently with expert standards; she further contends that
the diminution-of-value damages were not double recovery.
Appellate courts defer to the fact-finder’s determination of the weight and
credibility of expert-witness opinions. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432,
440 (Minn. 1971). Because we defer to those determinations as to each expert, we do not
conclude that the district court erred in relying on Hogendorf’s expert and appraisal.
7 Appellants also make a general assertion that Hogendorf’s expert lacked foundational reliability, but they do not provide any legal authority to support this assertion, and therefore, it is forfeited. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (explaining that arguments made without supporting authority need not be considered), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). Because the argument is forfeited, we do not address it.
31 Turning to the appraisal’s use of stigma to calculate the diminished value of
Hogendorf’s property, we determine that the district court did not err by considering
stigma. The supreme court has considered damages related to a condemned property and
explained stigma and the difference between clean, remediated, and contaminated
property:
Clean property is property that has never been contaminated. Remediated property is property that was contaminated but went through a remediation process to remove the contamination. Though the contamination is removed, the stigma of the former contamination may remain. . . . Even if the contamination is cleaned up and a property is believed to have been fully remediated, fear of discovering further contamination and the accompanying liability may reduce the property’s value. The effect of stigma demonstrates how remediated property, which is no longer contaminated, is different from property that has never been contaminated.
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 883 (Minn. 2010). In an earlier
opinion, the supreme court explained that stigma due to past contamination presents “the
perception of risk of liability, or government imposed restrictions on the use or
transferability of the property, among other concerns.” Dealers Mfg., Co. v. County of
Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. 2000). Although neither of these opinions involved
MERLA, they demonstrate that, in caselaw, stigma is a consideration for appraisers to use
and district courts to rely on when determining property value. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court did not err by considering the impact of stigma on Hogendorf’s
property when determining the diminution of value to award damages under
section 115B.05, subdivision 1.
32 As for whether the district court’s award of both diminution-of-value damages and
removal damages constitutes double recovery, the law and record demonstrate that it was
not. First, MERLA allows the injured party to receive both damages awards. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1(2) (removal costs), .05, subd. 1(1) (actual economic loss). And
second, a federal district court opinion that appellants urge us to follow demonstrates that
the district court’s damages award here is consistent with the statute. In Gopher Oil Co. v.
Union Oil Co. of California, the federal district court considered the issue of double
recovery under MERLA after the injured party requested that it keep the property and
recover damages equal to the cleanup costs and the entire purchase price of the property.
757 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D. Minn. 1990). The court explained that granting all of these
requests would be double recovery or the equivalent of punitive damages, which were not
contemplated by MERLA. Id. The injured party kept the property and recovered its
cleanup costs and the portion of its purchase price that exceeded the actual value of the
contaminated property, but not the entire purchase price. Id. The district court’s order here
is consistent with the outcome of Gopher Oil Co.: the district court awarded damages for
cleanup costs and diminution of value, but from the latter, it subtracted the costs already
expended on the cleanup that would not be transferred to a future owner of the property,
and therefore not borne by Hogendorf in the future sale of her property, preventing
Hogendorf from receiving double recovery.
Because caselaw demonstrates that consideration of stigma is permitted and relevant
when determining a property’s value after contamination and the statute and record
33 demonstrate that the district court did not grant Hogendorf double recovery, the district
court did not err in its damages award issued under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1.
DECISION
The state’s involvement in investigation or cleanup of a hazardous substance after
a release does not preclude the affected property owner from bringing a MERLA claim.
And the term “residue,” as it appears in the definition of “release” under MERLA, Minn.
Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4), does not include “rinsate” as defined in the
pesticide-control chapter, Minn. Stat. § 18B.01, subd. 25. The district court did not err in
determining that Green and WGL had ample control over the release of hazardous
substances onto Hogendorf’s property from their facility by directing rinsate created by the
rinsing of pesticides from equipment and vehicles in their workshop to drain onto
Hogendorf’s property. Therefore, the district court did not err by determining that a release
of hazardous substances occurred and that Green and WGL were responsible persons under
MERLA. Because Hogendorf proved all the elements of a MERLA claim, the district
court’s determination that appellants were liable under MERLA was not erroneous. The
district court did not clearly err in finding that Landmark’s work fell under MERLA’s
definition of “removal” and that its work was “reasonable and necessary,” and therefore,
the district court correctly awarded damages under section 115B.04, subdivision 1.
Additionally, because we determine that MERLA allows for diminution-of-value damages
under section 115B.05, subdivision 1, the district court did not clearly err by awarding
Hogendorf these damages in addition to the damages awarded under section 115B.04,
subdivision 1, or by considering the impact of stigma when awarding damages under
34 section 115B.05, subdivision 1. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order for
judgment in its entirety.
Affirmed.