Renee Coleman v. Department of Transportation

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedNovember 3, 2023
DocketDC-0752-17-0103-I-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Renee Coleman v. Department of Transportation (Renee Coleman v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Renee Coleman v. Department of Transportation, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RENEE COLEMAN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-17-0103-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DATE: November 3, 2023 TRANSPORTATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Renee Coleman , Takoma Park, Maryland, pro se.

Eugenia Jackson , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the agency’s removal action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge exhibited bias and that the agency violated her privacy. The appellant also generally asserts that her conduct did not warrant removal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

at 1-14, Tab 8 at 1-17. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 We find the appellant’s allegations of bias to be without merit. The Board has consistently held that, in making a claim of bias against an administrative judge, the appellant must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies all administrative adjudicators. Washington v. Department of the Interior, 81 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 7 (1999) (citing In re King, 1 M.S.P.R. 146, 151 (1979)). This presumption can be overcome only by a substantial showing of personal bias. Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 12 (2000). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if the administrative judge’s comments or actions indicate a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. Simpkins v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 411, ¶ 5 (2010). The record is devoid of any such bias. ¶3 The appellant also alleges that the agency violated her privacy by relying on a statement she made to an equal employment opportunity (EEO) specialist professing a desire to kill her supervisor and by referencing a Federal Protective 3

Service (FPS) report summarizing her conduct; however, both contentions are without merit. PFR File, Tab 5 at 4 -5, 11-12. Board proceedings are public in nature, and there is nothing inherently improper about the agency’s submission of, or reliance on, an FPS report. See Ortiz v. Department of Justice, 103 M.S.P.R. 621, ¶ 14 (2006) (explaining that the Board is a public body and the public has a right to be informed of the Board’s decisions); see also Kirkland-Zuck v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 90 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 6 (2001) (referencing an FPS citation in reasoning that the appellant’s removal was appropriate), aff’d, 48 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To the extent the appellant alleges that her statement to the EEO specialist was privileged, we find her contention unavailing. See Berkner v. Department of Commerce, 116 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶¶ 13, 15 (2011). Although the Board has noted that EEO counseling sessions are a context wherein it may be appropriate to afford employees more leeway, Daigle v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 84 M.S.P.R. 625, ¶ 6 (1999), we see no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings in light of the serious nature and gravity of the appellant’s statement, which registered such concern with the appellant’s EEO counselor that she immediately left her meeting with the appellant to report the incident. See Berkner, 116 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 13. ¶4 On review, the appellant also generally alleges that removal constituted an excessive penalty. 2 PFR File, Tab 8 at 16-17. When the agency’s charges are sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the relevant factors and exercised discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Stuhlmacher v. U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20 (2001). Here, the appellant’s general contention that a

2 Presumably to bolster her assertions as to the impropriety of the penalty imposed, the appellant provides numerous documents with her petition for review. PFR File, Tab 5 at 15-211, Tab 8 at 18-114. However, the appellant has not shown that these additional documents were unavailable prior to close of the record. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). 4

lesser penalty would have been more appropriate does not warrant disruption of the administrative judge’s reasoned findings. See id. Thus, the appellant’s contention in this regard is without merit.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general .

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Kirkland-Zuck v. Department of Housing & Urban Development
48 F. App'x 749 (Federal Circuit, 2002)

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Renee Coleman v. Department of Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/renee-coleman-v-department-of-transportation-mspb-2023.