Rene Z. Mendez v. Andrew Saul

District Court, C.D. California·Decided March 24, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00694·Unknown

Opinion

RENE Z. M., ) No. CV 20-694 AGR ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Plaintiff1 filed this action on January 23, 2020. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation that addressed the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under submission without oral argument.2 Having reviewed the entire file, the court reverses the decision of the Commissioner and remands for reconsideration as set forth below. 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the I. Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on February 9, 2016, and alleged an onset date of February 6, 2015. Administrative Record (“AR”) 24. The application was denied initially. AR 24, 87. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On April 12, 2018, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. AR 45-75. Plaintiff amended the onset date to November 6, 2016. AR 24. On August 8, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. AR 21-33. On November 25, 2019, the Appeals Council denied review. AR 1-6. This action followed. II. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). “Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance – it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523. In determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523. A. Disability A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). B. The ALJ’s Findings The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2020. AR 26. Following the five-step sequential analysis applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),3 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; and history of bilateral rotator cuff tears status post bilateral arthroscopic surgeries. AR 26. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work except that he could frequently perform all postural activities and frequently reach overhead with the bilateral upper extremities. AR 27. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as screen printer. AR 32. C. Residual Functional Capacity The residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic work activities. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 3 The five-step sequential analysis examines whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, whether the claimant’s impairment is severe, whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work, and whether the claimant is able to do any other work. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114. (1986). The RFC is a determination of “‘the most [the claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.’” Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The RFC assessment must be supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). As discussed above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform light work except that he could frequently perform all postural activities and frequently reach overhead with the bilateral upper extremities. AR 27. The ALJ gave weight to the medical source opinions in the record. The ALJ gave substantial weight to the opinion of the state agency physician, who issued an opinion on July 1, 2016 based on a review of medical records through June 2016. AR 31, 76- 86. The state agency physician opined that Plaintiff was capable of light work except that he could frequently reach overhead with the bilateral upper extremities, and opined that Plaintiff did not have any manipulative limitations. AR 80-84. The ALJ gave partial weight to the opinion of Dr. Wallack, who performed a consultative internal medicine examination on June 9, 2016. AR 31, 694-99. On physical examination, Plaintiff had no tenderness to palpation in the midline or paraspinal areas of the back, no muscle spasm and normal range of motion. AR 696. Plaintiff had normal range of motion of the bilateral shoulders, elbows, and wrists. Plaintiff had slightly reduced motor strength (4.5/5) and some reduced grip strength in the right hand. He had a normal gait. AR 697-98. Dr. Wallack opined that Plaintiff had a temporary restriction in lifting/carrying 10 pounds with his right arm due to recent surgery, but no permanent restriction. Dr. Wallack did not assess any postural or manipulative limitations. AR 698. The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Kim’s report on August 21, 2015 because it predated the amended onset date by more than one year. AR 31-32, 709-29. Dr. Kim recommended that Plaintiff avoid lifting more than 40 pounds, limit bending or stooping to 30% of the day, and avoid repetitive forceful gripping or grasping. AR 721-22. An ALJ may reasonably rely on examining physicians’ opinions, which constitute substantial evidence when as here they are based on independent clinical findings. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). The non-examining physician’s opinion may serve as substantial evidence when it is supported by other evidence in the record and is consistent with it. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not relying on medical records that

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Related

Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Barnhart v. Thomas
540 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Orn v. Astrue
495 F.3d 625 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Vasquez v. Astrue
572 F.3d 586 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Karen Lambert v. Andrew Saul
980 F.3d 1266 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Moncada v. Chater
60 F.3d 521 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
Drouin v. Sullivan
966 F.2d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)