Rene Dario Rodriguez-Castillo Lourdes Blanca Nieves Rodriguez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

122 F.3d 1073, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29525
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 4, 1997
Docket96-71075
StatusUnpublished

This text of 122 F.3d 1073 (Rene Dario Rodriguez-Castillo Lourdes Blanca Nieves Rodriguez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rene Dario Rodriguez-Castillo Lourdes Blanca Nieves Rodriguez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 122 F.3d 1073, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29525 (9th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

122 F.3d 1073

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Rene Dario RODRIGUEZ-CASTILLO; Lourdes Blanca Nieves
Rodriguez, Petitioners,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

Nos. 96-71075, Agl-zyc-wvl, Azd-zvd-bjz.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 25, 1997.**
Decided Sept. 4, 1997.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Before: SCHROEDER, FERNANDEZ, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

Rene Dario Rodriguez-Castillo ("Rene") and his daughter, Lourdes Blanca Nieves Rodriguez ("Lourdes"), natives and citizens of Peru, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") dismissal of their appeal from the immigration judge's ("IJ") order denying their applications for asylum and withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and we deny the petition for review.

Rene contends that substantial evidence does not support the BIA's determination that he failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of imputed political opinion or his former membership in a particular social group, the Peruvian Air Force. We disagree.

To the extent that the BIA clearly incorporated the IJ's decision as its own, "we treat the IJ's statement of reasons as the BIA's and review the IJ's decision." Alaelua v. INS, 45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1995). We review the denial of asylum for abuse of discretion, and review the factual findings regarding an applicant's eligibility for asylum under the substantial evidence standard. See Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.1993). We will not reverse the BIA's decision unless the evidence "presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).

To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that he has suffered past persecution or has well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Persecution is regarded as "an extreme concept," see Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.1995), which is broader "than threats to 'life or freedom,' " see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n. 22 (1984). To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show by "credible, direct, and specific evidence," facts which support an objectively reasonable fear. See Acewicz, 984 F.2d at 1061 (citation omitted). A showing of past persecution can give rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1997); Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 378 (9th Cir.1995).

While "the military is not a social group qualifying its servicemen or former servicemen for asylum eligibility," Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir.1991), "reprisals against former military officers can provide a basis for granting asylum" if the applicant provides objectively reasonable "evidence that he is likely to be singled out for rebel attacks," Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir.1996); Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir.1990).

Rene testified that he spent a life of service in the Peruvian Air Force, and that in 1988 and 1989 he engaged in direct combat missions against the Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") guerillas. In September and October of 1989, kidnapping attempts were made on two of his daughters by unidentified men. During October and November of 1989, Rene and his family received numerous threatening telephone calls from the Shining Path, based upon Rene's military involvement. Rene took early retirement from the Air Force, and in February of 1990 he moved to Argentina with his daughter, Ursula. His wife, Olinda, and two other daughters, Lourdes and Flor, remained in Lima.

Neither Rene nor his family were ever threatened or harmed while he was in Argentina, but Rene began to fear for his safety and returned to Lima in December of 1990. Rene remained in Lima for about two weeks, then moved his family north to Trujillo, where his parents and other family members lived. Shortly thereafter, Lourdes and Flor returned to Lima to continue their studies. Rene came to the United States in May of 1991. In June or July of 1991, unidentified men attempted to kidnap Lourdes near her home in Lima, but were frightened off by a neighbor. Olinda and Flor moved to Argentina in August of 1991; Lourdes later joined Rene in the United States.

We agree with the BIA that the evidence presented does not compel the conclusion that Rene experienced past persecution. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481; Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 n. 22; see also Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir.1995) (defining persecution as the "infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive."). Thus, he is not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Singh, 69 F.3d at 378.

We also find that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Rene's fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable. See Acewicz, 984 F.2d at 1061. First, although threatened, there is no evidence that Rene and his family were ever physically abused or harmed by the Shining Path. See Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.1991) (considering that applicant remained safe after occurrence of event alleged to have induced fear in determining whether applicant's fear was objectively reasonable); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277

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Related

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Stevic
467 U.S. 407 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Singh v. Ilchert
69 F.3d 375 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

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