Render v. Jones

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Render v. Jones

123 S.E.2d 196, 104 Ga. App. 807, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 809

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 17, 1961

Docket39154

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 123 S.E.2d 196 (Render v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Render v. Jones, 123 S.E.2d 196, 104 Ga. App. 807, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).

Pincite

Opinion

Carlisle, Presiding Judge.

1. Where, in a suit to recover property damages allegedly sustained as the result of a collision *808 between a motorcycle belonging to and operated by the plaintiff and the defendant’s automobile, the defendant sought to elicit from the plaintiff on cross-examination parol testimony that the plaintiff had been paid for his damages by an insurance company, such evidence, without more, was inadmissible and was properly excluded. Barrett v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 144 Ga. 47 (85 SE 1016). Special grounds 1 through 4 of the motion for a new trial complaining of the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to elicit such testimony from the plaintiff do not show harmful or reversible error.

2. One of the special grounds of the motion assigns error on the ground that the court refused to permit the defendant to elicit parol testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had assigned his cause of action to an insurance company in exchange for its payment of his damages. Any assignment of the plaintiff’s claim to an insurance company, to be valid, would have to be in writing, and the writing itself would be the best evidence of such an assignment. Consequently, an affirmative answer by the plaintiff, to the effect that he had assigned his claim would have been a legal conclusion and, not being the highest and best evidence, would have been insufficient standing alone to have entitled the defendant to a nonsuit, “still, since the information sought was such as lay peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff, the court should have allowed the defendant, on cross-examination, to develop tentatively the information sought, in order that the defendant might, if he could, legally prove the writing thus ascertained to be in existence.” Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 251 (125 SE 907). It was not essential that the defendant, in order to ascertain whether an assignment had been made, serve the plaintiff with a notice to produce or that he use other discovery procedures since these procedures are merely cumulative of other remedies available to a party for the purposes of discovery. The refusal of the judge to permit the line of questioning, as complained of in special ground 5 of the motion, unduly restricted the defendant’s right of cross-examination of the plaintiff, and was harmful and reversible error.

3. The final special ground complains of the exclusion from the evidence by the court of a letter allegedly written to the de *809 fendant by a third party who was not a witness in the case and so far as appears from the record had no connection with the case. Insofar as the plaintiff was concerned, the contents of this letter were purely hearsay and it was not admissible for any purpose.

Decided November 17, 1961 Rehearing denied November 30, 1961. Saul Blau, for plaintiff in error. Lipshutz, Macey, Zusmann & Sikes, contra.

Judgment reversed.

Eberhardt and Custer, JJ., concur.

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Carlisle, Presiding Judge.

1. Where, in a suit to recover property damages allegedly sustained as the result of a collision *808 between a motorcycle belonging to and operated by the plaintiff and the defendant’s automobile, the defendant sought to elicit from the plaintiff on cross-examination parol testimony that the plaintiff had been paid for his damages by an insurance company, such evidence, without more, was inadmissible and was properly excluded. Barrett v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 144 Ga. 47 (85 SE 1016). Special grounds 1 through 4 of the motion for a new trial complaining of the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to elicit such testimony from the plaintiff do not show harmful or reversible error.

2. One of the special grounds of the motion assigns error on the ground that the court refused to permit the defendant to elicit parol testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had assigned his cause of action to an insurance company in exchange for its payment of his damages. Any assignment of the plaintiff’s claim to an insurance company, to be valid, would have to be in writing, and the writing itself would be the best evidence of such an assignment. Consequently, an affirmative answer by the plaintiff, to the effect that he had assigned his claim would have been a legal conclusion and, not being the highest and best evidence, would have been insufficient standing alone to have entitled the defendant to a nonsuit, “still, since the information sought was such as lay peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff, the court should have allowed the defendant, on cross-examination, to develop tentatively the information sought, in order that the defendant might, if he could, legally prove the writing thus ascertained to be in existence.” Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 251 (125 SE 907). It was not essential that the defendant, in order to ascertain whether an assignment had been made, serve the plaintiff with a notice to produce or that he use other discovery procedures since these procedures are merely cumulative of other remedies available to a party for the purposes of discovery. The refusal of the judge to permit the line of questioning, as complained of in special ground 5 of the motion, unduly restricted the defendant’s right of cross-examination of the plaintiff, and was harmful and reversible error.

3. The final special ground complains of the exclusion from the evidence by the court of a letter allegedly written to the de *809 fendant by a third party who was not a witness in the case and so far as appears from the record had no connection with the case. Insofar as the plaintiff was concerned, the contents of this letter were purely hearsay and it was not admissible for any purpose.

Decided November 17, 1961 Rehearing denied November 30, 1961. Saul Blau, for plaintiff in error. Lipshutz, Macey, Zusmann & Sikes, contra.

Judgment reversed.

Eberhardt and Custer, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

123 S.E.2d 196, 104 Ga. App. 807, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/render-v-jones-gactapp-1961.

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