Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp.

349 F. App'x 696
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedOctober 2, 2009
DocketNo. 08-3662
StatusPublished

This text of 349 F. App'x 696 (Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp., 349 F. App'x 696 (3d Cir. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

Remote Solution Co., Ltd. appeals from the District Court’s denial of its motion to vacate or modify an arbitral award. The underlying dispute involves an agreement between Remote Solution and Contec Corporation.1 The arbitrator determined Remote Solution had agreed to defend and indemnify Contec against certain patent infringement claims brought by third parties and awarded damages to Contec, as well as fees and costs. The District Court denied Remote Solution’s motion to vacate or modify the arbitral award and entered judgment for Contec. We will affirm.

I.

Remote Solution is a Korean electronics manufacturer. In February 1999, it entered into a Manufacturing and Purchase Agreement [“Agreement”] with Contec, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. Contec sold remote-control devices to consumers and cable television providers. The agreement governed the production and sale of such devices according to specifications provided to Remote Solution by Contec. Section 3(c) of the Agreement states that Remote Solution would defend certain suits against Contec and indemnify Contec against damages:

Seller shall defend any suit or proceeding brought against Purchaser to the extent that such suit or proceeding is based on a claim that the Products constitute an infringement of any valid United States or foreign patent, copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property right and Seller shall pay all damages and costs awarded by final judgment against Purchaser.

One of the devices Contec purchased under the agreement was the RT-U49C. Contec sent specifications for the device and placed an order in the spring of 2000. About two years later, Universal Electronics, Inc. (“UEI”) sued Contec for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, claiming the RT-U49C infringed its patents. The parties settled in May 2002. That same year, Philips Electronics North America and U.S. Philips Corporation (collectively “Philips”) sued Contec, also in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, claiming the RT-U49C infringed its patents.2 In June 2003, Con-tec and another defendant entered into a Consent Judgment and Order stating they infringed two Philips patents. Contec incurred fees and costs in its defense against both patent-infringement claims. In resolution of the claims, it paid a settlement and royalties to both UEI and Philips.

Remote Solution’s failure to defend and indemnify Contec against the UEI and Philips actions prompted Contec to withhold payment from Remote Solution for devices shipped in January 2003. In June [698]*6982003, Remote Solution filed a complaint in Korean court, seeking payment for the devices. In response, Contec demanded arbitration with the American Arbitration Association under Section 19 of the Agreement,3 and subsequently filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York to compel arbitration. The arbitrator determined it had standing to hear the dispute, the New York court entered judgment confirming the arbitrator’s standing,4 and the parties proceeded to arbitrate their dispute.

In arbitration, Remote Solution claimed the indemnification provision did not apply because Contec’s own specifications had caused the patent infringement. The arbitrator, however, concluded Remote Solution had agreed to indemnify Contec in Section 3(c) of the Agreement regardless of whether Contec provided its own specifications. That provision, moreover, displaced N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-312(3), which “[u]nless otherwise agreed,” would require a buyer who furnishes specifications to hold the seller harmless against claims “aris[ing] out of compliance with the specifications.”5 The arbitrator ordered Remote Solution to pay Contec $482,067.50. This figure represents $1,102,105.50, which Remote Solution owes Contec under section IV(G) of the Arbitrator’s damages award, reduced by $620,038, the amount Contec withheld from Remote Solution for devices shipped in January 2003. Of the total amount, $295,833 represents Remote Solution’s share of the Philips and UEI settlement and royalties;6 $270,206.32 is for Contec’s attorneys’ fees and expenses in the Philips and UEI actions; $304,099.57 represents Contec’s fees and costs in the Korean and New York actions, which the arbitrator determined were “clearly incurred in the conduct of this arbitration;” and $231,966.62 is for Remote Solution’s share of Contec’s fees and expenses associated with the arbitration itself.

Remote Solution filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitral award in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The District Court denied the motion, and entered judgment for Contec.7 Remote Solution appeals.8

[699]*699II.

Review of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, is “extremely deferential.” Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir.2005). We may disturb the award only when the arbitrator is “partial or corrupt” or “manifestly disregards, rather than merely erroneously interprets the law.” Id.9 Additionally, we may refuse to enforce an award that violates law or a “well-defined and dominant” public policy. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir.1993). “[A] court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of [a] contradi ] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate ‘some explicit public policy that is ‘well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’ ” United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Remote Solution challenges the arbitrator’s determination that it had agreed to defend and indemnify Contec against patent claims like the UEI and Philips claims. Remote Solution contends the award violates public policy because the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract did not comport with proper principles of contract interpretation.10 (Br. of Appellant at 16) (citing Sweeney v. Hertz Corp., 292 A.D.2d 286, 740 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dep’t 2002) (requiring an indemnity provision in a car-rental contract to “clearly and unequivocally express an intent to indemnify [the rental company] against its own negligence”)). This argument suggests the arbitrator misconstrued the contract,11 not that the contract “as interpreted,” see Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct.

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349 F. App'x 696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/remote-solution-co-v-fgh-liquidating-corp-ca3-2009.