Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation

• Court: District Court, D. Minnesota
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 0:25-cv-01951
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Angela Remmick, File No. 25-cv-1951 (ECT/LIB)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

Brunswick Corporation, also known as Mercury Marine, and Dillon Remmick,

Defendants.

Nathan H. Bjerke and Charles D. Slane, TSR Injury Law, Bloomington, MN, for Plaintiff Angela Remmick. Daniel J. Connolly and Anthony W. Finnell, Jr., Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Brunswick Corporation. Gregory J. Duncan and Michael Joseph Vetter, Jr., Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Dillon Remmick.

This case arises from a boating accident. Defendant Dillon Remmick lost control of his pontoon and crashed into a dock where his wife, Angela Remmick, was sitting. Angela suffered severe injuries. She brought this case in Minnesota state court against the manufacturer of the boat’s motor, Brunswick Corporation, and Dillon. Angela and Dillon are Minnesota citizens. Brunswick is not. Contending Dillon was fraudulently joined, Brunswick removed the case on diversity grounds and moved for Dillon’s dismissal. The motion will be granted. Dillon’s presence as a party is proper if there is a reasonable basis in fact and law to predict that Minnesota law might impose liability on him. There is not. Even under the plaintiff-friendly fraudulent-joinder standards, Angela has not alleged facts making it reasonable to infer that Mr. Remmick might be liable for negligence. I1

On June 17, 2022, Dillon and Angela were at Gull Lake in Brainerd, Minnesota. Compl. [ECF No. 2-1] ¶ 9. Dillon was driving a pontoon boat to a dock where Angela was sitting, her legs dangling off the dock’s edge. Id. ¶¶ 10, 19. The boat was outfitted with an engine designed, manufactured, and sold by Brunswick. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7–8. As the boat approached the dock, Dillon slowed the boat down by shifting the engine

into neutral. Id. ¶ 13. As the boat came closer to the dock, Dillon planned to shift the engine into reverse, which would have acted like a brake. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Because of a gasket failure in the idle limiter, however, the engine malfunctioned; it began to idle at a high speed (or “RPMs”) and could not be shifted into reverse. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 26. “Mr. Remmick was unable to control the boat and was unable to shift into reverse to slow the

boat.” Id. ¶ 17. The boat hit the dock, and the collision severely injured Angela’s legs. Id. ¶¶ 19–22. Angela brought a state-court suit against Brunswick and Dillon. Id. ¶¶ 2–6. She claims Brunswick is liable for negligence, id. ¶¶ 31–38, and strict products liability, id. ¶¶ 39–46, and that Dillon is liable for negligence, id. ¶¶ 47–50. Brunswick removed the

case to federal court on diversity grounds. See ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 12–17; see 28 U.S.C.

1 The background facts are drawn from the operative Complaint and are presumed to be true. See Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2003) (requiring the district court to “resolve all facts . . . in the plaintiff’s favor” when adjudicating a fraudulent- joinder question). §§ 1332(a), 1441(b), 1446. Brunswick was incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Wisconsin. Compl. ¶ 3. The Remmicks are Minnesota

citizens. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Unless he is fraudulently joined, Dillon’s presence destroys complete diversity and would warrant remanding the case to Minnesota state district court. Brunswick has teed up that question by moving to dismiss Dillon. ECF No. 13. II A civil action pending in state court may be removed to federal court by the defendant when the action could have been filed in federal court originally. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Remand is required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “when the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or the removal was procedurally defective.” St. John v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1998). The party who removed the case bears the burden to show federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In re Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993).

“Fraudulent joinder is an exception to the complete diversity rule.” Johnson v. Midwest Div. - RBH, LLC, 88 F.4th 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2023). “[J]oinder is fraudulent when there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim against the resident defendants.” Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2002)). “However, if there is a

‘colorable’ cause of action—that is, if the state law might impose liability on the resident defendant under the facts alleged—then there is no fraudulent joinder.” Id. (footnote omitted). A “colorable” claim is one that is “reasonable, but speculative.” Id. at 810 n.10. In other words, it must be “clear under governing state law that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant.” Id. at 810 (quoting Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Med. Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977)). As the Eighth

Circuit explained in Filla, the district court’s task is limited to determining whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved. In making such a prediction, the district court should resolve all facts and ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law in the plaintiff’s favor.

Id. at 811. When uncertain about the state law outcome, courts resolve all doubts in favor of remand. Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 2007). Relevant here, the Eighth Circuit has found defendants to be fraudulently joined when plaintiffs “offered no factual basis” for a necessary element of the claim. See Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 2011); see Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The complaint likewise fails to allege any McDaniel-specific facts related to Henson’s protected activity—filing his administrative charge—and thereby does not make a colorable claim that McDaniel retaliated or aided and abetted retaliation against Henson.”). If the diverse defendant meets its burden of establishing fraudulent joinder, the district court can “assume jurisdiction over a facially nondiverse case temporarily and . . . dismiss the nondiverse party from the case and retain subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims.” Murphy v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 699 F.3d 1027, 1031 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Block, 665 F.3d at 951). In adjudicating a fraudulent-joinder question, courts in the Eighth Circuit may consider “materials beyond the allegations of the Complaint, but only to determine if there is any factual support for [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Masepohl v. Am. Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (D. Minn. 1997) (citing Banbury v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 818 F.

Supp. 276, 280 (D. Minn. 1993)); see Block, 665 F.3d at 948. Here, Brunswick relies on a report filed by Angela’s expert, see ECF No. 10 at 9–10; ECF No. 11-1, and Angela relies on an affidavit submitted by her counsel describing the parties’ pre-litigation communications, see ECF No. 19 at 5; ECF No. 19-2. The expert report will not be considered because it undermines Angela’s negligence claim against Dillon. The pre-suit communications will not be considered because they do not add factual content regarding

Dillon’s conduct or support the negligence claim against him. They just discuss the parties’ preliminary positions regarding Dillon’s liability. Here, whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that Minnesota law might impose liability on Dillon turns on the negligence standard. “Negligence is the failure to exercise the level of care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under

the same or similar circumstances.” Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014). Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff alleging negligence must show “(1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and (4) that the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of the injury.” Id. The focus is on the second (or “breach”) element. The parties agree Dillon owed Angela a duty of care and that she was

injured. See Minn. Stat. § 86B.311, subdiv. 1(1) (“A person may not operate or allow the operation of a watercraft . . . in a careless or heedless manner in disregard of the rights or safety of others.”); Melchert v. Clark, No. C1-97-1862, 1998 WL 188860, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1998) (relying on statute to set the standard of care); Compl. ¶¶ 20–22 (showing photographs of Angela’s injured legs).

Here, there is not an arguably reasonable basis for predicting that Minnesota law might impose liability on Dillon. This is so for two fundamental reasons. (1) The Complaint alleges the opposite. It alleges that Dillon acted reasonably in his operation of the pontoon. For example, Dillon operated the boat so that it “slowly approached the dock . . . as he had done many times before.” Compl. ¶ 12. He shifted into neutral and planned to shift into reverse, which would have slowed the boat further. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. As the

Complaint makes clear, Dillon’s actions were consistent with Brunswick’s operating instructions. Brunswick instructed operators to shift into neutral, stop there, and let the engine idle before shifting into reverse. Id. ¶ 14. Dillon followed that instruction. Id. ¶ 16. Because the motor began revving so high, however, he was not able to shift into reverse. Id. ¶ 16. For these reasons, the Complaint alleges, Dillon was “unable to control the boat,”

and it “coast[ed] towards the dock uncontrolled.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18. (2) Beyond that, the Complaint alleges only legal conclusions regarding Dillon’s actions that cannot be accepted as true. See Block, 665 F.3d at 950; Henson, 3 F.4th at 1080. These include that Dillon “failed to use reasonable care in his operation of the subject pontoon”; that his conduct “constitutes negligence that was a substantial factor in causing the incident and

[Angela’s] injuries”; and that Dillon “is liable for its [sic] negligence and for the injuries to [Angela] that were directly and proximately caused by [his] negligence.” Compl. ¶¶ 48– 50. From these allegations, it is not reasonable to infer that Dillon acted in a careless or heedless manner in disregard of Angela’s rights or safety. On the face of the Complaint, in other words, Dillon is not possibly negligent.

Angela advances essentially three arguments to support Dillon’s joinder, but none is convincing. First, she argues that the cases Brunswick relied on are distinguishable because they all involved a failure to adequately plead “factual dependent duties.” ECF No. 19 at 3 (first citing Block, 665 F.3d at 948; then citing Henson, 3 F.4th 1075; and then citing Lane v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., No. 22-cv-135 (WMW/LIB), 2022 WL 17721508 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2022)). Put another way, in Block, Lane, and Henson, the non-diverse

defendant could not be liable unless a certain exception applied: in Block and Lane, that the nonmanufacturer had knowledge of the product’s defect; and in Henson, that the supervisor directly oversaw or was actively involved in employment discrimination. See Block, 665 F.3d at 948–50; Lane, 2022 WL 17721508, at *3–4; Henson, 3 F.4th at 1079– 80. The problem is these cases give no reason to think this distinction matters, and other

Eighth Circuit precedent rejects it, if implicitly. In Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the plaintiffs fraudulently joined a defendant trustee on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 773 F.3d 887, 894 (8th Cir. 2014). Though Missouri law recognized the defendant trustee’s fiduciary relationship to the plaintiffs and corresponding duties, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations did not establish breach. Id. The absence of those allegations meant

there was “no reasonable basis in Missouri law” to impose liability on the trustee. Id. That is what we have here. Second, at the hearing, Angela argued that Block, Lane, and Henson relied on pleading standards because the courts were analyzing Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Since this case is not in that posture, the Rule 12(b)(6) reasoning should be ignored. This argument mischaracterizes these cases. In Henson, the non-diverse defendant moved to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), but the district court and the Eighth Circuit analyzed the issue under fraudulent-joinder standards. See Order at 3–4, Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 19-cv- 00082-CV-W-GAF (W.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2019), ECF No. 19; Henson, 3 F.4th at 1079. There, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that, taken as true, showed the non-diverse defendant might be liable for aiding and abetting discrimination and retaliation. See id. The other allegations were “broad” and “conclusory,” and so “insufficient to state a claim against

him.” Id. at 1080. While the court drew on Rule 12(b)(6) language, in the end, it determined that “[d]ismissal on the basis of fraudulent joinder was therefore proper.” Id. (emphasis added). Block and Lane are more direct: “In order to establish fraudulent joinder, the defendant must ‘do more than merely prove that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Block, 665 F.3d at 948 (quoting Knudson

v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 980 (8th Cir. 2011)); accord Lane, 2022 WL 17721508, at *2. Third, Angela argues that the negligence action against Dillon would survive a motion to dismiss under Minnesota’s notice-pleading standard, so he should not be dismissed as fraudulently joined. ECF No. 19 at 4 (citing Halva v. Minn. State Colls. &

Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2021)). “Though some federal courts answer fraudulent joinder, at least in part, by comparing complaints against state dismissal standards, that seems unnecessary and perhaps improper.” Klein as Tr. for Stanback v. Menard, Inc., No. 24-cv-2362 (ECT/JFD), 2024 WL 4880384, at *5 n.5 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2024) (citing e.g., Hazelwood v. S Serv., LLC, No. 3:19-cv-105-RGJ, 2020 WL 13543882, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2020)). Instead, “[t]he Eighth Circuit’s fraudulent-joinder rules establish the

standard against which to assess [Angela’s] claim[] against” Dillon. Id. Under those rules, conclusory allegations do not create a reasonable basis to predict the imposition of liability under Minnesota law. Block, 665 F.3d at 950; Henson, 3 F.4th at 1080.2

2 Though the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned interspousal tort immunity, it cautions courts to watch for collusion when one spouse sues the other. See Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419–20 (Minn. 1969). “Collusion in making spurious claims is an undeniable temptation where a member of the family is insured,” as “[a]n award to a wronged spouse upon a genuine claim may actually inure to the benefit of the wrongdoing spouse.” Id. at 419. “However, instead of saddling such suits with a presumption of fraud ab initio, we have trusted the judicial process to detect and dismiss collusive actions.” Nelson v. Nelson, 283 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. 1979). Drawing from a related context, the Minnesota Supreme Court notes that sees “no impropriety . . . where the [insurance] carrier is the real party in interest.” Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Minn. 1966) (abrogating immunity for children’s torts against their parents). Here, alertness to this issue seems warranted. First, Dillon is insured. ECF No. 19-2 at 1–2. His insurance carrier accepted the tender of defense and appointed his counsel. Id. at 1. Should Dillon be found liable, Angela would recover from his insurance, which “may actually inure to the benefit of the wrongdoing spouse.” Beaudette, 173 N.W.2d at 419. Second, Dillon has not moved to dismiss or otherwise opposed the suit. That’s unusual in fraudulent-joinder cases in district courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., Henson, 3 F.4th at 1080 (non-diverse defendant moved to dismiss); Lane, 2022 WL 17721508, at *1 (same); Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 10- cv-2802 & 10-cv-2803 (ADM/AJB), 2010 WL 5422555, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2010) (non-diverse defendant opposed motion to remand); Filla, 336 F.3d at 810 (same); Johnson v. Midwest Div. – RBH, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00728-BCW, 2021 WL 5544763, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2021) (same). Given this laissez-faire approach, it’s reasonable to ask whether the insurance carrier is the “real party in interest.” Balts, 142 N.W.2d at 73. Third, Dillon’s Answer claims he is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit many allegations in the complaint, including that he was on the lake that day, that he was operating the pontoon, that he slowly approached the dock, and that the pontoon coasted toward the dock uncontrolled. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 12, 18; ECF No. 5 ¶ 3. As Brunswick points out, it’s difficult to believe Dillon lacks this knowledge. ECF No. 10 at 12 n.3. Because Dillon will be dismissed as fraudulently joined, however, it is not necessary to determine whether the claim against him is dismissal-worthy for this separate reason. ORDER Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS

ORDERED THAT: 1. Defendant Brunswick Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Dillon Remmick as a Fraudulently Joined Defendant [ECF No. 13] is GRANTED. 2. All claims against Defendant Dillon Remmick are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated: September 29, 2025 s/ Eric C. Tostrud Eric C. Tostrud United States District Court