Reminger Co., L.P.A. v. Fishman

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 115897
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Reminger Co., L.P.A. v. Fishman, 2026-Ohio-2093.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

REMINGER CO., L.P.A., :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115897 v. :

OZZIE FISHMAN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-114082

Appearances:

Reminger Co., L.P.A., Brian P. Nally, and Kaitlyn M. Posta, for appellee.

Ozzie Fishman, pro se.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Defendant-appellant Ozzie Fishman (“Fishman”), pro se, appeals the

trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Reminger

Co., L.P.A. (“Reminger” or “the firm”) and awarding damages. Upon review, we

affirm the trial court’s decision. I. Facts and Procedural History

In March 2025, Reminger — a legal professional association

organized under Ohio law — filed a two-count complaint against Fishman, asserting

claims for breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment. Therein, Reminger alleged

that Fishman retained Reminger to represent him in a pending arbitration case and

entered into a valid and enforceable written contract with the firm in April 2023

(“Engagement Agreement”). Reminger claimed that its attorneys immediately

began performing legal services for Fishman and continued to do so through

October 2024. According to Reminger, the firm issued periodic invoices to Fishman

according to the Engagement Agreement’s terms. However, Fishman failed and/or

refused to pay Reminger for its legal services or reimburse the firm for cost

advancements and case expenses. After Reminger made numerous attempts to

resolve the issues related to Fishman’s non-payment, Fishman promised to begin

making periodic payments. Nevertheless, Fishman never made any payments to

Reminger. As a result, Reminger sought damages, interest, litigation costs and

expenses, attorney fees, and any other relief deemed equitable. Reminger attached

redacted copies of the Engagement Agreement and 13 invoices to the complaint.

In May 2025, Reminger moved for default judgment after Fishman

failed to respond to its complaint. A default hearing was held in June 2025, and

Fishman appeared pro se. The trial court granted Fishman leave to file an answer,

and he filed a “statement in opposition to [Reminger’s] motion for summary

judgment” that same day. After the trial court held telephone conferences and set a case-

management schedule, Fishman filed several contested motions, pleadings, and

briefs — among them a motion for summary judgment filed in July 2025. Therein,

Fishman argued that the Engagement Agreement misstated and exceeded the scope

of the requested services and was contingent upon Reminger’s receipt of retainer,

which was never paid. Fishman claimed that despite this contingency, Reminger

breached its own contract and waived its enforcement rights by proceeding to render

services absent receipt of the required retainer, provided “out-of-scope services,”

and failed to send monthly itemized bills. Fishman asserted that Reminger’s breach-

of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims were “barred by contract principles,

professional obligations, and controlling case law.” Fishman attached

approximately 110 pages of unauthenticated exhibits to his motion, including the

Engagement Agreement, email correspondence, and invoices. The trial court held

Fishman’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance since it was filed months

prior to the close of discovery.

Fishman filed an additional motion for summary judgment on the day

of the October 2025 dispositive-motion deadline. In his two-page motion, Fishman

argued that Reminger “failed to meet a condition precedent, breached the

[Engagement Agreement] by not issuing monthly invoices, performed work outside

the agreed scope, billed after the matter was settled, and failed to supplement

discovery as required.” As a result, Fishman concluded that he was entitled to

summary judgment on all claims. Fishman attached an affidavit that he executed in support of his motion and approximately 225 pages of summaries, tables, indexes,

and exhibits, which included “true and correct copies of documents referenced . . .

and relied upon in [his] motion for summary judgment.”

Reminger opposed Fishman’s motions, countering that some of the

cases cited by Fishman did not exist and the arguments raised were either misguided

or false. Reminger asserted that Fishman’s nonpayment of the retainer did not void

the attorney-client relationship and the firm kept him apprised of fees during its

representation, which was within the scope of the Engagement Agreement.

Reminger further claimed that Fishman acknowledged his requirement to pay,

promised he would begin making payments, and never raised any issues with the

scope of the firm’s representation before the complaint’s filing.

Reminger also filed its own motion for summary judgment. Therein,

Reminger argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on its breach-of-

contract claim. Reminger asserted that Fishman breached the Engagement

Agreement — a valid contract for legal services to which Fishman was the sole

signatory — after he failed to pay for the services Reminger provided pursuant to the

Engagement Agreement’s terms. In the alternative, Reminger argued that it was

entitled to summary judgment on its unjust enrichment claim. Reminger claimed

that Fishman obtained the benefit of the firm’s legal services, knew and

acknowledged that he was obligated to pay for those services, and failed to make any

payments. Reminger supported its motion for summary judgment with an

affidavit executed by the firm’s counsel of record in the matter (“Counsel”). Counsel

attested that Reminger began representing Fishman in the arbitration after he

signed the Engagement Agreement; Fishman specifically agreed to the necessary

and reasonable hourly rates charged and never claimed that Reminger performed

services outside of the scope of the Engagement Agreement; and all of Reminger’s

work was related to Fishman’s representation in the arbitration. Counsel further

attested that Fishman told him on multiple occasions that he would make payments

toward the outstanding invoices and never requested copies of the invoices or

disputed the amounts or specific items included. According to Counsel, Reminger

had not received a single payment from Fishman as of the affidavit’s date. True and

accurate copies of the following exhibits were redacted and attached to the affidavit,

with unredacted versions filed under seal: the Engagement Agreement; the answer

filed by respondents, including Fishman, in the arbitration; the answer and

counterclaim filed by Reminger in the arbitration on behalf of Fishman;

correspondence that Reminger exchanged with Fishman throughout its

representation; 13 invoices; correspondence Reminger exchanged with Fishman

about his unpaid invoices; and Fishman’s deposition transcript.

After Fishman failed to timely respond, Reminger filed a reply in

support of its motion for summary judgment. The reply reiterated Reminger’s

arguments and asserted that the motion should be considered unrefuted and

unopposed. Fishman sought leave to file an opposition instanter, and the trial court granted his contested motion. In his one-page brief in opposition, Fishman

countered that “[d]isputes exist regarding scope of engagement, billing compliance,

condition precedent, unauthorized work, benefit conferred, discovery compliance,

and RFA responses.” Fishman did not reference or include any case law or exhibits

in support of his brief.

The trial court denied Fishman’s motions for summary judgment and

granted Reminger’s motion, finding that no genuine issues of material fact remained

and the firm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its breach-of-contract

claim. The trial court dismissed Reminger’s alternative claim for unjust enrichment

with prejudice and issued judgment in favor of Reminger and against Fishman in

the amount of $25,582.26 plus eight percent interest and court costs.

Fishman appeals, raising four assignments of error for review:

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of [Reminger] where genuine issues of material fact existed, in violation of Civ.R. 56.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court erred by disregarding [Fishman’s] binding admissions under Civ.R. 36.

Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court erred by awarding damages unsupported by competent, admissible evidence. Assignment of Error No. 4

The trial court erred by awarding duplicative interest in violation of R.C. 1343.03.

II. Law and Analysis

In each of his assignments of error, Fishman challenges the trial

court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Reminger on its breach-of-

contract claim and awarding damages.

An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment

de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). In a de novo

review, the appellate court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and

independently reviews the record to determine whether summary judgment is

appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); Smathers v.

Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30.

A party may seek affirmative relief by moving for summary judgment

as to all or any part of a claim. Civ.R. 56(A). “One of the principal purposes of the

summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or

defenses.” Am. Dental Ctr. v. Wunderle, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4437, 4 (8th Dist.

Sept. 16, 1993), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any material fact

remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that

conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Grafton at 105. This court explained:

“[T]he plain language of the summary judgment rule mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no ‘genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of a non- moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

(Citations omitted.) Corradi v. Soclof, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2162, 6 (8th Dist.

May 25, 1995), quoting Toensing v. MK-Ferguson Co., 76 Ohio App.3d 826, 830

(8th Dist. 1992), citing Celotex Corp. at 323-324.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt,

75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). The moving party has the initial responsibility

of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of

the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the

essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claims. Id. To accomplish this, the

movant must be able to point to Civ.R. 56(C) evidentiary materials, which include

“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any[,]” for the court’s

consideration in rendering summary judgment. Id.; Civ.R. 56(C). “These

evidentiary materials must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dresher

at 293.

After the moving party’s initial burden is satisfied, the nonmoving

party “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings.’” Id.,

quoting Civ.R. 56(E). Rather, the nonmoving party’s reciprocal burden is triggered,

requiring it to set forth specific facts, by the means listed in Civ.R. 56(C), showing

that there remains a genuine issue for trial. Id. Finally, we note that a trial court

may consider evidence other than the materials specified in Civ.R. 56(C) if — as is

the case here — no objections are raised. State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v.

Mayfield Hts., 2009-Ohio-2871, ¶ 17.

In his first assignment of error, Fishman argues that the trial court

erred because “material factual disputes remain regarding the enforceability of the

Engagement Agreement, whether any condition precedent was satisfied or waived,

what the parties reasonably understood about payment responsibility, and what

damages — if any — are recoverable.” In his second assignment or error, Fishman

contends that the trial court erred by failing to give his Civ.R. 36 admissions “effect

when ruling on summary judgment.” In his third assignment of error, Fishman

challenges the money damages awarded against him, claiming that Reminger failed

to present “competent evidence establishing the reasonableness, necessity,

authorization, and value of the claimed fees.” Finally, in his fourth assignment of

error, Fishman contends that the interest award should be vacated or corrected

since the “claimed damages already embedded interest prior to judgment, such that adding statutory interest duplicated interest already included in the damages

figure.”

However, Fishman does not support his conclusions with references

to evidence in the record, citations to relevant law, or developed arguments. Instead,

Fishman’s challenges make vague references to allegedly disputed facts and issues,

“key elements” that his Civ.R. 36 admissions may bear on, and the trial court’s

purported failures and errors. Fishman’s application of legal authority to the

underlying case stops with his citations to two cases, which he uses to define the

summary-judgment standard of review on appeal. Fishman also identifies Civ.R. 36

and 56, App.R. 16, and R.C. 1343.03, but fails to discuss how these rules and statues

relate to his appeal. Fishman’s appellate briefs provide no authority to support his

specific challenges or refute the authority set forth by Reminger.

App.R. 16(A)(7) requires appellants to include “[a]n argument

containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to

the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” When

appellants fail to cite any legal authority in support of their claims, this court is

allowed to disregard them. Lewicki v. Grange Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-4544, ¶ 41 (8th

Dist.), citing Pinkney v. Salett, 2011-Ohio-4121, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing

App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); Siemientkowski v. State Farm Ins., 2005-Ohio-

4295, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). Appellate courts are not advocates, and appellants bear the

burden of constructing the legal arguments necessary to support their assignments of error. Id., citing Taylor-Stephens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121 (8th

Dist.), and Doe v. Cuyahoga Cty. Community College, 2022-Ohio-527, ¶ 26 (8th

Dist.). “‘If an argument exists that can support [an] assigned error, it is not this

court’s duty to root it out.’” Strauss v. Strauss, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.),

quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, *22 (9th Dist. May 6,

1998).

Moreover, “‘pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the

law and legal procedures and . . . are held to the same standards as litigants who are

represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10,

quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654

(10th Dist. 2001). Indeed, “‘[p]ro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights, and

they must accept the results of their own mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria, 2008-

Ohio-4586, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting Williams v. Lo, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18 (10th

Dist.).

The burden rests with Fishman to establish the validity of his

assignments of error; yet he provides this court with minimal guidance or support

for his position. Therefore, we decline to review Fishman’s claims that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Reminger and awarding of

damages.

However, we note that even if we were to address the merits of

Fishman’s appeal, we would find that the trial court properly granted Reminger’s

motion for summary judgment. Reminger satisfied its initial responsibility by informing the trial court of the basis for its motion, identifying portions of the record

that demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and pointing to

Civ.R. 56(C) evidentiary materials that established the essential elements of its

breach of contract claim. Indeed, our review of those materials reveals that

Fishman executed and entered into the Engagement Agreement with Reminger,

Reminger rendered services according to that Engagement Agreement, and

Fishman failed to pay Reminger for those services. Fishman failed to satisfy his

reciprocal burden, requiring him to set forth specific facts and Civ.R. 56(C) evidence

showing that there remained a genuine issue for trial. Consequently, the trial court

did not err in determining that no genuine issues of material fact remained and

Reminger was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its breach-of-contract

claim. Accordingly — and in the absence of any authority cited to the contrary — we

overrule Fishman’s four assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s decision.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR