Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Union Insurance

129 F. Supp. 3d 782, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123270, 2015 WL 5450182
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedSeptember 16, 2015
DocketCivil No. 15-2913 (RHK/HB)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 129 F. Supp. 3d 782 (Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Union Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Union Insurance, 129 F. Supp. 3d 782, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123270, 2015 WL 5450182 (mnd 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. (“Rembrandt”) is one of the nation’s largest egg producers. Defendant Illinois Union Insurance Company (“Illinois Union”) issued -an insurance policy to Rembrandt to cover several -of its farms and-facilities (the “Policy”). In late 2014, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (“HPAI”) virus, commonly called “bird flu-,” contaminated several of Rembrandt’s facilities and caused the loss of millions of dollars in income. Rembrandt filed a claim with Illinois Union, which was denied. Rembrandt then commenced this, action, alleging breach of the Policy. Now before the Court is Illinois Union’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (Doc. No. 13). , For the reasons that follow, its Motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are recited as alleged in the Complaint. Rembrandt owns and contracts with numerous farms and facilities for egg production throughout the midwest. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Illinois Union issued the Policy to Rembrandt on November 1, 2014, to cover these farms and facilities. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Policy contains two clauses relevant to the instant motion: a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause. The forum-selection clause states:

It is agreed that in the event of the failure of the Insurer to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Insurer and the “insured” shall submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of New York and shall comply with all requirements necessary to give such court- jurisdiction. Nothing in this clause -constitutes- or should be understood to constitute a waiver of the Insur[784]*784er’s right to remove an action to a United States District Court.

(Compl. Ex. A at 16.) The- choice-of-law clause states:

All matters arising hereunder, including questions relating to the validity, interpretation, performance, and enforcement of this Policy, and the rights, duties and obligations hereunder, shall be determined in accordance-with the law and practices of the State of New York.

(Id.) The Policy also contains sixteen endorsements, including-a Service of-Suit Endorsement (the “Endorsement”), which states: -

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY, PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY...If the insured - requests, the company will submit to the jurisdiction -of any court of competent jurisdiction. The company will accept the final decision of that court or any Appellate Court in the event of an appeal.... NOTHING HEREIN CONTAINED SHALL BE HELD TO VARY, ALTER, WAIVE OR EXTEND ANY OF THE TERMS, CONDITIONS, OR LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICY TO WHICH THIS- ENDORSEMENT IS' ATTACHED OTHER THAN AS ABOVE STATED. ' "
(Id. at 40.)

When the HPAI virus spread through the United States. in late 2014 through early. 2015, it contaminated six of Rembrandt’s facilities (the “Affected Sites”), which had to be placed under quarantine. (Id. ¶ 12.) The. quarantine forced. Rembrandt to suspend egg production at the Affected Sites and undergo costly remediation before resuming egg production. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14)

As a result, Rembrandt filed a claim with Illinois Union under the Policy for reimbursement for losses at the Affected Sites. (Id. ¶ 15.) Illinois Union denied coverage, asserting that the HPAI virus is not covered under the Policy. (Id.) Rembrandt then sued for breach of the Policy.

‘ Invoking the forum-sélection and choice-of-law clauses here, Illinois Union argues that venue is improper in this Court and moves to dismiss without prejudice or transfer this action to the Southern District of New York.1 (Def. Mem. at 11.) Rembrandt contends that the Endorsement amended the forum-selection clause, thereby allowing this action to be properly filed and litigated in this. Court. (PI. Mem. in Opp’n at 1.) Illinois Union’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (Doc.' No. 13) has been fully briefed, the Court heard arguments on September 9, 2015, and the Motion is ripe for disposition.

STANDARD OF DECISION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," a district court may transfer any civil- action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” Courts should not freely grant transfer motions under § 1404(a), and a heavy burden rests on the movant to demonstrate why a motion to transfer should [785]*785be granted. Radisson Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co., 931 F.Supp. 638, 641 (D.Minn.1996) (Kyle, J.).

The typical § 1404(a) analysis, changes when the parties’ contract contains a valid forum-selection clause.. A clause that “represents the parties’ agreement as to the most proper forum” should be given controlling weight absent “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 568, 581, 187 L.Ed.2d 487 (2013) (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988)). When a forum-selection clause .exists, the “plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not transfer the case to the forum to which the parties agreed.” Atl. Marine, 134 S.Ct. at 581-82.

ANALYSIS

To meet its burden, Rembrandt highlights the Endorsement as its reasoning why this action should not be transferred. (Pl. Resp. at 1; see Compl. Ex. A at 40.) Thus, the issue before the Court is the interpretation of the relationship between these two provisions.

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law to interpret insurance policies. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 68 F.Supp.3d 1044, 1048 (D.Minn.2014) (Magnuson, J.). Here, the choice-of-law clause mandates that New York law govern disputes under the Policy. (Compl. Ex. A at 16.) Thus, this Court must' apply New York law to interpret this Policy.2 Fed. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 642, 942 N.Y.S.2d 432, 965 N.E.2d 934, 936 (2012) (stating that New York courts apply general principles of contract law to interpret insurance policies). Under New York law, a court must “afford a fair meaning to all of the .language employed by the parties in the contract and leave no provision without fdrce and effect.” Id. “An interpretation of a contract that has the effect of rendering at least one clause superfluous or meaningless ... is not preferred and will be avoided if possible.” Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1992).

The parties provide two possible interpretations of the interplay between the forum-selection clause and the Endorsement. Rembrandt’s interpretation is that the Endorsement is meant as an amendment and thereby changes the Policy’s general jurisdiction and venue terms. (PI. Resp.

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129 F. Supp. 3d 782, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123270, 2015 WL 5450182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rembrandt-enterprises-inc-v-illinois-union-insurance-mnd-2015.