Religious Technology Center v. Lerma

908 F. Supp. 1353, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17868, 1995 WL 710239
District Court, E.D. Virginia·Decided November 29, 1995·No. Civ. A. 95-1107-A·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1995 AND AMENDED ORDER OF NOVEMBER 29, 1995

BRINKEMA, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Religious Technology Center’s (“RTC”) Emergency Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing of RTC’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against defendants The Washington Post, Marc Fisher and Richard Leiby (collectively, “The Post”), plaintiff RTC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against defendant Lerma and Digital Gateway System (“DGS”) and defendant Lerma’s Motion to Vacate the August 11,1995 Writ of Seizure and Order for Impoundment and to Increase the Amount of Plaintiffs Bond. On September 15, 1995 we denied all of RTC’s motions and granted Lerma’s motion. The memorandum to support that ruling was deferred.

I. RTC’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REHEARING ON RTC’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE WASHINGTON POST, MARC FISHER AND RICHARD LEIBY

At the outset, we caution counsel that this Court seldom revisits motions upon which it has already ruled. Such an approach fosters efficiency and finality. A reconsideration motion is typically heard only where the Court has “patently misunderstood a party” or where there is a “significant change in the law or facts” of a case. Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va.1983). Although neither circumstance is present here, the Court has permitted reargument because the RTC claims that the Court’s denial of its Temporary Restraining Order has significant First Amendment implications upon which the RTC had not focused in its first motion. In the Court’s view, these arguments should have been raised in RTC’s original motion against The Post instead of awaiting this second attack. Nevertheless, in the interests of full consideration of RTC’s claims, we granted the rehearing confident that RTC’s future pleadings will address all significant legal issues in the first instance.

A. The Free Exercise Clause

The most potent new issue raised by the RTC concerns the alleged interference that the Court’s August 30 Order (“the Order”) wreaks upon the free exercise of the Scientology religion. RTC asserts that *1356 maintenance of the secrecy and confidentiality of the documents in question (“AT documents”) represents a fundamental and inviolate tenet of the Scientology religion. Withholding these documents from unprepared or uninitiated observers was of primary importance to founder L. Ron Hubbard and is a belief woven throughout his original writings. Thus, for Scientologists publication of these materials threatens “irreversible alteration of religious beliefs, including compelled annihilation of a core belief — confidentiality of the [AT documents].” (RTC’s brief at p. 17)

The RTC asserts that the Court’s Order by permitting The Post limited and specified use of the AT documents “imposes a change in religious belief and practice by judicial fiat ... [It] dictate[s] to Scientologists how to practice their religion.” (RTC’s brief at p. 5) The Court thereby places in the hands of The Post “the authority to decide how the Scientology religion is practiced.” (RTC’s brief at p. 14) “Publishing is a literal violation of ... the very religious beliefs in question.” (RTC’s brief at p. 17) The RTC further argues that by denying their request to enjoin The Post and impound all AT documents in The Post’s possession, this Court is placing its imprimatur on activity which represents “sacrilege” to the religion and “does violence to everything [Scientologists] believe in ...” (Transcript of September 15,1995 Hearing at p. 15)

We recognize that the RTC has installed extraordinary measures to maintain the secrecy of its AT documents and that they have zealously pursued any reported leaks of information. However, it is a quantum leap to claim that Scientology’s endeavors to enforce the secrecy of these documents thereby prohibits secular organizations from undertaking legally permissible criticism of Scientology including quotes from these documents as long as possession of the documents was achieved lawfully. In their effort to enjoin The Post, the RTC is essentially urging that we permit their religious belief in the secrecy of the AT documents to “trump” significant conflicting constitutional rights. In particular, they ask us to dismiss the equally valid First Amendment protections of freedom of the press. Furthermore, RTC asks that we allow the Free Exercise Clause to deflate the doctrine of fair use as embodied in the copyright statute, one of the very status laws upon which the RTC has based this lawsuit.

Were they arguing to a religious council placed within a theocratic government, RTC’s arguments might prevail. But this Court is a secular branch of a secular democratic government. Our traditional separation of church from the state, combined with the heterogeneity of religious practices in this country compel us to reject the RTC’s arguments. ‘While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2490, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985). In the same vein, RTC may not employ the machinery of this Court to enforce its religious prescriptions against The Post by enjoining otherwise permissible activity.

Ultimately this Court must weigh any religious claims against the overriding necessity of enacting neutral and general laws to promote the common good. In evaluating the clash of these principles, the judiciary must honor legitimate secular goals. Activities that are otherwise permissible cannot be prohibited on the ground that they offend another individual’s religious culture or sensibilities. The Supreme Court stated this point cogently in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990):

The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’ To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs . ..• — permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’ — contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.

*1357 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The opinion concludes:

The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.

Id. at 888-89, 110 S.Ct. at 1605.

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Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17868, 1995 WL 710239 (E.D. Va. 1995).

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