Reliance Insurance v. Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance (In re Montgomery Ward & Co.)

344 B.R. 256, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41809
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJune 22, 2006
DocketBankruptcy No. 97-1409-PJW; CIV.A.No. 01-421-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 344 B.R. 256 (Reliance Insurance v. Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance (In re Montgomery Ward & Co.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reliance Insurance v. Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance (In re Montgomery Ward & Co.), 344 B.R. 256, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41809 (D. Del. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Forum’s Renewed Objection To The Bankruptcy Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Against Forum’s Illegality Defense (D.I.54) and Forum’s Motion For Leave To File Instanter Its Reply In Support Of Its Renewed Objection To The Bankruptcy Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Against Forum’s Illegality Defenses (D.I.59). In addition, Reliance has filed a Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Forum’s Reply In Support Of Its Renewed Objection To The Bankruptcy Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Against Forum’s Illegality Defense (D.I.62). For the reasons discussed, Forum’s Renewed Objection will be overruled, Forum’s Motion For Leave To File Instanter Its Reply will be granted, and Reliance’s Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply will be granted.

I. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

By its Renewed Objection, Defendant AIG Premier Insurance Company (f/k/a Colonial Penn Franklin Insurance Company) (“Forum”) contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Reliance Insurance Company, United Pacific Insurance Company and Reliance Surety Company (collectively, “Reliance”) on Forum’s defense that the agreement between Forum and Reliance (the “Forum Agreement”) violates the public policy of the Illinois Insurance Holding Company Systems Act (the “illegality defense”). (D.I. 55, Exh. 43 (Order of the Bankruptcy Court dated 4/21/00)). Specifically, Forum contends that the Forum Agreement violates Section 20a of the Illinois Insurance Holding Company Systems Act, 215 ILCS [258]*258§ 5/131.1 et seq. (the “Holding Company-Act” or the “Act”), which requires the Illinois Insurance Department to pre-ap-prove certain transactions in order to ensure the solvency of insurance companies and protect the interest of policyholders. Forum contends that the Forum Agreement is properly characterized as a guarantee, an extension of credit or a transaction involving the transfer of assets from or liabilities to an Illinois insurance company, and therefore, prior approval of the Forum Agreement by the Insurance Department was required. Because Reliance failed to obtain this approval, Forum contends that the Forum Agreement is void. Forum also contends that it presented sufficient facts to demonstrate that Reliance knew or should have known that the Forum Agreement was illegal, and therefore, unenforceable. Thus, Forum requests the Court to sustain its Renewed Objection, deny Reliance’s Motion For Summary Judgment and remand the illegality defense, together with Forum’s other defenses, to the Bankruptcy Court.

In response, Reliance contends that the Forum Agreement is an indemnity agreement that does not fall within the types of agreements delineated by Section 20a of the Holding Company Act. Reliance also contends that even if the Forum Agreement is governed by Section 20a of the Act, the failure of Reliance to obtain approval for the Forum Agreement only renders the agreement voidable, not automatically void. Reliance contends that the Illinois Director of Insurance (the “Director”) elected not to take any actions to void the Forum Agreement. Reliance further contends that the public policy behind the Holding Company Act is not implicated by the Forum Agreement, and therefore, the Forum Agreement should not be voided.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 9033(d), the Court applies a de novo standard of review to the Bankruptcy Court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court may “accept, reject or modify the proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the bankruptcy judge with instruction.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9033(d). In conducting a de novo review, the Court must consider all of the Bankruptcy Court’s findings and conclusions and afford them no presumption of validity.

In this case, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of Reliance on Forum’s illegality defense. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment if a court determines from its examination of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether there is a triable dispute of material fact, a court must review all of the evidence and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir.1995). A court should not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

The non-movant may defeat a motion for summary judgment, by coming forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the non-movant will not be sufficient to support a [259]*259denial of a motion for summary judgment. Rather, there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

The purpose of the Holding Company Act is to protect the interests of current and future policyholders of Illinois insurance companies. Hoylake Investments Ltd. v. Washburn, 723 F.Supp. 42, 46 (N.D.Ill.1989). The provisions of the Holding Company Act applicable to this dispute provide, in pertinent part:

131.20a. Prior notification of transactions; dividends and distributions

(l)(a) The following transactions between a domestic company and any person in its holding company system may not be entered into unless the company has notified the Director in writing of its intention to enter into such transaction at least 30 days prior thereto, or such shorter period as the Director may permit, and the Director has not disapproved it within such period:
(i) Sales, purchases, exchanges of assets, loans or extensions of credit,‘guarantees, investments, or any other transaction involving the transfer of assets from or liabilities to a company equal to or exceeding the lesser of 3% of the company’s admitted assets or 25% of its surplus as regards policyholders as of the 31st day of December next preceding—

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Bluebook (online)
344 B.R. 256, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reliance-insurance-v-colonial-penn-franklin-insurance-in-re-montgomery-ded-2006.