Reiter v. Kendall III

District Court, M.D. Tennessee·Decided March 27, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-00678·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICHARD B. REITER ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) NO. 3:23-cv-00678 v. ) ) JUDGE CAMPBELL FRANK KENDALL III, Secretary, United ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES States Air Force, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER Pending before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 33), which was filed on February 7, 2025. Through the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s cross motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. No. 24) be denied and that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. No. 26) be granted. Plaintiff filed objections (Doc. No. 34), and Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. No. 35). For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and approved. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.02, a district court reviews de novo any portion of a report and recommendation to which a specific objection is made. United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001). General or conclusory objections are insufficient. See Zimmerman v. Cason, 354 F. Appx. 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, “only those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate review.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987)). In conducting the review, the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). II. ANALYSIS A. Background Plaintiff served as an active-duty Air Force officer from December 1993 until August 1998

and then served in the Air Force Reserves from September 1998 until he retired in June 2021. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 26). In 2016, Plaintiff was eligible for promotion to the rank of Colonel. (Id. ¶ 27). The CY 16 Air Force Reserve Line and Nonline Colonel Promotion Selection Board with Board ID V0616A (the “Promotion Board”) oversaw Plaintiff’s promotion process. Plaintiff’s senior rater, Lieutenant General Stayce D. Harris, completed a promotion recommendation form (“PRF”) for Plaintiff. Before the Promotion Board meeting, Plaintiff received a PRF completed by Lt. Gen. Harris that ranked Plaintiff as number 1 of the total number of officers designated as “definitely promote” (the “#1 PRF”). (AR 15). However, the PRF for Plaintiff that the Promotion Board received was also completed by Lt. Gen. Harris but ranked

Plaintiff the second of two officers designated as “definitely promote” (the “#2 PRF”). (AR 16). Plaintiff was not promoted to Colonel. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 29). Plaintiff subsequently learned that the PRF he received was different than the PRF received by the Promotion Board. Plaintiff then submitted an application to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (the “Correction Board”) to request that his records be corrected and that a Special Selection Board consider the #1 PRF received by Plaintiff rather than the #2 PRF received by the Promotion Board. (AR 12). The Air Reserve Personnel Center, Promotion Board issued an advisory opinion that stated that without documentation from Lt. Gen. Harris to confirm that the incorrect PRF was submitted, the Promotion Board must use the PRF submitted by Lt. Gen. Harris. (AR 20). Plaintiff submitted a rebuttal to the advisory opinion. (AR 38-41). The Correction Board determined that Plaintiff had not been “the victim of an error or injustice” and denied Plaintiff’s application on March 19, 2018. (AR 42 – 44). The Correction Board advised Plaintiff that it may be willing to reconsider if Plaintiff submitted documentation from Lt. Gen. Harris stating that the incorrect PRF was submitted. (AR

44). Plaintiff submitted a second application to the Correction Board on June 27, 2018. The Air Reserve Personnel Center, Promotion Board issued a second advisory opinion and recommended that Plaintiff be given an opportunity to submit a letter to the board regarding his concerns about the PRF and that, if he did so, a Special Selection Board be convened in lieu of the Promotion Board. (AR 82-84). Plaintiff again submitted a rebuttal to the advisory opinion and requested that the Correction Board promote him to colonel without convening a Special Selection Board, or that a Special Selection Board convene and consider the #1 PRF rather than the #2 PRF. (AR 92 – 100).

On January 24, 2019, the Correction Board determined that Plaintiff had demonstrated an error or injustice with respect to part of his request. (AR 7-9). Specifically, the Correction Board determined that the incorrect PRF was mailed to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to discuss his rating with his senior rater or submit a letter to the Promotion Board, which the Correction Board found was an error or injustice. The Correction Board recommended that Plaintiff’s pertinent military records be corrected to ensure that he be granted supplemental promotion consideration utilizing the PRF provided by Lt. Gen. Harris and that Plaintiff be given the opportunity to submit a letter to the board president. (AR 7-9). With regard to the remainder of Plaintiff’s request, the Correction Board determined that “the evidence did not demonstrate material error or injustice and the application could only be reconsidered upon receipt of relevant evidence not already considered by the Board.” (AR 10). Plaintiff submitted a letter to the board’s president and requested that his records be reviewed with the #1 PRF instead of the #2 PRF. (Doc. No. 1-5). Plaintiff was not selected for promotion and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2021. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 45). Plaintiff subsequently commenced this lawsuit under the Administrative

Procedure Act. B. The Administrative Procedure Act “Federal courts have the authority to review the decision of a military board of correction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).” Bolton v. Dep't of the Navy Bd. for Correction of Naval Recs., 914 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted). Decisions of military correction boards “are ‘subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evidence.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Moreover, this court is without authority to reverse a decision of [a military board of correction] unless it is: found to be arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, or unsupported by substantial evidence, or is contrary

to applicable laws and regulations.” Covill v. United States, 959 F.2d 58, 63 (6th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has recognized that an agency’s decision is “arbitrary and capricious” when it “has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2529, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007) (internal citation omitted).

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