Reinhardt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided June 9, 2021·No. 17-1257·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 17-1257V

************************* * * GLENN REINHARDT, * * UNPUBLISHED * Petitioner, * * Special Master Katherine E. Oler v. * * * Filed: April 22, 2021 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND * HUMAN SERVICES, * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs * * Respondent. * * ************************* *

Michael Baseluos, Baseluos Law Firm, PLLC, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner Julia Collison, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On September 15, 2017, Glenn Reinhardt (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”) alleging Petitioner suffered from bilateral optic neuritis, leading to irreversible legal blindness from the influenza (“flu”) vaccine he received on October 11, 2016. Pet. at 1, ECF No. 1.

1 Because this unpublished Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this Decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B), however the parties may object to the Decision’s inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the Decision in its present form will be available. Id. 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2012)) (hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All subsequent references to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.

1 On August 9, 2020, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling $549,461.89.3 Fees App. at 11, ECF No. 117. On August 10, 2020, Respondent filed a response stating it is within my discretion to award interim attorneys’ fees and costs. Fees Resp., ECF No. 118. Respondent “defers to [me] to determine whether or not petitioner here has met the legal standard for interim fees and costs award.” Id. at 2.

For the reasons discussed below, I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and award a total of $501,197.89 in interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys' fees under the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not, however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Even though it has been argued that a petitioner must meet the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony, and undue hardship -- special masters have instead treated these criteria as possible factors in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the special master finds that a petitioner has brought his petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis. §15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs, 105 Fed. Cl. 148 (2012), at 154; Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed.

3 The correct amount of Petitioner’s request is $547,461.89. It appears that Mr. Baseluos double billed for Dr. Cestari’s retainer ($2,000). Petitioner’s calculations regarding his experts’ costs are inconsistent because he uses the terms “inclusive” and “exclusive” of retainer throughout his Fees Motion. The correct amounts Petitioner has requested for his experts are $145,750 for Dr. Akbari; $145,915 for Dr. Cestari; and $62,480 for Dr. Turner. The retainers will be removed from Petitioner’s miscellaneous costs for clarity and will be incorporated in the expert costs. All other calculations are accurate.

2 Cl. 323, 334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear, 2013 WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner; it also looks at any money expended by a petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2. Referring to Avera, former Chief Special Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general principle underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

Since the petition for compensation was successful, Petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See § 15(e)(1). Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in Vaccine Act cases are determined using the lodestar approach, which begins with an assessment of a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by a reasonable number of hours expended in the case. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008.)

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