Reiners v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.

188 So. 47, 192 La. 415, 1939 La. LEXIS 1100
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 6, 1939
DocketNo. 35114.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 188 So. 47 (Reiners v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reiners v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 188 So. 47, 192 La. 415, 1939 La. LEXIS 1100 (La. 1939).

Opinion

ROGERS, Justice.

This suit was originally brought by Mrs. Peter J. Reiners, as curatrix of the interdict Peter J. Reiners, and by William Edwin O’Neall, as lessee and assignee of certain mineral rights, against the Humble Oil & Refining Company and L. J. Jones to obtain the annulment of a certain mineral lease covering 246 acres of land *417 in what is known as the “North Crowley Area” in Acadia Parish.

• The lease was executed by Peter J. Reiners to L. J. Jones and was assigned by Jones to the Humble Oil & Refining Company. Plaintiffs, at the same time, brought another suit against R. W. Milner, Jr., Independent Consulting Company, J. Brien Eby, F. J. Muller, Marrs McLean, P. L. Lawrence, R. W. Mclllvain, and Jones-O’Brien, Inc., to obtain the annulment of certain mineral sales subsequently made by Peter J. Reiners. Plaintiffs set forth in both suits, as grounds of nullity of the various instruments attacked therein, that at the time he executed the instruments, for many years prior thereto, and. at all times since, Peter J. Reiners was insane and incapable of administering his affairs; that his insanity was notorious; that he was known by those who generally saw and conversed with him to be mentally deranged; that the defendants named in the suits were aware of his insanity and incapacity and that none of them could have been deceived as to the state of his mind.

The Humble Oil & Refining Company' filed an exception of non-joinder of necessary parties. The trial judge maintained the exception and ordered plaintiffs to amend their petition “by making the immediate mineral grantees of Peter J. Reiners and their respective vendees in title, the names of whom appear from the certified copies, of mineral deeds annexed to and made part of the exception of non-joinder, above referred to, parties to this suit.” In obedience to this order, plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition in the original suit against the Humble Oil & Refining Company and L. J. Jones, impleading as parties defendant the mineral purchasers and their immediate mineral grantees, and, in addition to the relief asked against the original defendants, prayed for judgment against the said mineral purchasers and their ' mineral grantees, annulling the mineral sales and all subsequent transfers thereof.

As the result of the filing of the amended petition all the matters and things that could have been put at issue in the other suit were put in issue in this suit.

Before defendants filed their answer, Peter J. Reiners died intestate, and his widow, as surviving spouse in community, and his children, as his sole heirs, were judicially recognized as such and substituted as parties plaintiff.

All the defendants, except L. J. Jones, filed answer, denying all the essential allegations of plaintiffs’ original and supplemental - petitions, setting up their respective titles, claiming that they were purchasers in good faith, and alleging that. Peter J. Reiners was sane at the time he executed the various instruments' under attack. L. J. Jones failed to file any answer, and as to him, the suit was put at issue by the entry of a preliminary default.

The pleadings in the case are lengthy and the evidence is voluminous, but the issues involved are clear. They are, first, was Peter J. Reiners sane or insane in the years 1933 and 1934 when he executed the various instruments herein sought to be *419 annulled, second, if he were, was such insanity notorious, or did the parties dealing with him have knowledge thereof, and, third, are the plaintiffs, or any of them, estopped from questioning his mental capacity to execute the instruments?

After keeping the case under advisement for a number of months, the trial judge rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants dismissing plaintiffs’ demands and recognizing the validity of the various instruments executed by Peter J. Reiners. The reasons assigned by the trial judge for his judgment are as follows:

“This case having been submitted on briefs and taken under advisement in the Parish of Vermilion, the Court rendered judgment rejecting the demands of plaintiffs and dismissing this suit at plaintiffs’ costs, on the ground that Peter Joseph Reiners was, during the entire ”year of 1933, and for some five years prior thereto sane and capable of managing and administering his affairs and competent to contract and understood the meaning and purpose and legal effects of the contracts executed by him during said year and sought to be set aside and annulled herein; that if at the time of the execution of the mineral deeds, in the year 1934, by said Peter Joseph Reiners and sought to be annulled and set aside herein, the' said Peter Joseph Reiners was insane and incapable by reason of such insanity, to enter into valid contracts such insanity was not notorious, and the purchasers of such minerals under said deeds were unaware of the insanity of said Peter Joseph Reiners and purchased said minerals in good faith and believing at the time that said Reiners was sane and capable of entering into valid contracts.”

Contending that the findings of the trial judge are erroneous and that his judgment is incorrect, plaintiffs have appealed.

The various instruments signed by Peter J. Reiners, which plaintiffs seek to annul, are a mineral lease in favor of L. J. Jones executed on May 11, 1933, and an act correcting the description of the leased property executed on August 22, 1933, which lease was assigned by Jones to the Humble Oil & Refining Company; mineral sales to R. W. Milner, Jr., dated June 8, 1933; to F. J. Muller, dated June IS, 1933; to Jones-O’Brien, Inc., dated May 3, 1934, and to P. L. Lawrence, dated November 27, 1934.

Article 1788 of the Revised Civil Code, which is contained in the chapter covering the capacity of persons to contract, announces the following rules:

“2. As to contracts, made prior to the application for the interdiction, they can only be invalidated by proving the incapacity to have existed at the time the contracts were made.
“3. But in order to prevent imposition, it is not enough to make the proof mentioned in the last rule; it must also, in that case, be shown that the person interdicted was known by those who generally saw and conversed with him, to be in a state of mental derangement, or that the person who contracted with him, from that or other circumstances, was acquainted with his incapacity.”

*421 After announcing these two rules, the same article provides:

“9. That evidence of general and habitual insanity, in order to avoid a contract, may be rebutted by showing that the contract or act was made during a lucid interval; but where general insanity, even with some intervals, is shown, the burden of showing that the particular act in dispute was made during 'such an internal, is thrown on the party who supports the validity of the act or contract.”

Plaintiffs, relying on rule 9 above quoted, take the position that Peter J.

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Bluebook (online)
188 So. 47, 192 La. 415, 1939 La. LEXIS 1100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reiners-v-humble-oil-refining-co-la-1939.