Reinecke v. Spalding

30 F.2d 369, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8442, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2412, 7 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 8442
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 2, 1929
DocketNo. 4074
StatusPublished

This text of 30 F.2d 369 (Reinecke v. Spalding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reinecke v. Spalding, 30 F.2d 369, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8442, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2412, 7 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 8442 (7th Cir. 1929).

Opinion

PAGE, Circuit Judge.

The leases, for iron ore bearing lands, in this case, were involved in McHale v. Hull (C. C. A.) 16 F. (2d) 781, and were made by appellee in that case and by plaintiff (appellee) here, and others, as lessors. The following matters present in this ease are not found in the McHale Case: (a) A properly authenticated bill of exceptions; (b) a jury trial; (c) each party asked an instructed verdict.

A verdict was directed for plaintiff, who sued to recover an alleged excess of taxes, paid under protest, for tho years 1917 and 1918, on her income under those leases.

There were seven leases, made, one in 1901, four in 1902, one in 1903, and one in 1905, for the mining of iron ore from lands in Minnesota, in which plaintiff owned a one-sixth interest. The compensation to lessors was a royalty of 25 cenis per ton, payable quarter annually. No lease was for a longer term than 50 years. Under the 1905 lease, the term, as to several tracts, was 45 years, but as to one tract was 50 years. Under the 1903 lease, the term was 25 years. Under one 1902 lease, the term was 50 years for mining five-sixths, but for mining a certain described one-sixth was for only 25 years. The provisions as to tho annual minimum to be mined varied. ■ Several, if not all of tho leases, gave the lessees the right to cancel on 30 days’ notice.

Tho sole controversy is over the correctness of the government’s .method of arriving at the value of the iron ore in the ground on March 1, 1913, a matter not covered by the revenue acts in question, nor by any regulation of the Treasury Department.

The only thing the government’s one witness testified to was the general custom in tho mining business with reference to determining allowance for depletion. In response to a question by the court, he said that in making such determination they assumed that the value of the mineral in place had been arrived at — that is to say, they assumed the very thing here in controversy.

For plaintiff, several witnesses testified, and their qualification is not questioned, that the March 1, 1913, value of the ore in place was over 25 cents per ton.

The government’s ease is based upon several assumptions: First, it assumes the number of tons of ore in place on March 1, .1913 —and the correctness of that assumption is not controverted; second, it states the average tonnage mined in the years 1913 to 1918, inclusive; third, applying that average, it assumes that the whole tonnage will be mined in 40 years, and that plaintiff’s one-sixth in[370]*370terest in the leases will yield her in 40 years, at 25 cents per ton, $7,849,287.18. And, therefore, the government says the way to arrive at the market value on March 1, 1913, of the ore in place is to find the March 1, 1913, value of the $7,849,287.18 — to- he paid, as assumed, over.a period of 40 yeans. By that process, the value of one ton of ore in place on March 1, 1913, was found to be .0886243, and the whole value of plaintiff’s one-sixth interest, as of that date, was found to be $2,782,551.64. The government’s figures and processes are set out in a letter to plaintiff, pertinent portions of which are as follows (numerals at left are ours) :

“Ore reserve, March 1, 3913, according to the Minnesota Tax Commission, as shown on questionnaire ‘ of the Royal

Mineral Association .......... 191,417,150 tons

Less: Advance royalty pay-

ment by lessees, prior to March 1, 1913, on.............. 3,034,258 tons

(1) Net tonnage as of March 1,

1913 ............................ 188,382,892

(2) Your interest, one-sixth,

March 1, 1913.................. 31,397,148.7 tons

(3) Total average extraction, 1913

to 1918, inclusive............. 4,770,000 tons

(4) Maximum life of mine allowed 40 years

(5) Interest rate allowed.......... 6%

(6) Royalty rate per ton........... $ 7 0.25

(7) Your capital sum returnable

in 40 years ................... 7,849,287.18

(8) Present worth of your inter-

est, March 1, 1913............ 2,782,551.64

(9) Unit cost per ton, March 1,

1933, basis for depletion...... 0.0886243

(10) Depletion in 1916, 1,096,015.4

tons at $0.0886243.............. 97,133.60

(11) Depletion in 1917, 1,040,289.4

tons at $Q.08S6243.............. 92,194.92“

We are of opinion that the government’s method of arriving at the March 1, 1913, value of the ore in place is wrong for many reasons, some of which are:

(a) The assumption that the value of the leases to plaintiff, at the end of 40 years, will be $7,849,287.18 is far from correct. That is only the principal she will receive for her one-sixth interest within the time taken to mine the whole of the ore. The leases were and are worth, also, the interest upon the payments made quarterly over the mining period. As shown by the letter, supra, there were mined in each year, 1916 and 1917, in excess of 1,000,000 tons, from whieh she received, each year, in excess of $250,-000. At five per cent, that would double in 20 years, and in 40 years would be worth to her nearly three-quarters of a million dollars. All interest would be in excess of the $7,849,287.18. On the government theory, it would take all interest to make that amount.

(b) It is reasonably probable that, where there is a large body of ore to be mined, extending over a term of years, the amount mined annually would vary greatly, being governed by the equipment employed, the market demands, and prices, and oftentimes by the fact that the lessee had, or did not have, requisite capital to operate the mines. For those reasons, the average extraction for the years 1913 to 1918 would, in all probability, be no fair basis for arriving at an average during the whole term. That this is so, is evidenced by the fact that the tonnage, shown by the letter to have been mined in 1916 and 1917 — 2 of the 6 years used by the government as the basis for arriving at the term of 40 years — would reduce the government’s theoretical period of 40 years by one-fourth, so that plaintiff’s whole tonnage at the 1916 and 1917 average would be mined in 30 years, thereby, on the government’s theory, very materially increasing the market value on March 1, 1913. Forty-five per cent, of the amount mined in those 6 years was mined in the two years,-1916 and 1917, ■ so that the average for the other 4 years was less than 700,000 tons.

'(e) With the exception of tract 6, whieh may be mined, under the lease made in 1905, within 50 years, there is no lease that runs for a term of 40 years after March 1, 1913. Under the 1901 lease, one-sixth had to be mined out in 25 years. The 1903 lease was made for a term of 25 years. So that the estimated period of 40 years extends far beyond the time permitted by the leases and within whieh plaintiff would have received all of her money if all the ore had been mined.

(d) The right to mine under the leases was not a sale of the iron ore. The leases here in question are similar to, if not identical in form with, the leases involved in a number of eases in the Supreme Court, one of whieh is Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 37 S. Ct. 201, 61 L. Ed. 460.

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Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.
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30 F.2d 369, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8442, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2412, 7 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 8442, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reinecke-v-spalding-ca7-1929.