Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc.

558 So. 2d 1249, 1990 WL 15806
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 21, 1990
Docket88 CA 1984, 88 CA 1985
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 558 So. 2d 1249 (Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc., 558 So. 2d 1249, 1990 WL 15806 (La. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

558 So.2d 1249 (1990)

Ronald REILLY
v.
DYNAMIC EXPLORATION, INC., et al. consolidated with
William O. BARRETT, Sr.
v.
PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.

Nos. 88 CA 1984, 88 CA 1985.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

February 21, 1990.

Warren A. Perrin, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant William O. Barrett, Sr.

Arthur Cobb, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant Ronald Reilly.

*1250 Charles O'Brien, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Kimray, Inc.

Stephen Wilson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc.

Before COVINGTON, WATKINS and SHORTESS, JJ.

SHORTESS, Judge.

These are suits for personal injuries resulting from an explosion. The petition of Ronald B. Reilly originally named as defendants Dynamic Exploration, Inc., Production Management Corporation, Inc., Don Dronet, Don Dronet Lease Management, Inc., J. Burton LeBlanc, and Kimray, Inc. The petition of William O. Barrett, Sr., originally named these parties as defendants with the addition of Mid-Continent Underwriters. The suits were consolidated for purposes of trial, and amending petitions made by both plaintiffs named as an additional defendant Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc. The trial involved only Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc. (Stockham) and Kimray, Inc. (Kimray), as settlements were apparently made with the other defendants. This appeal arises from a directed verdict in favor of both Stockham and Kimray. Plaintiffs specify error in the granting of the directed verdict and in an evidentiary ruling (the refusal to qualify an expert witness) made during the course of the trial.

FACTS

On the morning of May 4, 1981, Reilly and Barrett began a bypass operation on the No. 2 well at the Mallets Bluff production facility in East Baton Rouge Parish. Reilly was a "gauger" employed by Production Management, Inc. (Production Management) to monitor the production of eight different wells at two different locations, including the four wells located at Mallets Bluff. The facility was owned by Dynamic Exploration, Inc. (Dynamic), who contracted with Production Management for services such as those performed by Reilly.

Barrett was an independent contractor contacted by Reilly to perform the bypass. On the day of the accident Barrett and a two-man crew arrived at the site at approximately 7:30 a.m. Barrett and Reilly discussed the procedure and ordered the necessary materials.

There is some controversy as to appropriate authorization for the bypass job. Don Dronet, a production superintendent with Dynamic, ordered Reilly, a Production Management employee, to have it done. Dronet was out of town on the date of the accident and not present to oversee the operation. No one, in fact, in a supervisory capacity was present, and neither Reilly nor Barrett possessed a schematic diagram of the facility.

The Mallets Bluff field produces a crude oil and "heavy" natural gas[1] mixture. Each of the four wells is connected independently to a high pressure separator which decreases wellhead pressures approximating 1200 psi to approximately 600 psi, then a low-pressure separator which reduces the 600 psi to approximately 200 psi, and then a heater treater which separates water from the oil and gas. The pressure in the heater treater varies between 17 and 25 psi, and it is fueled by dehydrated gas from all four wells on the site; some dehydrated gas is also piped directly (bypassing the heater treater) to a gas vent line that exits the heater treater and is flared in a pit in order to maintain pressure in the heater treater itself.

Reilly testified that he shut in the No. 2 well and isolated the heater treater (by closing a number of valves) prior to beginning the procedure. A valve manufactured by Kimray, located immediately downstream from the heater treater, indicated approximately 17 psi still on the line. Barrett and Reilly attempted to bleed the pressure through an adjusting screw on the top of the Kimray valve, but there was no change on the pressure indicator. An arrow *1251 embossed on the Kimray valve indicated the direction of the vent line flow to be away from the heater treater. Reilly and Barrett testified that they understood the arrow to mean that the valve would only allow flow in that direction,[2] and that they relied upon the arrow to conclude that the safest means to bleed off the pressure would be at the union immediately upstream from the Kimray valve and downstream from the heater treater. Barrett testified the Kimray indicator told him what amount of pressure was upstream but he had no way to determine what pressure, if any, existed downstream from the valve. Barrett and a member of his crew proceeded to break the union. Barrett testified that he heard the familiar hiss of dissipating pressure, then nothing, and then there was an explosion.

EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT

During the course of the trial plaintiffs attempted to qualify Robert D. Owen, a self-employed safety consultant, as "expert in safety as it relates to the practices, procedures, equipment and personnel of the work place...." In traversal, Owen was asked, "in effect [that] means that you're an expert in safety in just everything?" Owen replied, "[w]ell I guess you'd have to interpret it that way, yes."

Defense counsel objected to the witness being qualified in a field without parameters. The trial court sustained the objection, commenting, "If you can define parameters, I'll reconsider." Owen was asked additional questions regarding his various clients and the particular services he provided those clients, and was re-tendered as an expert. Defense counsel again objected, and the trial court sustained, explaining that without definable parameters, a ruling on an objection as to a question being beyond Owen's field of expertise would be impossible. Owen was allowed to testify as a lay witness, and much opinion testimony was elicited without objection.

Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred in not accepting Owen as an expert. The discretion of a trial court to refuse or admit a witness as an expert is broad; the decision cannot be reversed absent clear error. Anthony v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 477 So.2d 1180, 1185 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1985), writ denied, 480 So.2d 743 (1986). In view of the reasons given for refusing to admit Owen as an expert and the inability of counsel or the witness to provide some workable limits, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred.

THE DIRECTED VERDICT

The trial court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict, dismissing the suit at the close of all the evidence. The motion was granted in open court, and the trial court indicated that written reasons would follow. None have.

Judgments of the trial court are presumed correct, and it is an appellant's burden to show otherwise. Gaudet v. G.D.C. Inc., 451 So.2d 158 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 458 So.2d 109 (1984). Where no reasons for judgment exist, we must assume the trial court followed the correct rule of law in arriving at the final judgment. See Pumilia v. Dileo, 169 So.2d 581, 583 (La.App. 4th Cir.1964).

A directed verdict may be granted only when the evidence viewed in a manner most favorable to the motion's adversary allows reasonable jurors no other conclusion. Pritchard v. Safeco Insurance Co., 529 So.2d 449 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 532 So.2d 159 (1988). Stated in the affirmative, if a reasonable jury could have found otherwise, the directed verdict constitutes error. Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hospital,

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Related

Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc.
619 So. 2d 120 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1993)
Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc.
571 So. 2d 140 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1990)
Bartlett v. Reese
569 So. 2d 195 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
558 So. 2d 1249, 1990 WL 15806, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reilly-v-dynamic-exploration-inc-lactapp-1990.