Reilly v. Cornell Steamboat Co.
This text of 214 F. 60 (Reilly v. Cornell Steamboat Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The flotilla, consisting of several vessels, was proceeding up river in tow of respondent’s tugs Crosby and Mead; the Primrose was a helper. About 5 p. m. of November 3d they were off Ver Plank’s Point when the Primrose took off the Go Ahead and another scow, the Blarneystone, which were bound for Tompkin’s Cove on the west side of the river. At the time there was a strong, northeast wind blowing, accompanied by rain and the water was rough. The two scows were light, there is no evidence to show that the wind was blowing more than 20 miles an hour, the tug was of ample power, and if the hawser were sufficient there was nothing to indicate that there was any trouble to be apprehended in the undertaking. The District Judge based his finding that the storm was too severe to take the scows across solely on the circumstance that the rope “broke”; but, since we are satisfied it did not break, we reach a different conclusion, and are satisfied that there was no negligence in starting them across the river to their destination under existing conditions. While thus proceeding the hawser parted, and the two scows drifted over towards Stoney Point. The tug thereupon put about and tried to pick them up. She passed a hawser to one of them, which was made fast there; but owing to the drifting of the scows the deckhand of the tug was unable to fasten it on the Primrose, it ran into the water, and the scows went on the rocks.
Judge Holt held the tug in fault because the hawser was not sufficiently strong, and because the Primrose, when trying to effect a rescue, did not fasten her hawser to her own bitt before passing it to the scows.
There is some conflict of testimony as to what was said when the towing hawser was passed aboard, but we find the evidence from the Primrose — viz., that the scowmen were told to take a round turn on the Go Ahead’s bitt — more persuasive. It is manifestly the correct way. Any boatman should have known that was the thing to do, and it was in that way that the lines between the Go Ahead and the Blar-neystone were made fast. Under our decisions in The Lyndhurst, 147 Fed. 110, 77 C. C. A. 336, and The Edwin Terry, 162 Fed. 309, 89 C. C. A. 19, the master of the tug cannot be held in fault because he did not himself go aboard the scows to see that his instructions as to making fast the hawser had been carried out.
The decree is reversed, with costs of appeal, and cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the libel, with costs.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
214 F. 60, 130 C.C.A. 500, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1107, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reilly-v-cornell-steamboat-co-ca2-1914.