Reighard v. Downs

273 A.2d 109, 261 Md. 26
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedMarch 11, 1971
Docket[No. 239, September Term, 1970.]
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 273 A.2d 109 (Reighard v. Downs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reighard v. Downs, 273 A.2d 109, 261 Md. 26 (Md. 1971).

Opinion

Smith, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is claimed that a transposition of figures created this litigation. Appellant Lanious K. Reighard (Reighard) sued appellees Leo Clark Downs (Downs), doing business as Harford Survey Associates, and Earl Bradley Crabtree (Crabtree), Downs’ employee, when it developed that a tract of land Reighard purchased in Harford County contained two and a half acres less than a plat had shown. We shall reverse judgment entered in favor of the defendants and remand the case for determination of appellant’s damages.

Reighard is a Harford County real estate broker. Prior to 1965, Gary B. Scheeler and other members of his family were owners of a large tract of land in Harford County with a frontage on Old Joppa Road. Some of this land was sold through Reighard and a realtor by whom he was then employed as sales manager. When the Scheelers decided *28 to sell 14 acres of land behind that which Reighard had sold, they listed with the realtor. Additional land was added. Through Reighard, Downs, a registered land surveyor, was employed to survey this tract. Various drawings were submitted. Ultimately plats were submitted specifying the acreage of the “enclosed area” to be “22.-075 Ac. ±”.

Reighard began to be interested in purchasing the land himself. The Scheeler listing was at $33,000.00 which worked out to about $1,500.00 per acre. Reighard offered $27,500.00, which he said was $1,250.00 per acre. An oral agreement was ultimately reached in April on this basis, with the Scheelers to get the sod off the meadow land. The sale was then contingent upon Reighard’s obtaining a satisfactory subdivision plan and establishing that the land would pass percolation tests.

Between the time that Reighard and the Scheelers orally agreed on a sale and the execution on June 21, 1966, of a contract of sale, Downs was directed by Reighard to do yet additional work relative to this land for which Reighard paid. Reighard testified that he advised Crab-tree (stipulated to have been an employee of Downs) that he wanted lots of approximately one acre in size with a minimum frontage of 125 feet. Many additional plans were submitted. The June 3 plat showed 19 lots; the July 8 plat, 20 lots; the August 9 plat, 17 lots; and the September 27 plat, 17 lots. Settlement was made on August 15,1966.

When Downs was requested to compute the size of each of the then remaining 17 lots and the area included in the roadbed it was discovered that the area enclosed on the plats (and purchased by Reighard) comprised 19.58 acres rather than 22.075 acres. There was no contention of error in the laying down of the lines. The error was one of computation brought about by inverting two coordinates when they were fed into a calculating machine by Crabtree.

Reighard sued Scheeler, Downs and Crabtree. The *29 trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer filed on behalf of the Scheelers. There is no appeal here upon that point.

The trial judge stated in pertinent part:

“The Defendants’ position is that the Plaintiff has failed to show a breach of any legal duty owed by them to the Plaintiff, so, therefore, there is no breach of contract. The Declaration says the Defendants did not perform the work in a ‘good and workmanlike manner’. While this wording may sound in tort, the Counts of the Declaration sound in contract, and, therefore, the Court will regard this case as one of a breach of contract. Since the Defendants also allege that a fatal variance exists by reason of the failure of proof to match the allegations, the Court must also review the evidence in connection with the allegations.
“Counts 4, 5 and 8 as Amended are the only remaining Counts in the Declaration that are relevant to the issue at hand. Counts 4 and 8 allege an Agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants that calls for the Defendants to prepare a satisfactory Sub-division Plan. The Defendants prepared a Plan calling for 23 lots, but the Plaintiff felt it was too crowded and, therefore, unsatisfactory. He asked for another Plan and an explanation of why 23 lots could not be fitted in. Another Plan was submitted calling for 20 lots. This appeared to be satisfactory and was submitted to Harford County for approval as a Sub-division. The Plan was disapproved because a change in the road plans and the drainage was requested. Because of this the Defendants prepared another Plan calling for 19 lots and meeting the objections of the County. This Plan was accepted by the Plaintiff, submitted to the County and approved. With the acceptance *30 of this Plan by the Plaintiff, he prepared a Contract of Sale with the Scheelers calling for a purchase price of $27,500. Settlement was held about two months later, on or about 15 August 1966.
“Count 5 on the other hand alleges that the Scheelers employed the Defendants to prepare a survey of the tract to be sold with the acreage computed; that this was done for the benefit of the Plaintiff as the Real Estate Agent, and for possible purchasers.”

He then held:

“The Court feels that the Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to show a breach of duty owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff to maintain a cause of action under Counts 4 and 8. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to establish the cause of action for the Plaintiff as a third party beneficiary undef the Contract between the Scheelers and the Defendants. In addition, there is no evidence that the Scheelers would have accepted less than $27,500. if the correct number of acres had been known. Mr. Scheeler’s testimony indicated that there was no discussion of price on a per acre basis. His motivation for accepting Plaintiff’s offer was that it gave him his $30,000. asking price minus commission. The number of acres in the tract was not a factor in his mind.
“Therefore, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion for a Dismissal.”

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 535 was filed by each of the defendants at the end of the plaintiff’s case. These motions were overruled. Each of the defendants then declined to offer any evidence and resubmitted what they called “a demurrer to evidence prayer”. As Judge McWilliams put it for the Court in Smith v. *31 State Roads Comm., 240 Md. 525, 214 A. 2d 792 (1965), relative to the motion to dismiss:

“If he waits until the close of all of the evidence then the motion becomes a nugacity because all of the evidence is then before the trier of facts and the determination of its legal sufficiency becomes an inseparable and necessary part of his decision.” Id. at 539-40.

Reighard assigns as error here the rulings of the trial judge (1) “holding [he] had no enforceable contractual rights as a result of a direct agreement between the parties”; (2) “sustaining the demurrer to [count two of] the Declaration”; (3) “sustaining the demurrer to [count three of] the Declaration”; and (4) “rejecting evidence of loss of profits”.

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Bluebook (online)
273 A.2d 109, 261 Md. 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reighard-v-downs-md-1971.