Reifschneider v. City of Des Peres Public Safety Commission

776 S.W.2d 1, 1989 Mo. LEXIS 92, 1989 WL 103257
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedSeptember 8, 1989
Docket71256
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 776 S.W.2d 1 (Reifschneider v. City of Des Peres Public Safety Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reifschneider v. City of Des Peres Public Safety Commission, 776 S.W.2d 1, 1989 Mo. LEXIS 92, 1989 WL 103257 (Mo. 1989).

Opinion

RENDLEN, Judge.

John J. Reifschneider, employed by the City of Des Peres as a fireman and policeman, petitioned the circuit court under the terms of § 536.100, RSMo 1986, for judicial review of a decision of the city’s Public Safety Commission. 1 In that petition, Reifschneider alleged he filed a workers' compensation claim when injured in the course of his employment but the city improperly set off his compensation benefits against his city sick leave pay and further, delayed returning him to duty. Reifs- *2 chneider further alleged that on learning of this action by the city, he petitioned the respondent, seeking there a reversal of the city’s action.

After a hearing before the Public Safety Commission, a decision was rendered by the commission on November 2,1987, denying Reifschneider’s claim and approving the actions of the city. Within the month, on November 30, appellant filed his timely 2 Petition for Review captioned “John J. Reifschneider, Petitioner, vs. City of Des Peres Public Safety Commission, Respondent” in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. 3

Respondent moved to dismiss, alleging failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and want of jurisdiction because petitioner failed to file a valid petition within the time allowed by law. These challenges were predicated upon the petition’s failure to set forth in the caption the names of the individual commission members. In this connection we note that the individual commissioners who participated in the decision were named in the body of the petition for review and it goes without saying that the respondent is indeed the agency involved and its individual members are identified. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, stating that petitioner failed to join all necessary parties and did not file a proper petition within the thirty days allowed by § 536.100. Following affirmance in the court of appeals, transfer was granted and the cause is determined as though on original appeal. Mo. Const, art. V, § 10. We reverse and remand.

Respondent, citing among others, Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 358 Mo. 365, 214 S.W.2d 529, 533-34 (1948), and American Fire Alarm Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City, 285 Mo. 581, 227 S.W. 114, 121 (1920), contends the City of Des Peres Public Safety Commission is not a legal entity subject to suit as such, and accordingly the individual commission members should have been named in the caption of the petition. Parker is representative of a line of authority concerning this Court’s original appellate jurisdiction in cases where a state officer was a named party. Mo. Const.1945, art. V, § 3 (amended August 4, 1970). There it was held that if the administrative agency was a legal entity, and thus a proper party rather than the individual state officers, the cause in such instance did not fall within the scope of this Court’s original appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, cases such as American Fire Alarm address quite another question; i.e., whether a particular administrative body may initiate or be named as a defendant in a civil suit originating in the trial court.

We find neither line of cases controlling on the question of whether the commission, rather than its individual members, was properly named as respondent in this petition for review of the commission’s own decision. In this context a determination that the commission is or is not a legal entity within the meaning of the former constitutional provision, art. V., § 3 (amended August 4, 1970), does little to assist in the problem of interpreting the provisions of the statute here under consideration.

A petition for review under § 536.100 is quite different from an independent action originating in the trial court in which the respective parties must necessarily possess the capacity to sue or to be sued. In this § 536.100 proceeding, the action had been commenced at the city level and worked its way through the administrative process, culminating in a reviewable decision by the City Public Safety Commission. The commission was in fact an active participant in the administrative proceedings. It was before that agency of *3 the city that the conduct of the city was judged and it was from a final decision of that agency that a mechanism for review is provided by § 536.100. Under the statute, whether vel non the commission is an independent legal entity is irrelevant. Reifs-chneider, as the aggrieved party seeking judicial review of the commission’s final decision, did so in a manner consistent with that intended by the legislature, and cannot be said to have erred in naming the commission as the respondent in his petition for review.

Though it may be common practice to name the individual members of the commission in the caption, we hold that the action taken here did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction so as to preclude its entertainment of the petition for review. Reifschneider and the commission as an agency of the city are the contestants involved in this judicial review proceeding and are the parties properly named in the caption of the petition consistent with Rule 55.02. 4 There are no other parties directly involved and in the posture of this case the commission in effect represents the interests of the city. Section 536.110, which governs the filing of the petition, is silent as to the form it should take.

Assuming arguendo appellant failed to name a party in his petition, it has recently been held in State ex rel. Cass County v. Dandurand, 759 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Mo.App.1988), that such defect does not necessarily deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. There, members of the Cass County Zoning and Planning Commission sought to prohibit the respondent circuit judge from proceeding in a cause where a number of county residents had petitioned for review, pursuant to § 64.660(2), of a special use permit granted by the commission. Relators argued the circuit court was without jurisdiction because the petition failed to name and give notice to a necessary and indispensable party. In refusing the requested writ the court of appeals noted that § 64.660(2), which provides the method for judicial review of the County Zoning Commission’s order, is to be read in pari materia with Chapter 536 to the extent it failed to specify procedural detail. The court pointed to the provision of 536.-110.2 which requires no summons in such review proceedings but only that copies of the petition be delivered to each party of record. Here, as in Cass County, the record was made before the administrative agency and the petition referencing that agency’s record was sent to the commissioners who heard the case 5 as well as the appropriate officers of the city. It was correctly stated in Cass County

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Bluebook (online)
776 S.W.2d 1, 1989 Mo. LEXIS 92, 1989 WL 103257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reifschneider-v-city-of-des-peres-public-safety-commission-mo-1989.