Reid v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 15, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-09243
StatusUnknown

This text of Reid v. The City of New York (Reid v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reid v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CEDRIC REID, Plaintiff, -v.- 20 Civ. 9243 (KPF) THE CITY OF NEW YORK; MARTHA W. ORDER OF SERVICE KING; CYRUS R. VANCE, JR.; LISA FRANCHINI; SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, Defendants. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Green Meadow Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that the New York City Department of Correction’s policy of allowing prosecutors unfettered access to recordings of detainees’ personal calls from Rikers Island for use in criminal proceedings violated his rights, given that the warnings provided to inmates are misleading. By Order dated January 12, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits — to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. DISCUSSION A. Claims Against Defendants Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., and Lisa Franchini Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon

v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding that absolute immunity is analyzed under “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). Prosecutors are also absolutely immune from

suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., and Lisa Franchini are based on actions within the scope of their official duties as prosecutors and associated with the conduct of a criminal trial. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Vance and Franchini are dismissed because he seeks monetary relief against defendants who are immune from

suit for such claims. B. Service on Defendants Securus Technologies and King Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process … in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally

requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summons and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date the summons is issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See

Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Securus Technologies, and New York City Board of Correction (BOC) Executive Director Martha W.

King through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. C. Service on the City of New York The Clerk of Court is directed to notify the New York City Department of Correction and the New York City Law Department of this Order. The Court requests that the City of New York waive service of summons.

Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if Plaintiff’s address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., and Lisa Franchini as these defendants are immune from suit for such claims. See 28 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein
555 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Simon v. City of New York
727 F.3d 167 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Reid v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reid-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2021.