Reid v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 478, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TYRELL REID, § § Defendant Below, § No. 478, 2024 Appellant, § § Court Below: Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2112006478A/B § (N) Appellee. §

Submitted: October 8, 2025 Decided: December 30, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

ORDER

After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and after

oral argument, the Court rules as follows:

(1) A Superior Court jury convicted Tyrell Reid of Murder First Degree,

Assault First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a

Felony. The court sentenced Reid to life in prison and additional time. Reid appeals

his convictions and claims two errors – an evidentiary issue involving impeachment

evidence and the lack of a jury cautionary instruction about Reid’s pre-trial custody

status. After careful consideration, we find that the Superior Court did not exceed

its discretion or err as a matter of law, and we affirm its judgment. (2) On September 25, 2021, three individuals were shot on North Monroe

Street in Wilmington, Delaware. Tyaire Anderson died from his injuries and two

juveniles were wounded by stray bullets. The Wilmington police secured the crime

scene and located video surveillance evidence. They spliced together video of the

shooter’s movements leading up to the incident, the shooting itself, and the

immediate aftermath.

(3) Although the shooter masked his face, the police observed that he wore

a black Nike hoodie on a hot day, walked in a peculiar manner with his toes pointed

outward, wore distinctive sneakers, and spoke to two people immediately before the

shooting. Police determined that the shooter was 5 feet 5 inches tall by measuring

the height of a utility meter appearing next to him in the video. Reid was 5 feet 5

inches tall, was known to wear a black Nike hoodie even in hot weather, had

distinctive Balenciaga sneakers, and had a distinctive walk that matched the

shooter’s walk.

(4) A grand jury indicted Reid for Murder First Degree, three counts of

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, two counts of Assault

First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. The Superior

Court severed the Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited into a “B” case.

The “A” case proceeded to a five-day jury trial.

2 (5) During trial, the State called Tahesha Brown, the mother of Reid’s

children, to testify. During an interview with police, Brown told Detective Jones

that she saw Reid with a gun on or about October 5, 2021, just 10 days after the

shootings. Before trial, the State redacted Brown’s statement about the gun and

agreed not to use that portion of the statement at trial.1

(6) On cross-examination, however, Reid’s counsel asked Brown whether

she had “ever seen Tyrell walk with a firearm in his hand?”2 Brown answered “no.”3

The State objected and claimed that Reid’s attorney had opened the door to Brown’s

prior inconsistent statement that she saw Reid with a gun. Reid responded that

Brown “did not previously state that she saw Mr. Reid walking with a firearm in his

hand, which was the specific question the defense asked; counsel was focused on the

walk.”4 The following colloquy occurred at sidebar:

[Prosecutor]: But Your Honor, the defense can’t ask on cross have you seen him walk with a firearm and then I have to get up on redirect and now say have you ever seen him with a firearm. You can’t say well, I limited it to a walk . . . .

[Defense Counsel]: That’s fine.

[The Court]: The door’s open. Go ahead.

1 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A531-33 [hereinafter A___]. 2 A531. 3 Id. 4 A533.

3 [Prosecutor]: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: That’s fair. Ask her that.5

(7) On redirect, the State asked if Brown had ever seen Reid with a gun.

She denied that she had. The State followed up by asking if Brown told Detective

Jones in an interview that she had seen Reid with a gun. She testified that she did

not recall making the statement. The State asked Brown a third time if she ever saw

Reid with a gun in her “20 years with him.”6 She said she did not remember seeing

him with a gun and did not remember making that statement to Detective Jones.

(8) The State recalled Detective Jones to the stand and asked about Brown’s

prior statement. Reid objected, arguing that Detective Jones’ testimony was hearsay.

The State countered that Brown’s statement to Detective Jones was admissible as a

prior inconsistent statement under Delaware Rule of Evidence 613. Reid changed

course and asserted that a greater foundation was required to establish the

inconsistency. Eventually, Reid returned to a hearsay objection – Detective Jones’

statement was “hearsay because it’s an out-of-court statement offered for the truth

of the matter asserted . . . .”7 The court overruled the objection. Reid did not request

5 Id. 6 A535. 7 A637.

4 a limiting instruction on the use of Detective Jones’ testimony.

(9) Detective Jones related Brown’s interview statement that she saw Reid

with a gun on or around October 5, 2021. He also testified that she described the

gun as “black” and “without a wheel, which [he] knew to be a semi-automatic.”8

Detective Jones also testified that, while Reid was held in the Howard R. Young

Correctional Institute in lieu of bail following his arrest, police monitored Reid’s

prison communications to understand where he was during the shooting. The State

introduced Reid’s calls from prison in which he discussed several alibis. Reid’s

attorney did not object to the questions.

(10) The jury found Reid guilty of all charges. The Superior Court found

Reid guilty in the “B” case. Reid was sentenced to life in prison and additional time.

(11) On appeal, Reid argues that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion

by admitting extrinsic evidence of Brown’s prior inconsistent statement through

Detective Jones. According to Reid, the State should have first confronted Brown

with her prior inconsistent statement during direct examination. Reid also argues

that the Superior Court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury not to consider

Reid’s custody status when reaching its verdict.

8 A638.

5 (12) We review a trial court’s evidentiary decision to determine whether the

court exceeded its discretion.9 A court exceeds its discretion when it exceeds the

bounds of reason given the circumstances or ignores recognized rules of law or

practice as to produce injustice.10

(13) The parties agree that the admissibility of Brown’s statement to police

is controlled by Delaware Rule of Evidence 613(b). Under Rule 613(b), “[e]xtrinsic

evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness

is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given

an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.”

(14) In Robinson v. State, this Court reviewed the use of a prior inconsistent

statement for impeachment purposes.11 Before Rule 613(b), to admit a prior

inconsistent statement of the witness, the cross-examiner had to “establish a

foundation for introducing extrinsic evidence . . . by questioning the witness about

the circumstances when the statement was made and verifying that the witness made

it;”12 and to “reveal the content of the prior statement to the witness before

9 McGuiness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156, 1190 (Del. 2024); Burrell v. Delaware, 332 A.3d 412, 424 (Del. 2024). 10 Strickland v. State, 328 A.3d 286, 297 (Del. 2024); McGuiness, 312 A.3d at 1190. 11 3 A.3d 257, 262-64 (Del. 2010). 12 Id. at 262.

6 questioning[, eliminating] the element of surprise.”13

(15) As we explained in Robinson, however, Rule 613(b) modified the

foregoing approach by requiring only that “the witness be afforded at some time an

opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement and to be available for further

interrogation.”14 Although the traditional sequencing procedure is the “preferred

methodology,” we held in Robinson that the witness’s explanation “may occur on

direct examination or redirect examination, cross-examination or at any other point

in the trial.”15 In other words, “[t]here need be no particular sequence or timing, so

long as the witness has that opportunity to explain the statement.” 16

(16) Here, Brown testified that she had not seen Reid with a gun and could

not recall telling Detective Jones she had previously seen Reid with a gun.17

Through Detective Jones, the State introduced extrinsic evidence of her prior

13 Id. 14 Id. (emphasis added). This Court has stated F.R.E. 613(b) is identical to D.R.E. 613(b). This Court further explained “F.R.E. 613(b) and subsequent case law interpreting that rule reflect that the strict sequencing procedure . . . is now unnecessary under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 264. 15 Id. at 264. 16 Id. (quoting Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1986)). See also Givens v. State, 2017 WL 2465195, at *3 (Del. June 6, 2017) (TABLE) (a trial judge does not exceed their discretion applying Rule 613 when the witness being impeached is “given the opportunity to explain her prior inconsistent statement, and defense counsel [is] permitted to question her about the statement.”). 17 A535-36.

7 inconsistent statement. Brown was still subject to the trial subpoena.18 Thus, Brown

was available “at some time” “to explain or deny” her prior statement and was

“available for further interrogation” if Reid thought it was advantageous to do so.

(17) Reid argues that Detective Jones’ testimony was hearsay and therefore

inadmissible. After Robinson, however, Rule 613(b) allows the State to introduce

extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement through the testimony of another

witness.19 What is necessary, and as occurred here, is the witness’s availability and

opportunity to explain the prior inconsistent statement at any time, not just during

her direct testimony. The Superior Court did not err by allowing Detective Jones to

testify about Brown’s prior inconsistent statement.20

18 A544. 19 See U.S. v. Pridgen, 518 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (district court erred under Rule 613(b) by excluding extrinsic evidence of a defendant’s prior inconsistent statement to an investigator); see also U.S. v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 763 (5th Cir. 2008) (district court did not exceed its discretion by allowing an agent’s testimony to impeach defendant’s prior inconsistent statements). 20 Reid argues that Givens and Wammock support his position because, according to Reid, the State needed to introduce Brown’s prior inconsistent statement while she was on the stand. We disagree. In Wammock, the Eleventh Circuit held the district court did not exceed its discretion by excluding an expert’s prior inconsistent testimony because the expert was not available to explain or clarify his inconsistency. 793 F.2d at 1521-23. In Givens, this Court held that a tape recording of a prior inconsistent statement was admissible under Rule 613(b) because the witness was given an opportunity to explain herself. 2017 WL 2465195, at *2-3. Neither case required the State to introduce the inconsistent testimony through the same witness. Instead, the witness making the inconsistent statement must have the opportunity to explain the inconsistency. Wammock, 793 F.2d at 1522-23 (“[I]f the witness is or might be available for recall and the opposing party simply fails to recall him, there has been a sufficient opportunity to explain such that the extrinsic evidence should be admitted under Rule 613(b).”).

8 (18) Reid raises two additional issues on appeal that were not preserved by

an objection at trial. According to Reid, the trial court should have sua sponte given

the jury limiting or cautionary instructions about its use of (a) Detective Jones’

impeachment testimony, and (b) knowledge of Reid’s pretrial incarceration status.

(19) Under Supreme Court Rule 8, we will only review unpreserved

objections “in the interests of justice.” The interests of justice are implicated when

plain error occurs. Plain error exists when “the error complained of [is] clearly

prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial

process.”21 Further, “the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which

are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in

their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which

clearly show manifest injustice.”22

(20) We have held that “[t]he trial court’s failure to, sua sponte, provide a

limiting instruction is generally not plain error.”23 We see no reason to depart from

the general rule here. The court gave the jury a general instruction regarding how it

21 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 22 Id. 23 Pinkston v. State, 2018 WL 6575420, at *2 (Del. Dec. 12, 2018) (TABLE). See also U.S. v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1995) (“While such an instruction is proper and certainly should typically be given when requested, a court does not ordinarily commit plain error when it fails to do so absent such a request.”).

9 should consider unsworn statements, including statements that were “inconsistent

with the witness’s in-court testimony.”24 The court instructed the jury that it “must

decide whether an out-of-court statement is credible, or believable, and how much

weight it should be given.”25 Reid suffered little, if any, prejudice by the lack of a

limiting instruction.

(21) Regarding Reid’s incarceration status, it is entirely possible that Reid’s

counsel did not request a limiting instruction for strategic reasons. It was apparent

from the testimony that Reid was making phone calls from prison. Defense counsel

could have decided that it was better not to call further attention to his pretrial

detention.26 In any event, Detective Jones’ reference to Reid’s custody status was

not per se prejudicial.27 Although a limiting instruction requested by defense counsel

24 A827-28, A878. The court gave the jury the following instruction: “The evidence in this case has included an unsworn statement claimed to have been made by a witness before their testimony here at trial. Under Delaware law, this type of statement is admissible regardless of whether it is consistent or inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony. As with any other evidence, you must decide whether an out-of-court statement is credible, or believable, and how much weight it should be given. If you conclude that there is a conflict between a witness’s in-court testimony and their out-of-court statement, you may take that conflict into account when you decide the credibility and weight of the out-of-court statement. A conflict is particularly important if there is no evidence to corroborate, or confirm, the inconsistent, out-of-court statement. However, you may convict solely on the basis of such a statement if, after judging the statement’s credibility and giving it the weight you believe it deserves, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged.” A878. 25 A878. 26 See Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1101 (Del. 2021) (no plain error review for waived claims). 27 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 185 (Del. 2020) (it is not per se prejudicial if the jury learns the defendant is in custody during trial).

10 would have been preferred, Reid has failed to point to any specific prejudice he

suffered in this case.28 Thus, the Superior Court did not plainly err by not giving the

jury a limiting instruction related to Reid’s custody status.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

28 See id. (defendant must identify “the actual prejudice he suffered.”). This Court has declined to find plain error when a trial court fails sua sponte to give a limiting instruction with respect to a defendant’s past convictions for crimes of dishonesty. Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1290 (Del. 2002). Without a showing of actual prejudice, the absence of a limiting instruction here falls short of plain error.