Reid v . Stanley CV-04-369-JD 07/06/06 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Reid
v. Civil N o . 04-cv-369-JD Opinion N o . 2006 DNH 077 Phil Stanley, et a l .
O R D E R
Robert Reid, who is proceeding pro s e , alleges equal
protection and due process violations arising from the
circumstances of his incarceration in Connecticut, as a New
Hampshire prisoner. The court denied the defendants’ first
motion for summary judgment, without prejudice, because the
defendants overlooked Reid’s equal protection claim, relied on
affidavits based on “knowledge and belief,” and failed to provide
the necessary documentary support for the affidavits. The court
also noted that Reid had not served the defendants with his cross
motion for summary judgment or his objection to the defendants’
motion. The defendants and Reid have now filed second motions
for summary judgment and their objections, and the service issue
has been resolved.
With their motion, the defendants submit the affidavits of
Kimberly Lacasse and Gregory Crompton, which are again based upon
the affiants’ “knowledge and belief.” Reid challenges the
defendants’ affidavits as failing to comply with the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). The defendants have
not responded to Reid’s objection. “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). That rule is ordinarily applied “to each
segment of an affidavit, not to the affidavit as a whole.” Perez
v . Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 315 (1st Cir. 2001).
Therefore, only the segments of affidavits that meet the Rule 56(e) standard may be credited for purposes of a motion for
summary judgment.
Gregory Crompton states that he was the Director of
Classifications at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections
from 1994 until 2002. Kimberly Lacasse followed Crompton in that
job. Both Crompton and Lacasse explain the bases of their
personal familiarity with Robert Reid and his record and their
familiarity with the classification system in New Hampshire.
Lacasse states that she reviewed Reid’s records from the
Connecticut Department of Corrections and provides copies of at least some of those records. The court accepts those parts of
the affidavits that are properly supported by facts which show
the affiants’ personal knowledge.
Background
Robert Reid was convicted in a New Hampshire state court of
second degree assault on a New Hampshire State Trooper in 1989.
2 He was sentenced to ten to thirty years in prison. His minimum
parole date was February 1 6 , 2002, and his maximum release date
is in 2019.1 In February of 1998, Reid was transferred from the
New Hampshire State Prison to a prison in the Connecticut
Department of Corrections system pursuant to the New England
Interstate Corrections Compact and an agreement between New
Hampshire and Connecticut. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 622-A.
Under the terms of the agreement, transferred prisoners are “subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable
to persons committed for violations of law of the receiving state
not inconsistent with the sentence imposed.” Contract for the
Implementation of the Interstate Corrections Compact, ¶ 1 7 . The
defendants interpret that provision to mean that a transferred
prisoner is subject to the classification procedures of the
receiving state. The New Hampshire Department of Corrections,
however, continues to control the parole status of a prisoner who
is transferred to another state.
Reid represents that Connecticut conducts only annual reviews of prisoners’ security classifications, while New
Hampshire conducts classification reviews every ninety days. In
addition, under the Connecticut procedures, a prisoner will not
be given a reduced custody classification until he has a firm
1 There is some indication in the documents provided by the defendants that Reid’s original minimum parole date was August 2 9 , 1999. Both Reid and the defendants, however, refer to February 1 6 , 2002, as his minimum parole date.
3 “vote to parole” date. The New Hampshire Parole Board, however,
will not vote to parole unless a prisoner has been classified for
reduced custody.
In 2003, Reid filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in state court in New Hampshire asserting that his parole
eligibility in New Hampshire was being affected by the
Connecticut classification system. On August 1 5 , 2003, the state
court ordered the New Hampshire Department of Corrections to move expeditiously toward reaching an agreement with Connecticut to
provide Reid a similar classification as he would be entitled to
have in New Hampshire so that Reid’s parole opportunity would not
be delayed. Reid filed suit in this court when he remained in
the Connecticut prison system without any change in his
classification.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.
See Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323 (1986). A party
opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must
4 present competent evidence of record that shows a genuine issue
for trial. See Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 ,
256 (1986). All reasonable inferences and all credibility issues
are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. at 255.
When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
must consider the motions separately to determine whether summary
judgment may be entered under the Rule 56 standard. Pac. Ins.
Co., Ltd. v . Eaton Vance Mgmt., 369 F.3d 5 8 4 , 588 (1st Cir. 2004); Bienkowski v . Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 1 3 8 , 140 (1st
Cir. 2002).
Discussion
Reid brings due process and equal protection claims against
officials and employees of the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, Phil Stanley, Jane Coplan, Greg Crompton, Denise
Heath, and Kim Lacasse. He contends that the alleged violations
of his constitutional rights arise from the incompatibility of
the New Hampshire parole requirements and the Connecticut
classification requirements. He also contends that Connecticut’s
classification review schedule did not provide him with the same
opportunity for level reduction that the New Hampshire
classification procedures would have allowed. The defendants
move for summary judgment, contending that they are entitled to
qualified immunity and that Reid cannot prove his claims. Reid
moves for summary judgment and opposes the defendants’ motion.
5 I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The defendants contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment on both of Reid’s claims on the ground of qualified
immunity because the applicable law was not clearly established
in Reid’s favor at the time in question. Alternatively, they
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Reid
cannot prove either claim. They also contend that defendants
Stanley and Coplan are entitled to summary judgment “as there is no evidence that either of these defendants were personally
involved in any of the actions that plaintiff complains about.”
Def. Mem at 2 2 .
A. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil
liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Valdizan v . Rivera
-Hernandez, 445 F.3d 6 3 , 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Surprenant
v . Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 , 14 (1st Cir. 2005)). Courts in this
circuit use “a three-step algorithm for the determination of
whether a state actor is entitled to qualified immunity[:] . . .
(i) whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a
constitutional violation; (ii) whether the constitutional right
at issue was clearly established at the time of the putative
violation; and (iii) whether a reasonable officer, situated
6 similarly to the defendant, would have understood the challenged
act or omission to contravene the discerned constitutional
right.” Pagan v . Calderon, 448 F.3d 1 6 , 31 (1st Cir. 2006).
1 . Due Process Claim
Reid contends that the defendants’ decision to keep him incarcerated in Connecticut, where he could not satisfy the New Hampshire parole requirements because he was subject to the Connecticut security classification system, violated due process. He contends that because the New Hampshire Parole Board required him to achieve a reduced custodial classification that would allow him to be transferred to a halfway house before he would be eligible for parole, he had a liberty interest in achieving that classification. He argues that certain provisions of the New England Interstate Corrections Compact provide the basis of a liberty interest. See N.H. Rev. S t . Ann. ch. 622-A. On initial review, the magistrate judge concluded that Reid stated a due process claim, based on a liberty interest in eligibility for a minimum security placement.2
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects
persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and
2 The magistrate’s finding was based, in part, on the analysis in Carillo v . DuBois, 23 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108 (D. Mass. 1998), where the court concluded that the plaintiff showed a liberty interest in his eligibility for a minimum security classification. That part of the decision in Carillo, however, was vacated upon reconsideration. See Carillo v . DuBois, 32 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 1999).
7 those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish
that one of these interests is at stake.”3 Wilkinson v . Austin,
125 S . C t . 2384, 2393 (U.S. 2005); accord Pagan, 448 F.3d at 3 2 .
“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence.” Greenholtz v . Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 , 7 (1979). A convicted inmate also has no
constitutional right or inherent liberty interest in a security classification. See Moody v . Daggett, 429 U.S. 7 8 , 88 n.9
(1976). Further, “the Constitution itself does not give rise to
a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse
conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 125 S . C t . at 2393.
Nevertheless, a state “may under certain circumstances
create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process
Clause.” Sandin v . Conner, 515 U.S. 4 7 2 , 484 (1995). Following
Hewitt v . Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), courts considered the
language of a particular regulation to determine whether the
state had created a liberty interest. Wilkinson, 125 S . C t . at
3 In other words, whether Reid’s claim arises under procedural or substantive due process, he must prove that the defendants deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest. Redondo-Borges v . U.S. Dep’t of of Hous. & Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1 , 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (procedural due process claim requires proof that plaintiff has been deprived of protected liberty or property interest without due process); Pagan, 448 F.3d at 32 (holding that substantive due process claim requires plaintiff to prove “both that the acts were so egregious as to shock the conscience and that they deprived him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property”).
8 2393. In Sandin, the court “abrogated the methodology of parsing
the language of particular regulations” for the purpose of
determining whether a state had created a protected liberty
interest. Wilkinson, 125 S . C t . at 2394. Instead, the liberty
interest analysis depends upon whether the condition of restraint
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484; accord Wilkinson, 125 S . C t . at 2394-97; see also Skinner v . Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 486 (1st Cir. 2005); Hamm v .
Latessa, 72 F.3d 9 4 7 , 954 (1st Cir. 1995).
New Hampshire provides an opportunity for parole to its
prisoners as a privilege, not a right. See Knowles v . Warden,
N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 3 8 7 , 390-91 (1995). As such, New
Hampshire has not created a liberty interest in the opportunity
for parole. Bussiere v . Cunningham, 132 N.H. 7 4 7 , 753-54 (1990);
Baker v . Cunningham, 128 N.H. 3 7 4 , 380 (1986); c f . Young v .
Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1997) (prisoner on parole or on
conditional preparole release enjoys liberty interest in that reduced custody); Debonis v . Warden, --- A.2d ---, 2006 WL
1562567, at *3 (N.H. June 9, 2006) (paroled prisoner “afforded
due process protections against unreasonable deprivations of his
conditional liberty interest, including protections against an
unreasonable delay between his arrest and parole revocation
hearing”). See also Ainsworth v . Stanley, 317 F.3d, 1 , 5 (1st
Cir. 2002). Even if an analysis of New Hampshire’s statutory and
9 regulatory scheme for parole would be different under the Sandin
standard, there was no clearly established right to parole under
New Hampshire law during the time that Reid was housed in
Connecticut.
New Hampshire courts have not addressed the question of
whether a prisoner has a liberty interest in the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections’ custodial classification system or a
liberty interest under the New England Interstate Corrections Compact. This court has concluded the New Hampshire
classification system does not provide prisoners with a liberty
interest. See Pratt v . N.H. Dep’t of Corrs., 2006 WL 995121, at
*9 n.7 (D.N.H. March 3 1 , 2006) (citing Reid v . Brodeur, 2000 WL
1466147, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 2 4 , 2000)); c f . Wilkinson, 125 S . C t .
at 2394-95 (finding Ohio prisoners have liberty interest in
avoiding assignment to “supermax” prison); Rodi v . Ventetuolo,
941 F.2d 2 2 , 25-26 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding protected liberty
interest under Rhode Island law in avoiding transfer to
administrative segregation). Courts have concluded that state law in Connecticut does not confer a liberty interest in the
classification system there. See Torres v . Howell, 2006 WL
1525942, at *15-*16 (D. Conn. May 3 0 , 2006). The only decisions
that address the question of whether the New England Interstate
Corrections Compact provides a liberty interest have concluded
that it does not. See McCarthy v . Teta, 101 F.3d 1 0 8 , 1996 WL
115330, at *2 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished decision); Carillo, 23
10 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (other parts vacated). Therefore, there was
no clearly established law during the time Reid was housed in
Connecticut that the Compact provided a liberty interest or that
prisoners had a protected liberty interest in being eligible for
a minimum security custodial classification.
The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Reid’s
due process claim in the absence of clearly established law that
Reid had a protected liberty interest in any of the circumstances
he alleges.
2. Equal Protection Claim
“The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the state from ‘deny[ing] any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’” meaning, in the
context of a state’s actions, “that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.” Pagan, 448 F.3d at 34
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ; other internal quotation
marks omitted). “It is well established that a challenged
classification that does not involve a suspect class or impinge
upon fundamental rights is accorded a strong presumption of
validity.” United States v . Melendez-Torres, 420 F.3d 4 5 , 52-53
(1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a
classification does not violate equal protection as long as it
satisfies the rational basis test. Id. at 5 3 .
Reid contends that while he was housed in Connecticut he was
11 treated differently than New Hampshire prisoners who remained in
New Hampshire prisons because of the differences between the
Connecticut and New Hampshire security classification systems,
which negatively affected his eligibility for parole. The
magistrate judge concluded that Reid stated an equal protection
violation based on the assumption that he was similarly situated
to New Hampshire prisoners in New Hampshire prisons and that no
rational basis existed for the difference in treatment. Reid does not contend that for purposes of this claim he is a member
of a suspect class or that the defendants’ actions implicated a
fundamental right.
The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity because at the time in question, between 1998 and 2005,
there was no clearly established law that prohibited their
actions based on the equal protection clause. An equal
protection violation, based on an allegedly discriminatory denial
of a discretionary benefit, exists if the plaintiff can prove
“that (i) he was treated differently than other similarly situated supplicants and (ii) the differential treatment resulted
from a gross abuse of power, invidious discrimination, or some
other fundamental procedural unfairness.” Pagan, 448 F.3d at 34
(citing PFZ Props., Inc. v . Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 2 8 , 32 (1st Cir.
1991) and Creative Env’ts, Inc. v . Estabrook, 680 F.2d 8 2 2 , 832
n.9 (1st Cir. 1982)). In the context of prisons, the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when prison officials make it more
12 difficult for one prisoner, when compared to other similarly
situated prisoners, to obtain the benefit of parole without a
rational basis for doing s o . See Settles v . U.S. Parole Comm’n,
429 F. 3d 1098, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord Bishop v . Moran,
676 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (D.R.I. 1987).
The law of equal protection in similar contexts was
sufficiently established to put the defendants on notice that
treating Reid’s eligibility for reduced custody classification, which affected his eligibility for parole, differently from other
similarly situated prisoners without a rational basis for doing
so could result in an equal protection violation. In addition,
the defendants were put on notice of a potential equal protection
problem when the New Hampshire state court resolved Reid’s habeas
corpus petition as follows: The State and the Department of Corrections acknowledged the different classification systems and have agreed to begin communications with the State of Connecticut to afford the defendant a similar classification as he would be eligible to receive in New Hampshire so that his parole opportunity would not be delayed. The State shall move expeditiously toward reaching an agreement with Connecticut. Reid v . Warden, 03-E-180 (N.H. Sup. C t . Aug. 1 5 , 2003). 4 Under
these circumstances, the defendants have not shown that they are
entitled to qualified immunity as to Reid’s equal protection
claim.
4 The defendants failed to address Reid’s state habeas proceeding in their motion for summary judgment.
13 B. Equal Protection Claim on the Merits
Although the defendants acknowledge the negative effect on
Reid caused by the conflict between the Connecticut
classification system and New Hampshire’s parole requirements,
they contend that Reid cannot show that he was treated
differently than similarly situated New Hampshire inmates who
were housed in New Hampshire prisons. The defendants further
argue that the state’s policy of subjecting transferred prisoners to the receiving state’s classification procedures is justified
by a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
Reid has demonstrated that Connecticut’s classification system is
different from New Hampshire’s, but he has not shown in the
record submitted for summary judgment that he was treated
differently than other similarly situated New Hampshire
prisoners.
Whether persons are similarly situated depends on “‘whether
a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would
think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated. Much as in the lawyer’s art of distinguishing cases,
the ‘relevant aspects’ are those factual elements which determine
whether reasoned analogy supports, or demands, a like result.
Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases
must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should be
compared to apples.’” Tapalian v . Tusino, 377 F.3d 1 , 6 (1st
Cir. 2004). “As with all such comparative evidence, it is the
14 plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that she is comparing apples to
apples.” Rathbun v . Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 6 2 , 76 (1st Cir.
2004).
As the defendants have established, Reid has an extensive
disciplinary record in the New Hampshire and Connecticut prison
systems. Because of his history and continuing behavior
problems, until recently, Reid was classified at or near the
highest security level in both prison systems. Kimberly Lacasse, the Administrator of Classifications for the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections, states in her affidavit that Reid
would not have received any reduction in his classification level
even if he had been housed in a New Hampshire prison. Reid has
provided no evidence to the contrary or any evidence of a New
Hampshire prisoner with a similar record who received a lower
classification than he did.
Therefore, based on the record presented for summary
judgment, taken in the light most favorable to Reid, the
defendants have demonstrated that no trialworthy issue exists to support Reid’s claim that he was treated differently than
similarly situated New Hampshire prisoners. The defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Reid’s equal protection claim.
Given this outcome, it is unnecessary to address the issue of
supervisory liability.
15 II. Reid’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Based on the summary judgment record and as the analysis of
the defendants’ motion demonstrates, Reid cannot show undisputed
facts that support his due process or his equal protection claim.
Therefore, he is not entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (document n o . 38) is granted. The plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment (document n o . 41) is denied.
The clerk of court shall enter judgment in favor of the
defendants and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge
July 6, 2006 cc: Robert A . Reid, pro se Andrew B . Livernois, Esquire Mary E . Maloney, Esquire