Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company

369 F. Supp. 684, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 13, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10619, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9206
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedDecember 17, 1973
DocketCiv. 68-323
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 369 F. Supp. 684 (Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company, 369 F. Supp. 684, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 13, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10619, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9206 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROBERT M. McRAE, Jr., District Judge.

This action was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The plaintiff seeks damages based upon religious discrimination against him by the defendant newspaper publisher. The case is presently before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (C.A.6 1972). Following the remand, a supplementary evidentiary hearing was conducted by this Court in the light of the Court of Appeals opinion.

At the first hearing, the District Court, relying upon Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company, (C.A.6 1970) 429 F.2d 324, affirmed by a divided court, 402 U. S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267, took the view that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove that he was not hired because of discrimination based upon religion. This Court found as a fact that there was an established policy on the part of the Memphis Press Scimitar that all of its employees be available to work on Saturday and took the further view that there was no duty on the part of an employer to accommodate an employee’s or potential employee’s belief contrary to the employer’s established and required work schedule. This Court concluded that religious discrimination had not been established by the plaintiff’s proof and, therefore, that the defendant had not been guilty of a violation of the Civil Rights-Act of 1964 for a refusal to hire plaintiff because of discrimination based on religion.

The Court of Appeals distinguished the Dewey case, supra, from the instant case. In doing so, it noted that the E. E.O.C. regulation relied upon by the District Judge at the time of Dewey’s discharge was not in effect but that at the time that the plaintiff in this case applied for employment the regulation was in effect. That regulation was adopted July 10, 1967, and it provides, in part, as follows:

“Part 1605 — GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION
§ 1605.1 Observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays.
* * -X-
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the *686 part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee’s needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.” 29 C.F.R. 1(305.

The Court of Appeals held that the question on remand is not whether the defendant’s rules, as established and applied by the Press-Scimitar, were intentionally discriminatory as to religion, but rather whether the Press Scimitar could make “reasonable accommodation” to the religious practices of plaintiff “without undue hardship”. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., supra, 468 F.2d at page 351. Plaintiff claims that the Press-Scimitar could have hired him as a copy reader to work Monday through Friday without undue hardship on the conduct of defendant’s business. On the other hand, the defendant claims that to have hired the plaintiff as a copy reader to work Monday through Friday, not only regularly but also without ever being subject to work on Saturday, would have been an undue hardship on the conduct of defendant’s business, and therefore defendant could not make a reasonable accommodation to plaintiff’s religious practices.

Since this suit was filed plaintiff has gained other satisfactory employment and does not at this time seek to become employed by the defendant. The relief now sought is monetary damages only. The amount of damages sought is the difference between what plaintiff would have earned while working as a copy reader for the defendant and the pay he received until he took a position paying more than he would have earned as a copy reader for the defendant, and attorney’s fees.

For clarity, the Court reiterates certain findings, namely, that the plaintiff was well qualified to become a copy reader for the defendant; that plaintiff was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church; that one of the religious principles of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church is that its members should not work on Saturday; that plaintiff was offered the job as copy reader on the Press-Scimitar on the condition that he make himself available to work on any day, including Saturday.

The record further establishes that the Memphis Press-Scimitar, the onp of the defendant’s two newspapers on which there was an opening for a copy reader, publishes three editions Monday through Friday, two editions on Saturday and no editions on Sunday, and that the plaintiff declined to accept the position due to his sincere religious belief that he should not work on Saturday.

In accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals Opinion, further evidence was offered on the employment practices of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, the other newspaper published by the defendant publishing company.

The proof shows that the Commercial Appeal had at the time in question two employees who were of the Seventh-Day Adventist faith and who were not required to work on Saturday. These employees were Lindley Richert and Glenn Allen. Richert was employed by the Commercial Appeal as a copy reader. The editor of the Commercial Appeal who employed Richert knew that Richert was a Seventh-Day Adventist and that he would not work on Saturday. However, since the Commercial Appeal publishes seven days per week, it has need of copy readers seven days a week. Sunday was a less preferable work day for many of the copy readers; there *687 fore, the editor employed Richert and assigned him to Sunday work on a regular basis with Saturday as one of his regular days off.

In the case of Allen, he had been an employee of the Commercial Appeal before he became a Seventh-Day Adventist. He worked in the Commercial Appeal’s library, which is staffed seven days a week. Allen customarily worked on Sunday and continued to work on Sunday after he became a Seventh-Day Adventist.

No changes in work schedules were required to be made by the Commercial Appeal, in order to accommodate Saturdays off for either Richert or Allen.

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369 F. Supp. 684, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 13, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10619, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reid-v-memphis-publishing-company-tnwd-1973.