Reichenstein v. Board of Commissioners

31 A.2d 814, 130 N.J.L. 115, 1943 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 142
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedMay 4, 1943
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 31 A.2d 814 (Reichenstein v. Board of Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reichenstein v. Board of Commissioners, 31 A.2d 814, 130 N.J.L. 115, 1943 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 142 (N.J. 1943).

Opinion

*116 The opinion of the court was delivered by

Donges, J.

After the court announced its decision to allow a writ of certiorari in this case, counsel, with the consent of the court, stipulated that the case should be considered upon the record submitted on the application for the writ and that the court should consider the merits as if the writ had actually issued and return thereto had been made. The case brings up the action of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Newark in dismissing prosecutor from his office of City Clerk after a hearing upon charges. There was a lengthy trial and the record is-large.

Prosecutor was found guilty upon twelve of thirteen charges, charge No. 12 having been withdrawn. Some of the charges was closely related and are grouped together for the purposes of argument in the briefs. We shall consider them as so presented.

Charge 1 was:

“That Harry S. Reichenstein, City Clerk of the City of Newark, did, on and before May 15th, 1941, contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided, cause the said City to incur liability for the payment of sums of money for purposes and in amounts not authorized by any appropriation included in' any budget, temporary budget or emergency appropriation.”

This charge grew out of the provisions made in the city clerk’s budget for the municipal election for commissioners in May, 1941. It appears that the budget provisions were more than $7,000 less than the amount actually expended for the election. This was occasioned principally by two factors. The first was that allowance was made for the compensation' of the more than 1,000 election officers at the rate of $10 per day whereas they were paid $15 per day. The other main item consisted of the expense attached to the voting by citizens absent in the armed service of the United States.

It appears by the testimony that when the budget was made up the prosecutor and his assistant adopted the figures of the budget for the year 1937 when the past previous muniei *117 pal election was held. In that year election officers were paid $10 per day, but after that election and before the 1941 election the Supreme Court filed an opinion, Gross v. Essex County Board of Elections, 120 N. J. L. 711; 198 Atl. Rep. 293, holding that election officers serving at a primary election were entitled to compensation at the rate of $15 per day. The significance of this decision and its effect on the municipal election was overlooked by the respondent and his staff. As to the expense of the soldier vote, the legislation which gave rise to this expense was adopted after the budget estimates were prepared and submitted to the city authorities.

In' this situation the defendants contend that the failure to make proper budget requests constitutes such gross neglect of duty and lack of efficiency as to warrant dismissal from office. We think it does not. There could not be and it is not claimed that there was any improper motive on the part of the prosecutor in this regard. It was an honest mistake. It resulted in no loss or damage to the city. It did not interfere with the holding of a proper election. A supplemental appropriation was passed and all proper items of expense were paid. We think there is no sufficient cause for removal in the evidence adduced under this charge.

The second charge was:

“That said Harry S. Reichenstein did, on and before May 13th, 1941, use or authorize, direct or permit to be used, property or personnel of the City of Newark, to wit:
“(a) The office of the City Clerk.
“(b) Stationery of the City of Newark.
“(c) Supplies of the City of Newark.
“(d) Employees of the City of Newark, during their regular working hours.”

As to the items of the use of stationery and supplies of the city, we think the evidence wholly fails to sustain the allegations. This second charge grows out of the use of a mimeograph machine, which was located in the city clerk’s office, for purposes other than those of the office. During the time in question the city clerk’s office was assigned to the Depart *118 ment of Public Affairs. There was in that department a public relations bureau and the head of that bureau, at the direction of the Director of the Department of Public Affairs, had certain pamphlets prepared and mimeographed on this machine. The mimeographed matter had to do with the relations between the city government and the citizens and was not for the benefit of any private interests. It is clearly established that certain mimeographing alleged to have been done for a private business of the prosecutor was not done at the city clerk's office but was done at the home of one of the employees who had equipment of this kind at his home which he used in spare time work. As to the few things prepared for and used by a civic organization known as the “Civiceers,” we think that the matter is trivial, to say the least, and that work ob behalf of an organization of that kind, devoted to civic welfare and the uplift of the community, is not such a departure from the public interest as to warrant a finding of guilt of improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor.

Charge 3 originally read as follows:

“That said Harry S. Reichenstein did, on and before May 13th, 1941, without good or sufficient reason, unnecessarily cause the City of Newark to expend or incur liability for the expenditure of exorbitant sums of money for the conduct of the City Commission election of May 13th, 1941.”

But was amended orally at the time of the hearing by adding the following:

“And he failed to abide by the laws of the State of New Jersey, and the ordinances of the City of Newark, with respect to advertising for bids for the purchase or sale of materials to the City of Newark or to him, with respect to the use of the central purchasing department.”

Eormal objection was made to the amendment, bnt there was no insistence upon a postponement. In any event we think there is no warrant for dismissal in this regard. On more than one occasion the office of the corporation counsel had advised the city clerk that it was not necessary for him *119 to take competitive bids for the purchase of the materials he is required to furnish to the election boards. We think prosecutor acted substantially in accordance with the advice of counsel and that he acted in good faith. The defendants argue that, because of an ordinance in existence requiring purchases to be made through the central purchase department, it was the duty of prosecutor to make purchases in that manner and failure to do so constituted a breach of duty warranting dismissal. We think not. The Election Law puts upon him the duty to furnish certain election supplies. The responsibility to do so is his, and he has a measure of discretion in adopting the proper course to discharge his statutory duty.

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Bluebook (online)
31 A.2d 814, 130 N.J.L. 115, 1943 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reichenstein-v-board-of-commissioners-nj-1943.