Rehart v. RMH Properties, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMay 10, 2005
DocketCUMcv-03-648
StatusUnpublished

This text of Rehart v. RMH Properties, Inc. (Rehart v. RMH Properties, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rehart v. RMH Properties, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2005).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT Cumberland, SS Civil Action cone Docket No. CV-03-648 - Zul} HAY il A 8: Ob “TE i) _ ‘ J . Lg : Ne RICHARD SCOTT REHART, Plaintiff Vv. DECISION AND JUDGMENT a Ss RMH PROPERTIES, INC., AUS a Defendant , lens

I. BACKGROUND™

Plaintiff Richard Scott Rehart brought this claim against defendant RMH Properties, Inc. seeking damages for missing personal property stored in a trailer for a fee on defendant's property in Biddeford. He claims that the property, which consists primarily of tools related to his woodworking business and some personal items, is valued at more than $18,000.

Plaintiff claims that the defendant is a warehouseman,’ that he stored his goods for a fee and is liable for their value because he did not comply with warehouse statutes, 11 M.R.S.A. 8§ 7-201 et seq., dealing with safeguarding or disposing of property; that RHM was negligent and reckless and violated the duty to safeguard plaintiff’s property, 11 M.R.S.A. § 7-204(1); and, that RHM is liable in common law and statutory conversion. 11 M.RS.A. § 7-2210(9).

In its answer, RMH denied the essential allegations but did admit that it isa New Hampshire corporation and is the property manager for the premises at 24 Pearl Street in Biddeford where plaintiff stored his property. In addition, defendant asserts the

affirmative defense “that the individual who was solely responsible for removing the

' 11M.R5.A.§ 7-102(h). “Warehouseman’” is a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.

subject trailer from the property and disposing of certain possessions therein was acting outside the scope of his employment with RMH.”

A trial was held before the court without a jury. The plaintiff appeared pro se as he has throughout the case. The defendant was represented by counsel and no person was introduced as a representative of the defendant corporation. The plaintiff testified on his own behalf. At the close of the plaintiff's case the court, construing all facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, denied defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defense rested without presenting witnesses or further evidence. The court

took the matter under advisement to consider the evidence in light of the legal

arguments offered by the defendant.

Il. FINDINGS OF FACT

After trial, the court makes the following findings of fact:

The plaintiff moved to Maine in 1998 and rented space from one Gamache at an old mill in Biddeford. From that space he operated a work-working construction firm until August 1999 when he closed the business. At the time that he closed his shop he arranged with the owner (Gamache) to store a 24 foot enclosed trailer on the premises. The trailer contained tools, equipment and miscellaneous personal property. He agreed to pay a fee of $20.00 per month for the storage which was paid by his wife every month.

The barn doors to the trailer were secured with a lock and the trailer hitch was also locked. Rehart gave a key to the hitch lock to Gamache’s representative on the premises to be used if it was necessary to move the trailer.

Sometime in 2001 plaintiff received a notice from RMH that it had taken over the

property and that the $20.00 monthly storage fee should be paid to RMH. The monthly

payments were regularly made even though there was no written contract or other documentation relating to storing the trailer.

The trailer and its contents were stored outdoors on defendant's premises in a non-secure area. Plaintiff would periodically check on the trailer to make sure it was still there. In June or July 2002 he actually went to the trailer and inspected the contents, which appeared to all be there, but he did not take an inventory, nor did he make a list of the items in the trailer when he first placed it in storage.

A couple of months later, at the end of September 2002, he went back to check on the trailer and discovered it was gone. He did not immediately report it to the police because he wanted to check with RMH to see if they knew anything about the location of the trailer. When RMH disclaimed any knowledge of the trailer, Rehart reported the missing trailer to the Biddeford Police Department. The plaintiff spoke with Peter Nestel, RMH’s on-site manager, who told him he would look into the situation. Hearing nothing, the plaintiff wrote to Jonathan Morse, the owner, on January 6, 2003 to explain the situation and demand compensation of more than $18,000.

In turn, Nestel reported to Morse ° that his investigation revealed that Scott Goldtwaith, a former property manager for RMH at the Biddeford location, had taken the trailer and all its contents and that plaintiff had been informed of that fact and Nestel suggested that Rehart contact the police. Nestel also told plaintiff that Goldtwaith had been fired about two weeks before the trailer was reported missing.

Nestel also reported that several other employees purchased items from

Goldtwaith that had been taken from the trailer. RMH was able to retrieve three items

2 See plaintiffs exhibit #3, letter from R. Scott Rehart to RMH Properties and Jonathan Morse, dated January 6, 2003.

> See plaintiff's exhibit #1, e-mail from Peter Nestel to Jonathan Morse, dated January 9, 2003.

ua

from the employee who did not know they were stolen. They are being held and are available for return to Rehart.

The custom made trailer was recovered by the Biddeford police and returned to plaintiff. No criminal charges have been brought against any person who may have

had a role in the taking of the trailer and contents.

Il. DISCUSSION A. Violation of Statute (Count I)

The plaintiff claims that RMH violated applicable statutes, 11 M.R.S.A. §§ 201 et seq., because

“it did not properly notify plaintiff of its intent to sell or otherwise dispose

of his property, did not properly notify the public of its intent to sell or

otherwise dispose of plaintiff's property and sold or disposed of plaintiff's

property on commercially unreasonable terms.” Plaintiff's complaint, { 15, Count I.

Several facts are clear form the evidence: Defendant took over the responsibilities of Gamache as a “warehouseman;” accepted a monthly fee for the storage of the trailer; the trailer was at defendant's Biddeford premises in mid-summer 2002; the trailer was gone by the end of September; and, Scott Goldtwaith was a former employee of the defendant and was the manager of the Biddeford location until he was fired about two weeks before the trailer was discovered missing.

As a warehouseman, RMH is charged with a statutory duty “to exercise such care in regard to [plaintiff's property] as a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances ....” 11 M.RS.A. § 7-204(1).

There is no specific evidence of how or when the trailer was taken. Because

Goldtwaith was fired approximately two weeks before the theft was discovered, it is

just as likely that it occurred after he was fired as an act or defiance or retaliation. Although RMH is liable for the acts of its employees, it is not responsible for the

criminal acts of others. The plaintiff's proof fails.

B. CONVERSION (Count I)

The plaintiff claims that RMH willfully and intentionally converted his property causing him damage and loss. He bases his claims on both common law and statutory conversion.

Conversion occurs when one party is in possession, or has been in possession of property, and fails to return it on demand, thus defeating the other person’s right to possession. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anacone, 160 Me.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Anacone
197 A.2d 506 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1964)
Withers v. Hackett
1998 ME 164 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Rehart v. RMH Properties, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rehart-v-rmh-properties-inc-mesuperct-2005.