Reginald Thadeous Blevins v. State of Alabama

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: May 5, 2023
• Docket: CR-2022-1148
• Status: Published

Opinion

REL: May 5, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 _________________________

CR-2022-1148 _________________________

Reginald Thadeous Blevins

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CC-20-1246)

KELLUM, Judge.

Reginald Thadeous Blevins was convicted of robbery in the first

degree, see § 13A-8-41(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and assault in the second

degree, see § 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced CR-2022-1148

him, as a habitual felony offender, to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for each of his convictions.

On appeal, Blevins raises only two issues for our review, both

relating to his sentencing. First, Blevins contends that the trial court

erred in sentencing him under the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("the

HFOA"), § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, without requiring the State to

provide certified copies of his prior convictions to satisfy its burden of

proof.1 The record reflects that Blevins testified on his own behalf at trial

and that, during cross-examination, he admitted that he had previously

been convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, robbery

in the third degree, shooting into an occupied vehicle, assault in the

second degree, and murder. It is well settled that " '[t]he admission by a

defendant of a prior conviction constitutes proper proof to enhance that

defendant's sentence under the Habitual Offender Act.' " Nix v. State,

747 So. 2d 351, 357 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Daniel v. State, 623

So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)). "A defendant's admission is a

proper method of proving a prior conviction for purposes of the Habitual

1Blevins raised this issue at the sentencing hearing; therefore, it is properly before this Court for review. 2 CR-2022-1148

Felony Offender Act." Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485, 493 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1984), aff'd, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985). See also Ex parte Jones, 520

So. 2d 553, 554 (Ala. 1988) ("[W]here a defendant admits prior convictions

under oath the State is relieved of its normal burden of proof regarding

the prior convictions."); Hayes v. State, 647 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. Crim. App.

1994) ("For determining habitual felony offender status, a defendant's

prior convictions may be proved by his admissions to those prior

convictions at trial."); and Whitt v. State, 461 So. 2d 29, 30 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1984) ("By admitting the prior convictions, the appellant relieved

the State of the burden of proving the prior convictions." (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Although Blevins recognizes this general rule, he nonetheless

argues that, in this case, his admissions were invalid and did not relieve

the State of presenting certified copies of his prior convictions because,

he says, the prosecutor committed misconduct when cross-examining him

about those convictions. Specifically, he argues that twice when he

hesitated in answering a question about a prior conviction, the prosecutor

indicated that he could provide Blevins with documentation of the

conviction, but the prosecutor did not have any documentation relating

3 CR-2022-1148

to the prior convictions. According to Blevins, "[i]t was improper for [the

prosecutor] to feign that he possessed something in front of the jury and

the Court if he did not possess it." (Blevins's brief, p. 20.) However,

Blevins did not object to the prosecutor's questioning him about his prior

convictions or otherwise raise this specific issue in the trial court.

Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved for review and will not

be considered. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003)

(" 'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and

timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1989). 'An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to

appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and

presented.' Pate v. State, 601 So. 2d 210, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).").

Blevins also contends that his sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole for his conviction for assault in the

second degree, a Class C felony, see § 13A-6-21(b), Ala. Code 1975, was

illegal under the HFOA. Although Blevins did not raise this issue in the

trial court, it is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time. See

Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10, 13 (Ala. 2021) ("This Court has

routinely held that the imposition of a sentence in a criminal case that is

4 CR-2022-1148

not authorized by statute creates a jurisdictional defect that is

nonwaivable and that can be raised at any time."). And Blevins is correct

that his sentence is illegal. Section 13A-5-9(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides,

in relevant part:

"(c) In all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any three felonies that are Class A, Class B, or Class C felonies and after such convictions has committed another Class A, Class B, or Class C felony, he or she must be punished as follows:

"(1) On conviction of a Class C felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 99 years but not less than 15 years."

The maximum sentence Blevins could receive for his assault conviction

was life imprisonment. Therefore, his sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole was illegal.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Blevins's convictions for robbery

in the first degree and assault in the second degree and his sentence for

the robbery conviction. However, we remand this cause for the trial court

to conduct another sentencing hearing, at which Blevins is entitled to be

present and to be represented by counsel, and to resentence Blevins for

his assault conviction in accordance with § 13A-5-9(c)(1). Due return

shall be filed within 63 days of the date of this opinion and shall include

5 CR-2022-1148

the transcript of the resentencing hearing and a copy of the trial court's

amended sentencing order.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.