NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0327-24
REGINA ROBINSON and CHARLES HARRIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, NORMA FERNANDEZ, both individually and as the Acting Superintendent of the Jersey City School District, EDWIN RIVERA, both individually and as the Director of Human Resources of the Jersey City School District, NATALIA IOFFE, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, GINA VERDIBELLO, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, PAULA JONES-WATSON, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, YOUNASS MOHAMED-BARKOUCH, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, NOEMI VELAZQUEZ, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, LORENZO RICHARDSON, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education, and LEKENDRICK SHAW, both individually and as a member of the Jersey City Board of Education,
Defendants-Respondents. ________________________________
Argued September 29, 2025 – Decided October 31, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2155-22.
Desha Jackson argued the cause for appellants (Desha Jackson Law Group, LLC, attorney; Desha Jackson and Stephen J. Edelstein, on the briefs).
Cherie L. Adams argued the cause for respondents (Adams Lattiboudere Croot & Herman, LLC, attorneys; Cherie L. Adams, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Regina Robinson and her spouse Charles Harris appeal from an
August 5, 2024 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the
Jersey City Board of Education ("JCBOE"); Norma Fernandez, its then-acting
Superintendent; Edwin Rivera, Director of Human Resources; and various
A-0327-24 2 elected members of the school board. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged race and
gender-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 and the
Conscientious Employee Protection Act ("CEPA"), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 - 14.1 The
court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm both orders.
I.
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. On August 24, 2017, Franklin Walker,
former superintendent of the JCBOE, hired Robinson, a Black female, to serve
as a tenured School Business Administrator in the Jersey City Public Schools. 2
There is no dispute Robinson held the requisite certification to serve in this role
consistent with applicable State Board regulations.
Robinson was hired pursuant to a contract with the district and served
from 2017 until August 2022 when her contract was not renewed. 3 Robinson's
contract provided for a salary of $176,868 per year, as reflected in the September
1 Pursuant to an order entered on November 28, 2022, the court dismissed all allegations against individual defendants. 2 The position of Business Administrator is statutorily mandated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-14.1. 3 Robinson's contract is not included in the record before us. A-0327-24 3 2017 Personnel Action Form recommending her appointment, following the
retirement of her predecessor, Luiggi Campana. Pursuant to JCBOE Policy
1320, Robinson's responsibilities were to: supervise the management of the
schools' financial affairs; develop a budget and financial plan; establish
standardized accounting practices and supervise accounting; oversee payroll
operations; safeguard all funds; manage the district's real estate holdings and
insurance programs; attend and record the minutes of the board meetings, and
supervise non-educational staff such as the district's food, property, purchasing,
and transportation services. Robinson's tenure with the district began in the final
year of the State takeover of the district and in 2018, the State returned control
of the district to the JCBOE.
After working in the district for approximately four years, Robinson filed
a series of internal human resources/affirmative action complaints and circulated
memos to her supervisors and district personnel alleging discrimination as a
result of inequitable pay based on her sex. The record shows that on June 10,
2021, Robinson wrote to both former superintendent Walker and Board
President Mussab Ali, alleging discrimination in pay. Days later, Robinson
wrote to Melissa Pearce, executive county superintendent, stating her salary o f
$176,868 was not fair or equitable when compared to the salary of business
A-0327-24 4 administrators in other school districts. Although she initially complained of
the disparity in pay, her other complaints included an inability to hire the staff
she needed to run the business office, defendants' failure to address her concerns
over their hiring preferences, and that other employees were engaged in the
"unlawful practice of selling sick days to non-retiring employees." According
to Robinson when she complained to defendants, she was made to endure
additional harassment and even the ensuing district investigation into her claims
was "handled improperly without the required confidentiality."
On December 1, 2021, Robinson contacted Walker to advise that she was
a victim of a hostile work environment due to racial animus. Two days later,
Robinson contacted Superintendent Fernandez to express her opposition to the
decision to pay additional money to a vendor, who she claimed had failed to
perform work. Approximately ten days later, Robinson filed an affirmative
action complaint, alleging harassment and a hostile workplace, she wrote:4
I continue to be subjected to continuous mistreatment by Edwin Rivera and individuals of the HR Department. [Director of Human Resources] Mr. Rivera has openly "trashed" and slandered my name to employees her serve in the Union Leadership positions on or about December 6, 2021, that include members of the ESA, PPA collective bargaining units and the
4 Robinson erroneously dated this complaint form as of October 5, 2021; a mistake that has been parroted by the parties throughout their briefing. A-0327-24 5 assistant director of HR. Ms. Harold who is aware of my AA complaint bare witness to the hostile conversation, triangulation and attempt by Mr. Rivera to sabotage my relationship and reputation with the District's Union Leadership. [sic]
Under the heading "[w]hat corrective action are you seeking?", Robinson stated: On Friday, December 10, 2021 Mr. Walker called a meeting with Edwin Rivera and myself to "move forward. I told Mr. Walker I'm beyond "frustrated", my blood pressure is up, and that the "black girl" can't get the positions posted. He wanted to know what we do to move forward, the HR department need to support me. I said some choice "F" bomb words and when Edwin Rivera wanted to speak I apologized to Mr. Walker and said I was not going to do this with Edwin.
On Friday, December 10, 2021 I spoke with Sabrina Harold, AA Officer and explained to her what happened, and that I am clearly upset and that I was "leaving" the building. I told her I was "not quitting", but would not be returning to the building until that matter was resolved. I explained to Ms. Harold, that she is fully aware of the situation as the AA Officer needs to handle this matter. I explained to her two years ago I suffered a "heart attack" and I was not going to let this place make me sick, as I currently can get my blood pressure under control. She was going to speak with Mr. Walker. [sic]
On the same day, Robinson provided notice of injury to the district stating
that she was suffering from work-related stress and elevated blood pressure. She
A-0327-24 6 did not return to work. 5 In February 2022, Robinson filed an EEOC complaint,
alleging a hostile work environment and discrimination, which was withdrawn.
On June 30, 2022, plaintiffs filed a six-count complaint against the
JCBOE and district defendants, alleging hostile work environment,
discrimination, harassment, unequal pay because of her race and gender,
retaliation under CEPA, and loss of consortium. As in prior internal memos and
forms, Robinson alleged multiple instances where defendants prevented her
from fulfilling her duties, prevented her from hiring staff and intentionally
undermined her with the leadership. She alleged that Rivera thwarted her efforts
to hire staff because of his preference for Latino candidates and his "cronies."
Robinson further alleged she complained to the Board about its "sanctioned
practice of selling sick days to non-retiring employees" and advised against
Rivera and Fernandez's appointment of a Coordinator of Contractual Operations,
actions that invited further hostility and retaliatory acts against her, which
caused her significant stress.
5 On January 18, 2022, Robinson asserts that she provided a doctor's note as proof she was under a doctor's care, a claim, which is refuted by defendants. No such record is contained in the record before us.
A-0327-24 7 She eventually left the district on medical leave related to stress. In
August of the same year, Robinson was placed on medical leave with full pay
and benefits. This leave was subsequently extended through the end of
Robinson's contract; she never returned to work. The JCBOE did not renew
Robinson's employment contract. Robinson claims her leave and complaint
formed the basis for additional retaliation by defendants, including their
decision to file two sets of tenure charges against her.
After the filing of her complaint, a period of discovery ensued between
the parties whereby only limited discovery was exchanged. Defendants moved
for summary judgment following the expiration of the April 15, 2024 discovery
end date and prior to the June 20, 2024 trial date. Plaintiffs filed no timely
opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion but sought an adjournment,
which the court granted. Plaintiffs eventually responded to the motion and
emailed defendants a log of 1,200 documents, rather than annexing the actual
documents in response to defendants' request for production. 6 Defendants
moved to strike plaintiffs' late-served document production. And, plaintiffs
6 Plaintiffs document production consisted of a computer-generated document log, listing files by name, document type, date, topic, and comments, categories and bate number.
A-0327-24 8 cross-moved for leave to file an amended complaint and reopen discovery. 7
On August 5, 2024, the court entered two orders: the first granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants and the second denied plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint and reopen discovery. The court issued separate
written statements of reasons with each order.
In granting summary judgment, the court stated "there are no triable issues
of material fact. . . . [p]laintiffs did not include any of their document production
to the [c]ourt for review in their opposition to the motion and did not offer a
sworn affidavit, or other competent evidence, to support their claims." The court
declined to consider plaintiffs' "late-served document production." The court
explained [p]laintiffs have not provided the specific documents that they utilize
to support their opposition. Plaintiffs only mention their allegations in the
[c]omplaint, an internal complaint submitted by [p]laintiff, an EEOC Inquiry
Information Form, and an index of their document production. These documents
are mere argument and speculation and do not constitute competent and
persuasive evidence that support [p]laintiffs' claims. On the same day, the court
7 On July 23, 2024, plaintiffs, via attorney certification, argued the documents defendants sought to strike were produced in June 2024 and are already in defendant's possession "since one or more of them were parties to the communications produced, or are policy or other similar documents created by JCBOE." A-0327-24 9 found defendants' motion moot based on its grant of summary judgment and
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.8
Robinson moved for reconsideration and provided a certification and
appendix with attachments, including a June 2021 memorandum seeking
additional compensation, internal discrimination complaint forms, and various
email communications between Robinson, HR Director Rivera, and
Superintendent Fernandez, mostly expressing her need for additional staff and
frustration over being excluded from personnel meetings and decisions. The
court denied the motion in a brief statement included in the order.
The court explained it had previously granted summary judgment because
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact and had failed to
include any documents, sworn affidavits or other competent evidence to support
their claims. The court found that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence, including
documents or Robinson's sworn statements, to support claims of lower
compensation, repeated mistreatment and harassment by the JCBOE,
understaffing, whistleblowing, or internal and external complaints. The court
reiterated the underlying summary judgment motion was granted due to
8 Robinson's tenure charges are neither before us nor included as an exhibit for this appeal. A-0327-24 10 plaintiffs' failures to both include documentation and competent evidence in
support of their claims and present evidence to dispute defendants' statement of
material facts with specific citations to the record pursuant to Rule 4:49-2(a) and
(c). This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015)). Applying the same standard that
governs the trial court's review, we determine whether "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a ECo.
of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, (1995); R. 4:46-2(c). However, this court owes "no
deference to the motion judge's conclusions on issues of law." Bove v.
AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 138 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
We, however, review a trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration
for abuse of discretion. Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020). See
also Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). We note
A-0327-24 11 that "[a] court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State
v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). "[A] functional approach to abuse of discretion
examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the
particular decision at issue." R.Y., 242 N.J. at 65 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). "When examining a trial court's exercise
of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was
'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141,
149 (App. Div. 2007)).
III.
We first address Robinson's argument the court erred in granting summary
judgment as the standard was not met. More particularly, Robinson contends
the motion court erred in failing to consider her late-served documents,
including "more than 1,000 documents produced in response to [d]efendants'
requests" and finding she failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.
Robinson alleged defendants discriminated and retaliated against her based on
A-0327-24 12 protected characteristics, including failing to provide increases in salary,
denying staff support, and ultimately pursuing tenure charges against her.
As a preliminary matter, we recognize the gravamen of Robinson's
argument that had the court considered the late-served discovery, she would
have met her burden of establishing genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
defeat the motion. 9 Stated differently, she asserts that had "counsel been able to
complete discovery, [she] would have been able to demonstrate the missing
elements that would have prevented the granting of the motion for summary
judgment." This argument, however, is without merit since at the time of the
motion hearing, the court did not have the benefit of the additional discovery,
only a log referencing the documents, some of which were only provided at the
time of the motion for reconsideration. The documents generally consist of
Robinson's formal HR complaint forms, alleging she was underpaid; email
communications between Robinson, Director Walker and Superintendent
Fernandez regarding ongoing vacancies in the business office; and emails
expressing her frustration with the current staffing levels in her office and being
excluded from meetings. Having reviewed the entirety of the record before us
9 Robinson also asserts poor representation and attorney neglect resulted in the dismissal of her case and we are obligated to review the dismissal of her complaint on the merits. A-0327-24 13 the late-served documents proved insufficient to demonstrate Robinson
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD, or CEPA and
thus summary judgment was warranted.
Because Robinson's claims are rooted in allegations of discriminatory
disparate treatment, it is her burden to establish a prima facie case showing by
a preponderance of the evidence, that she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2)
applied and was qualified for an employment position sought by the employer;
(3) was rejected or otherwise treated adversely despite adequate qualifications;
and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Bergen Commercial Bank v.
Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 210 (1999); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J.
539, 550 (1990).
Once a prima facie case is established, a presumption of discrimination
arises and the burden then shifts to defendants to show a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for its employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802; see also Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005).
Plaintiffs must then show that this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
A-0327-24 14 Here, we accept Robinson's arguments with respect to the first three
prongs of the prima facie test but are not persuaded she satisfied the fourth prong
that she was the victim of an adverse employment action.
"[T]here is no bright-line rule defining an adverse employment action in
the context of a LAD claim. New Jersey has been guided by the federal courts'
interpretation of Title VII and civil rights legislation to decide what constitutes
an adverse employment decision with regards to a LAD retaliation claim."
Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. 400, 417 (App. Div. 2019).
"The factors to be considered include an 'employee's loss of status, a clouding
of job responsibilities, diminution in authority, disadvantageous transfers or
assignments, and toleration of harassment by other employees.'" Ibid. (quoting
Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 349 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2002)).
Although Robinson asserts that she was unable to hire staff, which we
glean she urges us to consider as a diminution in authority, she does not support
her argument with any details concerning her staffing needs or sufficiently
address who she sought to hire and the stated reason why her requests were not
met. Additionally, the record shows Robinson never returned to work—after
December 13, 2021—yet, she received full compensation and benefits consistent
with the terms of her contract for the duration of her leave. Under these
A-0327-24 15 circumstances, Robinson cannot establish an adverse employment action
occurred even with the benefit of the additional discovery, as there is nothing in
the record to refute that she did not suffer a demotion, separation, or diminution
in authority.
Similarly, Robinson also claims she was subjected to retaliation under the
LAD as a result of engaging in protected activity. The prima facie elements of
a retaliation claim under the LAD requires plaintiff to demonstrate that: (1)
plaintiff was in a protected class; (2) plaintiff engaged in protected activity
known to the employer; (3) plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse
employment consequence; and (4) that there is a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment consequence. Victor v. State,
203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010) (citing Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J.
Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)).
Here, as with her previous claims, Robinson fails to establish that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action. As we have previously stated in
this opinion, Robinson's allegations as stated in her complaint are conclusory
and speculative and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fusco
v. Bd. of Edu. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 461 (App. Div. 2002).
Rule 4:46-5 (requiring more from a non-movant in a summary judgment
A-0327-24 16 proceeding than mere speculation and conclusory statements). Robinson also
does not establish a causal link between any claimed protected activity and
adverse employment consequence under the fourth prong of the LAD. Thus,
even if discovery was timely served and in viewing the competent evidentiary
materials in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, and construing all inferences in
their favor, no rational jury could find that Robinson established a prima facie
case under the LAD.
Robinson's CEPA claim suffers from the same malady as the other counts
in her complaint as she cannot establish an adverse employment action occurred
resulting from her confrontation with Superintendent Fernandez.
Under CEPA, Robinson must establish:
1. That she reasonably believes that her employer's conduct was violating either a law, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law;
2. [T]hat she performed a 'whistle-blowing' activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a);
3. [T]hat an adverse employment action was taken against her; and
4. [T]hat a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.
[Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003)
A-0327-24 17 (citing Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476 (App. Div. 1999)).]
It is unclear from the record whether Robinson engaged in any of the
enumerated whistle-blowing activities as she has not shown proof of an activity
reasonably believed to be in violation of a rule, law, or against public policy .
Robinson asserts that "she complained in writing because Superintendent
Fernandez was attempting to pay additional monies to a vendor for services that
the vendor could not render," and to JCBOE counsel regarding the
administration's "sanctioned practice of selling sick days to non-retiring
employees in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:30-3.5." She avers that "[t]hose alleged
facts would establish the misappropriation of public funds and would certainly
enable [her] to have formed a reasonable belief that a law or regulation had been
violated."
The State contends Robinson's claims of race and gender discrimination
as a result of filing internal complaints must fail because she "has not offered
any evidence whatsoever other than mere speculation and most importantly, has
offered no evidence to even raise a genuine issue of fact to support her claim
that an adverse employment action was taken against her in retaliation for filing
those complaint."
A-0327-24 18 N.J.S.A. 18A:30-3.5 addresses payment for accumulated sick leave by a
board of education. It provides in pertinent part:
[A] board of education, or an agency or instrumentality thereof, shall not pay supplemental compensation to any officer or employee for accumulated unused sick leave in an amount in excess of $15,000. . . .
Supplemental compensation shall be payable only at the time of retirement from a State-administered or locally administered retirement system based on the leave credited on the date of retirement.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:30-3.5.]
Robinson contends only that sick days "were being sold to employees who
were not retiring from [the JCBOE] employment," and that defendants have
retaliated against her for this complaint. Although she alleges violations
concerning sick leave payments and vendor contracts, she does not point to any
proofs that she disclosed or threatened to disclose unlawful conduct, nor does
she identify any specific retaliatory action taken against her as a consequence.
She was not terminated, demoted, or suspended following her complaints, and
she continued to receive all contractual pay and benefits while on leave. Without
competent evidence of adverse action or a causal link to any protected activity,
her CEPA claim cannot survive summary judgment. Against this backdrop, the
A-0327-24 19 court did not err in concluding defendants were entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.
We further note that although Robinson asserts her compensation fell
below those of her peers in other districts, however, she does not support this
claim of discrimination with any proof tying her compensation to her race or
gender. Rather, in her complaint, Robinson merely alleges that she was
compensated at a lower rate than her male, Latino predecessor. She further
argues the JCBOE failed to approve any salary adjustment following her written
complaint about her salary in June 2021 wherein she provided a spreadsheet
showing the salaries of other business administrators in other districts
throughout the State. She does not state the salary of her former counterpart,
his qualifications or experience in order to show disparate treatment.
Moreover, under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-14.1, the salary of business
administrators is fixed by the employee's own Board and Robinson was
compensated pursuant to her multi-year contract with the JCBOE and there is
no claim the JCBOE breached the terms of her contract or compensated her less
because of her race and gender. We therefore reject Robinson's contention the
court erred in granting summary judgment on her LAD claim based on pay
disparity claims.
A-0327-24 20 Because we conclude the court properly granted summary judgment on
the record before it, we reject plaintiffs' contention the court erred in denying
reconsideration.
Robinson maintains she "moved for reconsideration to place the key
documents before [the court]," which are addressed in her certification and
attached exhibits. 10 She maintains the court erred in granting summary judgment
because the complaint and over one thousand documents provided in response
to defendants' discovery demands sufficiently alleges and demonstrates
discrimination. In her certification, Robinson recounts the history of her
complaints from June 2021 and alleged retaliatory actions by Rivera, including
mistreatment and persistent understaffing of her department and exclusion from
human resources meetings. She maintains that "repeatedly failing to provide
[her] with the resources necessary to do [her] job and run the [b]usiness [o]ffice
is an adverse employment action, and [she is] convinced that [her] predecessor,
a Latino male, would have been treated differently and better."
10 Robinson further maintains that because all the documents placed before the court had been in the possession of the School District since 2022 or earlier, there was no prejudice to the defendants should the court considers them, in the interest of justice. A-0327-24 21 Though brief, the court addressed the motion for reconsideration under
Rule 4:49-2 and found plaintiffs failed to state with specificity the basis on
which they believe the court relied upon "plainly incorrect reasoning or [failed]
to consider evidence or a good reason for the court to reconsider new
information." Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301-02 (2020). We will
not disturb a court's decision for reconsideration unless it represents an abuse of
discretion where "a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Ibid.
(citing Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super.
378, 382 (App. Div. 2014)). Moreover, the late-served documents add little to
establish the prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD and CEPA.
Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
denying reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2.
In sum, Robinson’s claims, even viewed in the light most favorable to her,
fail to present genuine issues of material fact under either the LAD or CEPA.
She has not produced competent evidence of an adverse employment action or
connected alleged mistreatment to any protected characteristic or activity. Her
claims of pay disparity and understaffing are unsupported by the record and do
A-0327-24 22 not rise to the level of actionable discrimination or retaliation. The trial court
committed no error in granting summary judgment or denying reconsideration.
Affirmed the orders granting summary judgment in defendants' favor and
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
A-0327-24 23