Opinion issued December 19, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00012-CV ——————————— REGINA CHENNAULT, Appellant V. CHI ST. LUKE’S HEALTH - BAYLOR ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, ALI JALALI, M.D., AND ASHWIN VISWANATHAN, M.D., Appellees
On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-35941
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Regina Chennault appeals, pro se, the trial court’s take-nothing
summary judgment on her health care liability claim. Appellees sought traditional
summary judgment based on limitations and the impropriety of pleading a health
care liability claim as a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Liberally construing Chennault’s corrected brief, we recognize that she has
challenged the trial court’s summary judgment. We affirm.
Background
In her original petition, Chennault alleged that she was treated at the hospital
defendant’s emergency room on September 4, 2013, two days after she was injured
in a car accident. She was discharged the following day with a diagnosis of an
epidural hemorrhage, prescription pain medicine, and an order to follow up with an
MRI with contrast of her brain. Chennault alleges that, while she was treated at the
defendant’s hospital, she did not receive intravenous fluids, and she maintains this
breached the applicable standard of care. About two weeks later, she had an
outpatient MRI with intravenous gadolinium contrast. Chennault alleges that she
did not receive IV fluids at that time, either, which also fell below the standard of
care.
Chennault alleges that the defendants’ actions and omissions, including the
use of gadolinium contrast for the MRI caused her injuries. She alleged that she
suffered numerous symptoms, including kidney pain and difficulty urinating
beginning after her treatment in 2013 and continuing to the present day. Chennault
alleges that, in June 2020, urine tests showed evidence of gadolinium toxicity. She
further alleges that, in October 2021, skin biopsies showed that she had
nephrogenic systemic fibrosis, an incurable condition, caused by gadolinium.
2 Chennault filed suit against the defendants on June 15, 2022. She pleaded a
health care liability claim against all defendants under the Texas Medical Liability
Act (“TMLA”) and a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“DTPA”) as to the hospital defendant only. The appellees answered with general
denials and affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations. The hospital
defendant and physician defendants filed separate traditional motions for summary
judgment on the grounds that her claims were barred by the TMLA’s two-year
statute of limitations. and that the DTPA did not apply to her claims. In response,
Chennault filed an unsigned, unverified, unauthenticated typewritten letter that
purported to be from a doctor and that stated she was under his care and suffering
from medical conditions that are “only caused by injection of gadolinium with
damages cumulative over time and repeat dosing.” She later sought leave to
supplement the record with the same letter, accompanied by a signed jurat, several
pages of medical records, unspecified spreadsheets, and text messages. The
defendants objected and asked the court to deny the motion to supplement the
summary judgment record because Chennault’s proffered documents were not
proper summary-judgment evidence.
Chennault also argued that her claims were not barred by limitations because
she filed suit within two years of being “correctly diagnosed,” “brain fog” from her
health problems left her temporarily incapacitated, and the defendants fraudulently
3 concealed the cause of her injuries. Finally, she mentioned the Open Courts
provision of the Texas constitution, but she did not explain how or why it should
apply to her case.
The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Chennault’s
claims. Chennault appealed.
Analysis
On appeal, Chennault asserts four issues. She argues that the court abused its
discretion by excluding medical testimony, that a clerical error caused some
documents to be absent from the record, that defense counsel did not understand
her evidence, and that the application of filing deadlines was unreasonable due to
holidays and winter storms.
As with many pro se briefs, the appellant’s briefing on appeal falls short of
complete compliance with the briefing rules. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see also
Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (pro se litigants
held to same standards as licensed attorneys); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573
S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules,
one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.”).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Texas has frequently advised that “[a]ppellate
briefs are to be construed reasonably, yet liberally,” and that “appellate courts
4 should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry v.
Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008).
Much of Chennault’s brief is exposition about her health, medical treatment
and testing, and factual assertions about the course of proceedings in this case.
Most of these factual assertions are not supported by the appellate record.
Nevertheless, liberally construing Chennault’s brief, we conclude that she has
challenged the trial court’s denial of her motion to supplement the record with
proffered evidence and the court’s summary-judgment ruling that the statute of
limitations bars her claims as a matter of law. To the extent that Chennault
attempted to raise any other issues, they are overruled as inadequately briefed. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79,
84 (Tex. 2018). “If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment.” Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; see Maldonado v. Maldonado, 556 S.W.3d
407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The evidence raises a
genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their
conclusions in light of all the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire &
5 Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). A defendant moving for
summary judgment on an affirmative defense has the burden to conclusively
establish every element of that defense. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81,
88 (Tex. 2021).
A health care liability claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a); Kovaly v. Kuruvanka, 497 S.W.3d
539, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Section 74.251(a)
provides that a health care liability claim must be brought “within two years from
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Opinion issued December 19, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00012-CV ——————————— REGINA CHENNAULT, Appellant V. CHI ST. LUKE’S HEALTH - BAYLOR ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, ALI JALALI, M.D., AND ASHWIN VISWANATHAN, M.D., Appellees
On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-35941
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Regina Chennault appeals, pro se, the trial court’s take-nothing
summary judgment on her health care liability claim. Appellees sought traditional
summary judgment based on limitations and the impropriety of pleading a health
care liability claim as a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Liberally construing Chennault’s corrected brief, we recognize that she has
challenged the trial court’s summary judgment. We affirm.
Background
In her original petition, Chennault alleged that she was treated at the hospital
defendant’s emergency room on September 4, 2013, two days after she was injured
in a car accident. She was discharged the following day with a diagnosis of an
epidural hemorrhage, prescription pain medicine, and an order to follow up with an
MRI with contrast of her brain. Chennault alleges that, while she was treated at the
defendant’s hospital, she did not receive intravenous fluids, and she maintains this
breached the applicable standard of care. About two weeks later, she had an
outpatient MRI with intravenous gadolinium contrast. Chennault alleges that she
did not receive IV fluids at that time, either, which also fell below the standard of
care.
Chennault alleges that the defendants’ actions and omissions, including the
use of gadolinium contrast for the MRI caused her injuries. She alleged that she
suffered numerous symptoms, including kidney pain and difficulty urinating
beginning after her treatment in 2013 and continuing to the present day. Chennault
alleges that, in June 2020, urine tests showed evidence of gadolinium toxicity. She
further alleges that, in October 2021, skin biopsies showed that she had
nephrogenic systemic fibrosis, an incurable condition, caused by gadolinium.
2 Chennault filed suit against the defendants on June 15, 2022. She pleaded a
health care liability claim against all defendants under the Texas Medical Liability
Act (“TMLA”) and a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“DTPA”) as to the hospital defendant only. The appellees answered with general
denials and affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations. The hospital
defendant and physician defendants filed separate traditional motions for summary
judgment on the grounds that her claims were barred by the TMLA’s two-year
statute of limitations. and that the DTPA did not apply to her claims. In response,
Chennault filed an unsigned, unverified, unauthenticated typewritten letter that
purported to be from a doctor and that stated she was under his care and suffering
from medical conditions that are “only caused by injection of gadolinium with
damages cumulative over time and repeat dosing.” She later sought leave to
supplement the record with the same letter, accompanied by a signed jurat, several
pages of medical records, unspecified spreadsheets, and text messages. The
defendants objected and asked the court to deny the motion to supplement the
summary judgment record because Chennault’s proffered documents were not
proper summary-judgment evidence.
Chennault also argued that her claims were not barred by limitations because
she filed suit within two years of being “correctly diagnosed,” “brain fog” from her
health problems left her temporarily incapacitated, and the defendants fraudulently
3 concealed the cause of her injuries. Finally, she mentioned the Open Courts
provision of the Texas constitution, but she did not explain how or why it should
apply to her case.
The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Chennault’s
claims. Chennault appealed.
Analysis
On appeal, Chennault asserts four issues. She argues that the court abused its
discretion by excluding medical testimony, that a clerical error caused some
documents to be absent from the record, that defense counsel did not understand
her evidence, and that the application of filing deadlines was unreasonable due to
holidays and winter storms.
As with many pro se briefs, the appellant’s briefing on appeal falls short of
complete compliance with the briefing rules. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see also
Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (pro se litigants
held to same standards as licensed attorneys); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573
S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules,
one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.”).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Texas has frequently advised that “[a]ppellate
briefs are to be construed reasonably, yet liberally,” and that “appellate courts
4 should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry v.
Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008).
Much of Chennault’s brief is exposition about her health, medical treatment
and testing, and factual assertions about the course of proceedings in this case.
Most of these factual assertions are not supported by the appellate record.
Nevertheless, liberally construing Chennault’s brief, we conclude that she has
challenged the trial court’s denial of her motion to supplement the record with
proffered evidence and the court’s summary-judgment ruling that the statute of
limitations bars her claims as a matter of law. To the extent that Chennault
attempted to raise any other issues, they are overruled as inadequately briefed. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79,
84 (Tex. 2018). “If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment.” Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; see Maldonado v. Maldonado, 556 S.W.3d
407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The evidence raises a
genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their
conclusions in light of all the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire &
5 Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). A defendant moving for
summary judgment on an affirmative defense has the burden to conclusively
establish every element of that defense. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81,
88 (Tex. 2021).
A health care liability claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a); Kovaly v. Kuruvanka, 497 S.W.3d
539, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Section 74.251(a)
provides that a health care liability claim must be brought “within two years from
the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care
treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim
is made is completed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a); see also
Davenport v. Adu-Lartey, 526 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, pet. denied).
The Texas Legislature has abrogated the discovery rule for health care
liability claims. Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985) (“We hold
that the Legislature’s intent in passing [the predecessor to the TMLA] was to
abolish the discovery rule in cases governed by the Medical Liability Act.”). More
recently, the Texas Supreme Court observed that, as to health care liability claims,
“[i]t is undeniable that the statute of limitations contains no discovery rule.”
Walters v. Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292, 298 n.28 (Tex. 2010).
6 Here, it is undisputed that Chennault’s claim is a health care liability claim.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(13) (“‘Health care liability claim’
means a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment,
lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical
care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly
related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant,
whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.”).
Chennault’s petition establishes that she was last treated by the defendants in
September 2013, and she did not file suit until June 2022. Chennault’s suit was
filed more than two years after the date the medical treatment and hospitalization
for which the claim is made was completed. Therefore, the statute of limitations
applies and bars her claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a).
We do not need to address Chennault’s issue about the trial court’s denial of
her request to supplement the summary-judgment record because the proffered
evidence could not have overcome the statute of limitations affirmative defense.
See Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155–56 (Tex. 2015)
(contrasting “affirmative defense” with “confession and avoidance”); Affirmative
Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“A defendant’s assertion of
facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim,
even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.”)
7 We overrule all of Chennault’s issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Peter Kelly Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Guerra.