Regina Bennett v. Butler County Board of Education

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: May 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-10186
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 1 of 6

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-10186 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

JOSEPH WEST, et al., Plaintiffs, REGINA M. BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, LINDA HAMILTON, Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Butler County Board of Education, MICKEY JONES, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Butler County Board of Education, MICHAEL NIMMER, USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 2 of 6

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Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Butler County Board of Education, LOIS ROBINSON, Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Butler County Board of Education, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-01061-RAH-JTA ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Regina Bennett sued the Butler County Board of Education, five Board members, and the Superintendent for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. The crux of her claims is that the defendants discriminated against her when they reas- signed her from a school counselor position to a kindergarten teacher position at the same school. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims and en- tered a final judgment for the defendants. Bennett timely appealed. USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 3 of 6

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Bennett argues the district court erred in two respects. First, she says the district court abused its discretion in denying her mo- tion for leave to amend her complaint. Second, she says the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judg- ment on her race discrimination claim under Title VII. We agree with the defendants that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bennett’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. See Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402, 1404 (11th Cir. 1994). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quota- tions omitted). Bennett missed the district court’s deadline to move for leave to amend the pleadings. After granting multiple extensions, the district court set the deadline for the parties to file amended pleadings for December 17, 2019. Bennett purported to file an amended complaint on December 17, but did not move for leave to file her amended complaint until December 18. Two rules govern motions for leave to amend that are filed after a deadline in a scheduling order. Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave” and that “[t]he court should freely USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 4 of 6

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give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But “a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as un- due delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.” Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 793 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). When a party has not been dili- gent in seeking an extension, a district court is well within its dis- cretion to decline to modify a scheduling order. See Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court held that there was no good cause to mod- ify the scheduling order and denied Bennett’s motion because of her undue delay in filing it, because it would require significantly more discovery, including the redeposition of parties and wit- nesses, and because it would prejudice the defendants. Bennett fails to explain how the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, applied the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, followed improper procedures in denying her motion, or made clearly erro- neous findings of fact. See Aycock, 769 F.3d at 1068. Rather, she ar- gues that justice requires her new claims to be heard and that the district court’s ruling was inconsistent with the “spirit” of the Fed- eral Rules. We disagree. The district court followed the Rules, and nothing in the record suggests that it abused its discretion in doing so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Bennett’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 5 of 6

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Next, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on her race discrimination claim because Ben- nett failed to present evidence that her transfer was discriminatory under our existing Title VII caselaw. While this appeal was pend- ing, the Supreme Court decided Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 144. S. Ct. 967 (2024), in which it held that, under the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII, a plaintiff who is suing over an allegedly dis- criminatory workplace transfer “need show only some injury re- specting her employment terms or conditions” and “[t]he transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so.” Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. at 977. This standard differs from our pre-Muldrow caselaw, which required a Title VII plaintiff alleging an adverse employment action to establish a “serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sher- iff’s Off., 525 F.3d 1013, 1031 (11th Cir. 2008). We have said that our standard requires that the adverse action specifically involve a re- duction in pay, prestige, or responsibility. See Hinson v. Clinch Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 231 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court in this case, citing our precedent, held that it was Bennett’s burden to establish that her transfer “in some substantial way alter[ed] the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em- ployment, deprive[d] him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect[ed] his or her status as an employee.” Plaintiffs no longer need to meet that “substantial way” burden. USCA11 Case: 23-10186 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 6 of 6

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Although the defendants argue that we should affirm on other grounds, we believe the more prudent course is to remand for additional proceedings under the new legal standard. The plain- tiff’s evidentiary presentation and briefing at summary judgment were directed to meeting a legal standard that no longer exists. And the district court did not have the benefit of the new standard when it decided the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accord- ingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s summary judg- ment order as to the Title VII race discrimination claim so that the court may reconsider whether Bennett’s Title VII race discrimina- tion claim should proceed to trial. The district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED AND REMANDED in part.