Regal West Corporation v. Nguyen

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: May 9, 2022
• Docket: 3:19-cv-05374
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT TACOMA 10 11 REGAL WEST CORPORATION, CASE NO. 3:19-cv-05374-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REGAL’S v. MOTION TO LIFT STAY AND FOR 13 LEAVE TO FILE A PROPOSED MINH KHAI NGUYEN et al., SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 Defendant. 15

16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Regal West Corporation’s (“Regal’s”) Motion 17 to Lift Stay and for Leave to File a Proposed Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 102. Regal’s 18 motion to lift the previously granted stay is now moot, as the stay expired on Monday, April 25, 19 2022. Dkt. No. 100. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Regal has failed to show 20 good cause for joining additional defendants beyond the previously scheduled joinder date and 21 reserves ruling on whether Regal should be allowed to add new claims against Defendant Minh 22 Khai Nguyen under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) until 23 final judgment is entered in the parallel litigation currently pending in the US District Court for 24 1 the Central District of California, Softketeers, Inc. v Regal West Corporation et al., 8:19-cv- 2 00519-JWH-JDE (“the Softketeers case”). 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 After Mr. Nguyen initiated the Softketeers case in California in early 2019, Regal filed

5 this case in May 2019 raising claims against both Mr. Nguyen and Softketeers, Inc. See Dkt. 6 No. 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer this case to be tried with the more 7 senior related California action. Dkt. No. 24. Plaintiff responded by filing a First Amended 8 Complaint (“FAC”) on July 3, 2019, dropping Softketeers, Inc., from this case and raising seven 9 counts against Mr. Nguyen in his individual capacity, including claims under the Lanham Act, 10 the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Washington’s Trade Secrets Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 11 Act, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Dkt. No. 27. The crux of Regal’s claims is that 12 Mr. Nguyen misappropriated Regal’s trade secrets through its relationship with Softketeers, 13 Inc.—a closely held corporation owned and operated primarily by Mr. Nguyen—to benefit 14 himself and his other closely held company, Retail Exchange Network, Inc. (“RXN”). After

15 withdrawing his prior motion, Mr. Nguyen refiled a new motion to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 16 No. 31. On September 30, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Mr. Nguyen’s 17 motion, dismissing two of the seven counts, including the False Advertising claims under the 18 Lanham Act and all claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Dkt. No. 37. 19 On January 16, 2020, the Court entered a case management schedule, setting a deadline 20 for joining additional parties by March 15, 2020, and a discovery completion deadline of 21 October 13, 2020. Dkt. No. 45. On April 17, 2020, one month after the joinder deadline, Regal 22 moved to compel discovery related to RXN, which Mr. Nguyen had objected to on the grounds 23 that he was sued in his personal capacity, and RXN was not a party to the action. Dkt. No. 51.

24 Plaintiff argued that the discovery was warranted to the extent Mr. Nguyen was using RXN as a 1 vehicle for his personal wrongdoings. See id. at 1, 5, 10. On May 12, 2020, the Court granted the 2 motion and ordered Mr. Nguyen to “submit complete responses, including information and 3 documents within his control at RXN” to Regal’s specified interrogatories and requests for 4 production. Dkt. No. 55. Regal notes that Mr. Nguyen’s May 2020 supplemental discovery

5 responses indicated that his RXN cofounder, Garry Neeves, was “‘responsible for [the] sales and 6 marketing’ of RXN and averring that Mr. Neeves ‘approv[ed]’ certain actions of RXN.” Dkt. 7 No. 102 at 4-5 (revisions in original, internal citations omitted) (quoting Dkt. No. 103, Ex. 3 at 3, 8 7, 10). 9 Discovery then proceeded, including additional motions practice. On August 21, 2020, 10 Mr. Nguyen moved to compel specific discovery responses and to generally object to the pace of 11 Regal’s document productions. Dkt. No. 60. After learning in July that Mr. Nguyen’s personal 12 attorney in this action was not authorized to accept service on behalf of RXN and failing to 13 achieve personal service of third-party subpoenas on RXN in August, on September 10, Regal 14 moved to compel Mr. Nguyen to accept service on behalf of RXN through his personal attorney.

15 Dkt. No. 68. Before a ruling was entered on Mr. Nguyen’s fully briefed motion, and before 16 opposition briefing was due on Regal’s motion, the Parties jointly moved to stay all proceedings 17 for two months because Mr. Nguyen’s wife was hospitalized with a serious health condition. 18 Dkt. No. 70. The Court granted the stay and struck the pending discovery motions. Dkt. No. 71. 19 The stay has subsequently been extended five times at the Parties’ request. See Dkt. Nos. 20 79, 82, 88, 92, 100. Most recently, on January 14, 2022, the Parties asked the Court to vacate “all 21 current deadlines” and extend the stay to April 25, 2022, representing that 22 [w]hile trial is now complete in [the Softketeers case] and the court heard oral argument on four of the parties’ post-verdict, prejudgment motions on January 11, 23 2022, the hearing was continued as to the remaining four post-verdict motions until February 22, 2022. Once all post-verdict motions are decided, the case is 24 expected to proceed to judgment and related post-judgment briefing, as necessary 1 and appropriate. The parties anticipate that resolution of these motions in [the Softketeers case] will impact certain issues in this litigation. 2 Dkt. No. 98 at 1-2. The Court granted the Parties’ request and ordered the Parties to file a joint 3 status report by no later April 18, 2022. Dkt. No. 100. 4 On March 4, 2022, Regal filed the instant motion to lift the stay early and for leave to file 5 a proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) joining both RXN and Garry Neeves as 6 additional defendants, adding several new claims against the new defendants, and including a 7 new RICO claim against all three parties. Dkt. No. 102. The motion was noted for March 25, one 8 month before the stay was set to end. Mr. Nguyen filed his opposition on March 21 (Dkt. 9 No. 109), and Regal replied on March 25 (Dkt. No. 112). The Parties also filed a joint status 10 report on April 18 as ordered. Dkt. No. 113. In the joint status report, the Parties acknowledge 11 that the Sofketeers case has still not yet fully resolved, although they now appear to disagree as to 12 how that action impacts any issues in this case and whether an extension of the stay is warranted. 13 Id. at 2-3. 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 The Court-ordered deadline to join additional parties was March 15, 2020. Dkt. No. 45. 16 Although Regal previously amended its Complaint to remove a defendant (Softketeers, Inc.), it 17 did not attempt to join either RXN or Mr. Neeves at any point prior to this deadline. Therefore, 18 Regal is required to assert good cause for relief from the joinder deadline before the Court will 19 entertain its motion for leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(4). Good cause under Rule 16 20 “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth 21 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). If the good cause standard is met, the Court 22 then considers the propriety of the proposed amendments under Rule 15. Id. Leave to amend 23 should be freely granted “where justice so requires” (Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2)); however, the 24 1 Court has discretion to deny an amendment under Rule 15 if it finds that the amendment (1) is 2 sought in bad faith, (2) would cause undue delay, (3) would prejudice the opposing party, (4) is 3 repetitive of previous amendments that failed to cure a deficient pleading; or (5) is futile. Allen v. 4 City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

5 A. Regal was not Diligent in Moving to Join RXN 6 Regal fails to show good cause for its belated request to join RXN as an additional party. 7 For good cause, the Court’s primary consideration is “the diligence of the party seeking the 8 amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. At a minimum, Regal must show that it could not have 9 reasonably met the March 15, 2020, joinder deadline despite its diligence. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. 10 P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment)). Regal’s initial Complaint as well as its 11 FAC, both of which were filed before the March 15 deadline was even set, contain numerous 12 references to RXN, including repeated references to how Mr. Nguyen’s alleged misconduct was 13 intended to enrich both himself and RXN. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1 (including 59 references) 14 and 27 (including 63 references). Regal has not provided any rationale for why it could not have

15 reasonably joined RXN prior to the deadline. 16 Instead, Regal claims that it did not have sufficient visibility into RXN’s activities to 17 justify adding RXN. Regal blames Mr. Nguyen’s resistance in responding to its early discovery 18 requests about RXN, as evidenced by the Court granting its April 2020 motion to compel, for its 19 inability to learn more about RXN’s potential involvement prior to the deadline. Dkt. No. 102 20 at 8. Regal claims that it “apprised itself of every opportunity to seek information regarding . . . 21 RXN’s involvement . . . . [by] serv[ing] Mr. Nguyen with discovery requests seeking information 22 regarding . . . RXN’s relevancy to this action.” Id. 23 Gaining such visibility is the purpose of discovery, but there is no question that adding

24 RXN as a codefendant early on would have permitted Regal to directly seek the information it 1 now says it lacked. Regal chose not to do so. In fact, Regal previously admitted that it 2 intentionally pursued only claims against Mr. Nguyen in his individual capacity. In its 3 April 2020 motion to compel (filed a month after the joinder deadline), Regal argued that Mr. 4 Nguyen’s resistance to RXN-related discovery was misplaced because “Regal is not attempting

5 to obtain . . . discovery into the activities of RXN.” Dkt. No. 51 at 10. Regal further represented 6 that its claims in its FAC intentionally “focus on Nguyen’s wrongful misappropriation of Regal 7 property through Softketeers for the benefit of RXN” and not on RXN’s potential complicity 8 with Mr. Nguyen’s alleged misconduct. Id. Far from indicating diligence in assessing RXN’s 9 involvement, these admissions show that Regal had knowledge about RXN’s potential 10 involvement and chose not to add claims against RXN directly in its FAC as a deliberate aspect 11 of its litigation strategy. Had Regal joined RXN as codefendant early on, it would not have 12 needed to narrow the scope of its RXN-related discovery or seek third-party discovery, and 13 likely would have avoided its need for discovery motions practice altogether. 14 Regal also admits that it received sufficient information to justify moving for leave to add

15 RXN after receiving Mr. Nguyen’s supplemental responses in May. Dkt. No. 102 at 8. Yet again, 16 instead of moving for leave to add additional parties just two months after the deadline elapsed, 17 Regal chose to pursue additional third-party discovery. See Id. at 8-9. This deliberative decision 18 shows that Regal was not diligent in moving to add RXN but was instead intent on furthering its 19 intentional strategy of pursuing its claims against Mr. Nguyen alone. 20 Whatever its reasons for not initially including allegations directly against RXN, Regal 21 chose how to build its house, cannot now take it apart to rebuild it, and must live in it as it stands. 22 Regal could have added such allegations prior to March 15, 2020 or, at the latest, a couple of 23 months following the deadline. Therefore, Regal’s request for leave to amend its FAC to add

24 claims against RXN is DENIED. 1 B. Regal was not Diligent in Moving to Join Garry Neeves 2 Regal fails to show good cause for its belated request to join Mr. Neeves as an additional 3 party. Regal asserts that it could not have known of Mr. Neeves’ involvement prior to the 4 March 15, 2020, deadline, and only learned of it after receiving Mr. Nguyen’s RXN-related

5 supplemental discovery responses in May 2020. Dkt. No. 102 at 4-5. Again, Regal attempts to 6 shift the blame to Mr. Nguyen for its inability to discover sufficient information to add claims 7 against Mr. Neeves. Id. at 5, 8-9. The Court’s focus, though, is on Regal’s actions, which do not 8 show diligence as to its claims against Mr. Neeves. 9 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Gary Neeves is one of the founders of Regal 10 alongside his father, Roque Neeves. Dkt. No. 28 at 12. Further, Regal admits that Mr. Nguyen’s 11 May 2020 supplemental discovery responses informed it that Gary Neeves was not only 12 responsible for the sales and marketing of RXN but also approved certain actions of RXN. Id. 13 at 4. Assuming the truth of Regal’s assertion that it only learned of Mr. Neeve’s involvement in 14 May 2020 after receiving supplemental discovery responses, Regal could have moved for relief

15 from the deadline to add parties at that time, which was just two months after the deadline and 16 still at the outset of discovery, or it could have issued a subpoena to Mr. Reeves in his RXN 17 capacity at that time. But Regal made a choice to do neither. 18 The Court is skeptical about Regal’s claim that it was completely unaware of Mr. 19 Neeves’ potential involvement until receiving the May 2020 supplemental discovery responses. 20 The record clearly shows that Regal had information concerning Mr. Neeves’ potential 21 involvement prior to the deadline for adding parties. As early as June 2019, Mr. Nguyen had 22 disclosed Mr. Neeves’ connection to RXN and his potential involvement in the alleged 23 misconduct. See Dkt. No. 24 at 2; Dkt. No. 26 at ¶ 6. In January 2020, Mr. Neeves was also

24 identified as a potential witness having information regarding “Regal’s authorization of or 1 acquiescence in conduct alleged in plaintiff’s FAC” and “persons who oversaw and directed, and 2 participated in, conduct alleged in the FAC.” Dkt. No. 110-5 at 4. Again, in February 2020, in 3 response to Regal’s written discovery, Mr. Nguyen disclosed that “Garry Neeves has served as 4 CEO and director of RXN” and that “Garry Neeves, former vice president of Regal . . . ,

5 authorized the use of certain elements in connection with the advertising and marketing of 6 RXN.” Dkt. No. 110-6 at 4, 12, 14. These disclosures surely put Regal on notice of Mr. Neeves’ 7 potential involvement well before the March 15, 2020, joinder deadline. 8 Even if the Court were to accept Regal’s contention that it could not have known about 9 Mr. Neeves’ potential involvement prior to receiving the May 2020 supplemental discovery 10 responses, Regal must still show that it was diligent in seeking to add Mr. Neeves in the nearly 11 two years that has since elapsed. Putting aside the period in which this case was stayed at the 12 Parties’ request,1 Regal still had the four-month period between May and September 2020 in 13 which it could have moved to add the claims again Mr. Neeves. Regal admits that Mr. Nguyen’s 14 May 2020 supplemental responses were “sufficient to form a basis for this Motion,” yet it chose

15 to pursue third-party discovery instead. Dkt. No. 102 at 8-9. 16 Regal’s third-party discovery efforts also belie its claim that it “apprised itself of every 17 opportunity to seek information regarding Mr. Neeves’ . . . involvement in the circumstances 18 underlying this action.” Dkt. No. 102 at 8. Nothing in Regal’s stricken motion to compel—which 19 it filed four months after it received the supplemental discovery responses—indicates an intent to 20 attain discovery regarding Mr. Neeves’ involvement. See generally Dkt. Nos. 68, 68-1 thru 68-7, 21 69. In fact, Regal only ever attempted to serve Mr. Nguyen, as RXN’s registered agent, with 22

23 1 The initial stay was set to last only two months, and Regal voluntarily joined the five separate extension requests, each of which represented an opportunity for Regal to oppose extending the stay so it could move for the instant 24 amendments. 1 RXN-specific subpoenas; never once did Regal attempt to serve Mr. Neeves with any discovery 2 directly or even as an officer of RXN. Id. 3 Regal’s own actions fall well short of showing diligence in ascertaining Mr. Neeves’ 4 potential involvement in this case. Therefore, Regal’s request for leave to amend its FAC to add

5 claims against Garry Neeves is DENIED, and the Court does not need to reach the Rule 15 inquiry. 6 C. The Court Reserves Ruling on Whether Regal May Add Its RICO Claims Against Mr. Nguyen 7 Per the above, Regal cannot add its proposed RICO claims as to RXN or Mr. Neeves. 8 The question remains whether the Court should grant Regal leave to add the RICO claims as to 9 Mr. Nguyen. Leave to amend should be freely granted “where justice so requires” (Fed. R. Civ. 10 Proc. 15(a)(2)), but the Court has discretion to deny any amendment if it finds that the 11 amendment (1) is sought in bad faith, (2) would cause undue delay, (3) would prejudice the 12 opposing party, (4) is repetitive of previous amendments that failed to cure a deficient pleading, 13 or (5) is futile. Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990). 14 Mr. Nguyen argues that Regal generally seeks to amend its FAC (1) in bad faith for 15 retaliation for its unfavorable outcome in the Softketeers case and (2) to unduly delay 16 proceedings and (3) prejudice Mr. Nguyen as an individual defendant by belatedly expanding the 17 scope of this litigation. Dkt. No. 109 at 12-15. Mr. Nguyen also argues that the RICO claim, 18 specifically, is futile because of the jury verdict in the Softketeers case. Id. at 15. 19 1. General Bad Faith, Undue Delay, and Prejudice 20 Mr. Nguyen’s general arguments rest essentially on the delay and subsequent prejudice 21 he would experience from the greatly expanded scope of litigation in this case if all of Regal’s 22 amendments were allowed. Dkt. No. 109 at 12-13. The delay would come from the fact that the 23 stay was initially entered with only about a month remaining in the discovery period but 24 1 allowing the amendments at this stage would require a considerable expansion of necessary 2 discovery. Id. Mr. Nguyen argues that such tactical late-stage amendments are inherently 3 prejudicial and evidence bad faith. Dkt. No. 109 at 14. Mr. Nguyen also points to the fact that he 4 is an individual defendant and any expansion or delay in the litigation “threatens to swamp [his]

5 resources . . . . [which] are meager in comparison to” Regal’s. Id. at 14-15; see also Priddy v. 6 Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Putting the defendants through the time and 7 expense of continued litigation on a new theory, with the possibility of additional discovery, 8 would be manifestly unfair and unduly prejudicial.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 9 Mr. Nguyen also raises several arguments calling into question Regal’s true motives for 10 seeking the amendments. For example, Mr. Nguyen argues that many of the allegedly new 11 allegations could have been raised earlier in this litigation (see discussion above regarding claims 12 against RXN and Mr. Neeves), including claims that it dropped from its original Complaint in 13 response to Mr. Nguyen’s initial motion to dismiss, but Regal intentionally chose to sue Mr. 14 Nguyen individually instead for familial reasons. Dkt. No. 109 at 12-13. Further, Mr. Nguyen

15 disputes whether any of the allegedly new information that came out of the Softketeers case is 16 actually new at all, noting that much of it had been disclosed well before the initial stay was 17 entered in this case.2 Id. at 13. 18 Additionally, the primary change in circumstance since May 2020, when Regal 19 acknowledges it received sufficient information “to form the basis for this Motion” (Dkt. 20 No. 102 at 8), is that it received an unfavorable jury verdict in the Softketeers case. According to 21 Mr. Nguyen, this raises the suspicion that Regal’s proposed amendments are actually a 22 23 2 The Court again notes that Regal also had several opportunities to oppose extending the stay in order to seek leave 24 to add any new claims based on information it learned during the Softketeers case. 1 retaliatory attempt to multiply the litigation in this case because it knows that it has more 2 resources. 3 The Court notes that its decision to deny Regal leave to add claims against the proposed 4 additional defendants prohibits nearly all of the proposed amendments. While the Court

5 acknowledges that the discovery period had nearly run when the stay was initially entered, it had 6 not yet elapsed. Furthermore, both Parties were actively engaged in motion practice at the time. 7 It is not unreasonable to assume that the initial discovery period may have been expanded 8 anyway. Thus, whatever Regal’s true motivations, the prejudicial effects of allowing all of the 9 amendments are generally ameliorated when considering only adding the RICO claims against 10 Mr. Nguyen, and “[p]rejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a).” Eminence Cap., 11 LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation 12 omitted). 13 For these reasons, Mr. Nguyen’s general arguments against the amendments do not 14 preclude allowing Regal to add the RICO claims against Mr. Nguyen in his individual capacity.

15 2. Futility of the RICO Claims Due to the Verdict in the Softketeers Case 16 Mr. Nguyen also argues that the RICO claims would be barred by the verdict in the 17 Softketeers case, assuming the court there enters a judgment in line with the verdict upon 18 resolution of the Parties’ still pending post-trial motions. Dkt. No. 109 at 15. In the recently filed 19 joint status report, Mr. Nguyen argues that the stay in this case should be extended at least until 20 judgment is entered in the Softketeers case. Dkt. No. 113 at 3. Regal disputes that the judgment 21 in the Softketeers case will affect its RICO claims in any way. Dkt. No. 112 at 6-7. 22 For its RICO claim, Regal is required to allege at least two predicate offenses to establish 23 the necessary element of a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The Supreme

24 Court has further clarified that this is a minimum standard and “that while two acts are 1 necessary, they may not be sufficient.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989) 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 3 n.14 (1985)). 4 As to the pattern of racketeering activity element, Regal’s proposed amendments allege

5 “multiple, repeated, and ongoing acts of trade secret misappropriation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 6 § 1832.” Dkt. No. 103-2 at ¶ 192. Specifically, Regal alleges that Mr. Nguyen misappropriated 7 “Regal’s custom Software” (id. at ¶ 189) and misappropriated “Regal’s confidential and 8 proprietary customer database and customer-coding system” (id. at 190). Mr. Nguyen argues that 9 the jury in the Sofketeers case found that Softketeers, Inc., not Regal, owned the alleged “custom 10 Software” that forms one of the alleged predicate acts of trade secret misappropriation. Dkt. 11 No. 109 at 15. Regal disputes Mr. Nguyen’s representation of what the verdict means and claims 12 that the custom software nonetheless has Regal proprietary information embedded within it.3 13 Dkt. No. 112 at 7. 14 However, the Parties previously represented “that resolution of [post-verdict] motions in

15 [the Softketeers case] will impact certain issues in this litigation” even before the proposed 16 amendments. Dkt. No. 98 at 2. Regal does not dispute its prior representation, but instead argues 17 against a continued stay because the Softketeers case will not have an “outcome- determinative 18 impact on this action.” See Dkt. No. 113 at 2 (emphasis added). Neither Party specifically 19 addresses what, if any, effect the Softketeers decision will have on the claims raised in the FAC, 20 but the Court countenances the Parties prior representations that the still pending post-verdict 21 motions and judgement could impact the current claims in this case. Consequently, it seems that 22

23 3 It is unclear if the alleged “trade secret information embedded in” the software is separate and distinct from the proprietary “customer database and customer-coding system” that forms the second alleged predicate act of 24 misappropriation. 1 determining whether the RICO claim would be futile at this juncture turns on resolving the 2 dispute as to what issues were specifically resolved in the Sofketeers case. The Court 3 acknowledges, though, that judgement has yet to be entered, so a final resolution is still 4 forthcoming, notwithstanding any potential appeal. For these reasons, the Court believes there is

5 good cause to extend the previous stay, at least until final judgement is entered in the Softketeers 6 case. 7 III. ORDER 8 For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS that 9 1. Regal’s Motion to Lift Stay and for Leave to File a Proposed Second Amended 10 Complaint (Dkt. No. 102) is DENIED. Regal’s request to lift the previous stay is moot, and 11 the Court finds that Regal has failed to show good cause for joining additional defendants 12 beyond the joinder deadline and reserves ruling on whether Regal should be allowed to 13 add new claims against Mr. Nguyen at this time. 14 2. This case shall be stayed until (i) final judgement is entered in the Softketeers case, (ii) it

15 is lifted by stipulated request of the Parties, or (iii) it is otherwise ordered by this Court. 16 3. The Parties shall file a joint status report regarding the status of this case by no later 17 than fourteen (14) days after final judgment is entered in the Softketeers case. 18 4. Plaintiff may, at any time after final judgment is entered in the Softketeers case, but no 19 later than fourteen (14) days after the Parties file their joint status report, reinitiate 20 its motion for leave to amend its complaint to add the RICO claims against Mr. Nguyen. 21 Plaintiff shall include a discussion of the impact, if any, the Softketeers case has on the 22 claims raised in this case. All relevant procedural rules regarding such motions will 23 apply, including meet and confer and noting requirements.

24 1 5. If Plaintiff chooses to forgo the RICO claims, and the Parties agree that any still pending 2 decisions or potential appeals in the Softketeers case do not preclude this case from 3 proceeding in its current stature, the Parties’ may jointly move the Court to lift the stay so 4 this litigation may proceed.

5 Dated this 9th day of May 2022. 6 A 7 Tana Lin 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24