Reeves v. State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 18, 1995
Docket95-10549
StatusUnpublished

This text of Reeves v. State of Texas (Reeves v. State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reeves v. State of Texas, (5th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-10549 Summary Calendar

WAYNE MORRIS REEVES, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

STATE OF TEXAS, PARDON AND PAROLE DIVISION; JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; JOHN DOE, Commissioner of TDCJ-Board of Pardons and Paroles Division,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas (2:93-CV-255) (September 27, 1995)

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1 Appellant, a Texas Department of Criminal Justice inmate,

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the suit under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d) as frivolous. We affirm, and specifically warn

1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. Appellant that the filing of any further frivolous suits will

result in sanctions.

Appellant claims that the Texas practice of requiring inmates

to work violates the Thirteenth Amendment; that since he cannot be

forced to work, he cannot be disciplined for refusing to work; and

that inmates should be compensated for their work and given more

“work time credit”. This Court has long ago decided all these

issues adverse to Appellant’s position. Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d

619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Murray v. Mississippi Dep’t

of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 1050 (1991). These same authorities dispose of

his claim regarding revocation of prisoners “work time credits”.

We do not consider Reeves claims that relinquishment of work

time credit as a condition of parole is unconstitutional because he

did not allege that he either has been, or will be, eligible for

parole so he has not presented a case or controversy for decision.

Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1983). This Court is

without jurisdiction to consider the issue.

Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the contentions

that his medical records have been altered and that attendance at

the Windham School deprives inmates of true educational

opportunity. We do not consider issues not raised in the district

court. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1991). His

assertion in the district court that other prisoners’ medical

records were altered does not state a claim that Appellant is

competent to litigate.

2 Numerous orders of the district court are complained of on

appeal but no understandable argument is advanced in Appellant’s

papers in relation to them so we are unable to review them.

AFFIRMED.

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