Reeves v. Brand-Name Fashion Outlet

532 F. Supp. 32, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 852, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10805
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 11, 1982
DocketNo. C-80-2593
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 532 F. Supp. 32 (Reeves v. Brand-Name Fashion Outlet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reeves v. Brand-Name Fashion Outlet, 532 F. Supp. 32, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 852, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10805 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER

HORTON, District Judge.

This case is one in which the plaintiff, Virginia H. Reeves, charges sex discrimination in employment. Plaintiff asserts the defendant demoted her from the position of assistant store manager to that of an hourly paid sales clerk because she was pregnant. The defendant, Brand-Name Fashion Outlet, states the plaintiff was demoted because of her unsatisfactory job performance and not because of her pregnancy. For reasons stated in this memorandum, the Court enters judgment for the defendant.

On December 3,1979, Charles R. Shaughnessy, President, Brand-Name Fashion Outlet, a division of Manhattan Industries, Inc., with home offices in the state of New Jersey, interviewed Mrs. Reeves for a management position in a new retail store being opened by that company in a shopping mall at Lakeland, in Shelby County, Tennessee. On December 5, 1979, Mr. Shaughnessy hired two women to manage that store. Mrs. Sandra Hartman was employed as [33]*33Store Manager, Mrs. Reeves was hired as Assistant Store Manager. The new retail store was scheduled to open at Lakeland, on January 7, 1980.

During the period January 2-5, 1980, both women were provided on the job training in one of the defendant’s stores located in Ocala, Florida. On the job training was provided by experienced employees of the defendant company. The training included, among other things, learning to operate cash registers, record keeping, reporting requirements, personnel rules, customer relations, inventory ticketing procedures, daily financial reporting and other procedures necessary to conduct the on-going operation of a retail outlet store.

During the early evening of January 2, 1980, while the parties were in Florida, Judy Lane Leighton, a management instructor, drove plaintiff to a restaurant where dinner had been planned for the management group. Mrs. Reeves informed Mrs. Leighton that she was pregnant. Mrs. Leighton informed Mr. Shaughnessy, and others in the group, that she was driving “a lady in a delicate condition.” Apparently, that was the defendant’s first knowledge that Mrs. Reeves was pregnant.

Due to construction delays, the defendant did not open its store in Lakeland on January 7,1980, as scheduled. Instead, the store opening was delayed until January 14,1980, on which date Mrs. Reeves reported for work. On January 17, 1980, Mrs. Reeves was notified by Mr. Shaughnessy that she would be demoted from the position of Assistant Store Manager to a job as sales clerk with the opportunity of working back up into a management position. Rather than accept the demotion, Mrs. Reeves resigned.

Mrs. Reeves testified that she was graduated from Memphis State University in May of 1974. She earned a 3.78 academic average. She had been employed in a management position with Lowenstein’s, a large retail store in Memphis. She had acquired four years’ experience in the retail marketing field. She said that Mr. Shaughnessy interviewed her twice and offered her a job as assistant manager of the Lakeland store. The salary was $210 per week or about $11,000 per year. She said she never heard anything from Mr. Shaughnessy about a thirty day trial period. She thought she “hit it off pretty well” with Mr. Shaughnessy.

Mrs. Reeves denied that she reported to work late on January 14, 1980. She denied ever lying on a floor doing nothing. Mrs. Reeves testified that on January 17, 1980, Mr. Shaughnessy told her that he had been watching her performance and she had not been showing initiative. When she asked Mr. Shaughnessy if she was being fired, he said he was demoting her to sales clerk. When she replied that she would not accept that job, Mr. Shaughnessy said “that’s it.” She also testified that since January 17, 1980, she has been unable to find a comparable job. She is now employed selling insurance and annuities door-to-door earning five to six hundred dollars per month. Mrs. Reeves said, “I feel like they demoted me because I was pregnant.”

Mrs. Doris King, a co-worker, did not recall that Mrs. Reeves was late for work on her first day, January 14, 1980. She said that Mrs. Reeves worked about as hard as anyone else and had about as good an attitude.

Plaintiff claims that she has suffered discrimination because of her sex in that she was demoted because of her pregnancy. She states that she has been the victim of disparate treatment because of her sex and because she is the only company employee demoted 1) after less than three weeks on the job, 2) before the end of a training period, and 3) without counselling, warning or a probationary period. Plaintiff also claims that her demotion constituted a constructive discharge from her employment.

Virginia Reeves alleges that she was demoted from assistant store manager to sales clerk because she was pregnant. In effect, Mrs. Reeves states that she has been treated less favorably than her peers because of her sex. Her claim amounts to one of disparate treatment, which in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), was de[34]*34dared unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Canham v. Oberlin College 666 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1981). Section 2000e-2 provides:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Termination of employment because of pregnancy has a disparate and invidious impact upon the female gender. Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977).

The plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. She was in fact demoted from the position of assistant store manager to sales clerk during the time she was pregnant. She alleged that fact in her complaint. She testified in support of that fact. Pregnancy cannot be the basis for discriminatory treatment. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 91 S.Ct. 496, 27 L.Ed.2d 613 (1971).

Once the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut that prima facie showing of discrimination. The defendant was required to produce evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was demoted for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, such a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.

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Bluebook (online)
532 F. Supp. 32, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 852, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reeves-v-brand-name-fashion-outlet-tnwd-1982.