WILLIAM REEVE, Case No. 1:24-cv-01458-JLT-EPG Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE v. TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT SYNCHRONY BANK, et al., (ECF No. 36) Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Defendant Synchrony Bank’s “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint.” (ECF No. 36).1 Upon review, the Court will grant the motion and permit Defendant Synchrony Bank to file a Third-Party Complaint, naming Merced Powersports as a Defendant. I. BACKGROUND On November 29, 2024, Plaintiff William Reeve filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, naming as Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Synchrony Bank. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint states claims for (1) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (2) Violation of California’s Identity Theft Act; (3) Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting 1 The “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint” (ECF No. 36) was referred to the undersigned on May 5, 2025. (ECF No. 37). Agencies Act. (ECF No. 1). Within the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Synchrony violated the Fair Credit Act by issuing a loan in his name for a motorcycle that he did not purchase. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff further alleges that he filed a dispute with the major credit reporting bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union; however, both Equifax and Experian failed to do any independent investigation and continued reporting inaccurate information about Plaintiff. (Id. at 5-6). On May 2, 2025, Defendant Synchrony Bank filed a “Motion for Leave to File Third- Party Complaint.” (ECF No. 36). In the motion Defendant Synchrony requests permission to file a Third-Party Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, naming as Third-Party Defendant Merced Powersports. (ECF No. 36-1). According to Defendant Synchrony, Merced Powersports should be impleaded as a Third-Party Defendant because Merced Powersports was “responsible for submitting the application for the Loan, pursuant to a merchant agreement between Synchrony and Merchant.” (Id. at 2). Defendant Synchrony attaches a copy of its proposed Third-Party Complaint that lists two claims against Merced Powersports: (1) Indemnification and Contribution, and (2) Contractual Indemnification and Contribution. (Id. at 11). In support of the motion, Defendant Synchrony argues that there is good cause for impleading Merced Powersports because (1) such will not prejudice Plaintiff, (2) given that this case is in the early stages, there will be no complications of the issues for trial, (3) such will not cause delay of trial, and (4) and granting the motion will promote judicial efficiency and eliminate the need for Synchrony to bring a separate lawsuit. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion, and the other Defendants have since settled their claims with Plaintiff and are no longer parties to the lawsuit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) provides that “[a] defending party may as third- party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a [non-party] who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). The purpose of Rule 14 is to “promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity for the defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may be secondarily or derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's original claim.” Sw. Adm'rs, Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986). “The decision whether to implead a third party defendant is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. “[A] third-party claim may be asserted only when the third-party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim and the third-party's liability is secondary or derivative.” United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983). “The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third- party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. The mere fact that the alleged third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the original claim is not enough.” Stewart v. Am. Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988). As further stated in Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure: A third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 14(a)(1) only when the third party’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defending party. The secondary or derivative liability notion is central and thus impleader has been successfully utilized when the basis of the third-party claim is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty, or some other theory. Wright and Miller, § 1446 When a Third-Party Action Is Proper, 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1446 (3d ed.). III. ANALYSIS Defendant Synchrony Bank moves to implead Merced Powersports because, according to Synchrony, Merced Powersports “is not only essential to determining the validity of Plaintiff’s allegations of identity theft, but also the proper allocation of liability under the Merchant Agreement without duplicative proceedings.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 3). Defendant further argues that impleading Merced Powersports “ensures judicial efficiency and a comprehensive resolution of the dispute.” (Id. at 3-4). There is no opposition to the motion. The Ninth Circuit has stated that a third-party claim under Rule 14(a) may only be asserted if: (1) the third-party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim; and (2) the third-party's liability to defendant is secondary or derivative. Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 452. Here, Defendant Synchrony states in defense to Plaintiff’s claim that Merced Powersports is the party directly responsible for issuing the loan. Additionally, Defendant Synchrony alleges proposed Third-Party Complaint that it and Merced Powersports “entered into an agreement with Synchrony, under which Merced Powersports agreed to indemnify Synchrony for any liability, damages, or losses incurred by Synchrony as the result of any actions by Merced Powersports.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11). Thus, the outcome of the main claim may concern Merced Powersports’ liability for issuance of the loan or impose an obligation of indemnification.
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WILLIAM REEVE, Case No. 1:24-cv-01458-JLT-EPG Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE v. TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT SYNCHRONY BANK, et al., (ECF No. 36) Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Defendant Synchrony Bank’s “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint.” (ECF No. 36).1 Upon review, the Court will grant the motion and permit Defendant Synchrony Bank to file a Third-Party Complaint, naming Merced Powersports as a Defendant. I. BACKGROUND On November 29, 2024, Plaintiff William Reeve filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, naming as Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Synchrony Bank. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint states claims for (1) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (2) Violation of California’s Identity Theft Act; (3) Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting 1 The “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint” (ECF No. 36) was referred to the undersigned on May 5, 2025. (ECF No. 37). Agencies Act. (ECF No. 1). Within the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Synchrony violated the Fair Credit Act by issuing a loan in his name for a motorcycle that he did not purchase. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff further alleges that he filed a dispute with the major credit reporting bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union; however, both Equifax and Experian failed to do any independent investigation and continued reporting inaccurate information about Plaintiff. (Id. at 5-6). On May 2, 2025, Defendant Synchrony Bank filed a “Motion for Leave to File Third- Party Complaint.” (ECF No. 36). In the motion Defendant Synchrony requests permission to file a Third-Party Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, naming as Third-Party Defendant Merced Powersports. (ECF No. 36-1). According to Defendant Synchrony, Merced Powersports should be impleaded as a Third-Party Defendant because Merced Powersports was “responsible for submitting the application for the Loan, pursuant to a merchant agreement between Synchrony and Merchant.” (Id. at 2). Defendant Synchrony attaches a copy of its proposed Third-Party Complaint that lists two claims against Merced Powersports: (1) Indemnification and Contribution, and (2) Contractual Indemnification and Contribution. (Id. at 11). In support of the motion, Defendant Synchrony argues that there is good cause for impleading Merced Powersports because (1) such will not prejudice Plaintiff, (2) given that this case is in the early stages, there will be no complications of the issues for trial, (3) such will not cause delay of trial, and (4) and granting the motion will promote judicial efficiency and eliminate the need for Synchrony to bring a separate lawsuit. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion, and the other Defendants have since settled their claims with Plaintiff and are no longer parties to the lawsuit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) provides that “[a] defending party may as third- party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a [non-party] who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). The purpose of Rule 14 is to “promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity for the defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may be secondarily or derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's original claim.” Sw. Adm'rs, Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986). “The decision whether to implead a third party defendant is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. “[A] third-party claim may be asserted only when the third-party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim and the third-party's liability is secondary or derivative.” United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983). “The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third- party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. The mere fact that the alleged third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the original claim is not enough.” Stewart v. Am. Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988). As further stated in Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure: A third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 14(a)(1) only when the third party’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third party is secondarily liable to the defending party. The secondary or derivative liability notion is central and thus impleader has been successfully utilized when the basis of the third-party claim is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty, or some other theory. Wright and Miller, § 1446 When a Third-Party Action Is Proper, 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1446 (3d ed.). III. ANALYSIS Defendant Synchrony Bank moves to implead Merced Powersports because, according to Synchrony, Merced Powersports “is not only essential to determining the validity of Plaintiff’s allegations of identity theft, but also the proper allocation of liability under the Merchant Agreement without duplicative proceedings.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 3). Defendant further argues that impleading Merced Powersports “ensures judicial efficiency and a comprehensive resolution of the dispute.” (Id. at 3-4). There is no opposition to the motion. The Ninth Circuit has stated that a third-party claim under Rule 14(a) may only be asserted if: (1) the third-party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim; and (2) the third-party's liability to defendant is secondary or derivative. Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 452. Here, Defendant Synchrony states in defense to Plaintiff’s claim that Merced Powersports is the party directly responsible for issuing the loan. Additionally, Defendant Synchrony alleges proposed Third-Party Complaint that it and Merced Powersports “entered into an agreement with Synchrony, under which Merced Powersports agreed to indemnify Synchrony for any liability, damages, or losses incurred by Synchrony as the result of any actions by Merced Powersports.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 11). Thus, the outcome of the main claim may concern Merced Powersports’ liability for issuance of the loan or impose an obligation of indemnification.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Synchrony’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of a claim against Merced Powersports. See Schrader vy. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58821, 2005 WL 8156197, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“The obvious case for impleader, of course, is the one in which the third-party defendant is obligated by contract to indemnify the defendant against the liability on which the plaintiff has sued.”) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 14.04[3][b] (3d Ed. 2003)). Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Court will grant the “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint.” Iv. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendant Synchrony Bank’s “Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint” (ECF No. 36) is GRANTED. 2. Defendant Synchrony Bank is permitted to file a Third-Party Complaint on the docket against Merced Powersports. IT IS SO ORDERED. 24] Dated: _ June 25, 2025 hey UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE