DREW, Justice.
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the full commission of the Florida Industrial Commission reversing an award of the deputy commissioner granting certain benefits to the petitioner.
The laical facts are undisputed. Petitioner was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with his employer, Lowry Electric Company, in Key West, Florida on June 10, 1957 when, while employed as a journeyman electrician, he sustained injury to his back while attempting to climb a scaffold. He was furnished medical care and attention by the company doctor for this injury.
Petitioner then went to work for the Whitmore Electric Company in Key West, Florida and on June 18th, eight days after the above accident, petitioner sustained another accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment as a journeyman electrician with the Whitmore Electric Company. This accident happened when the claimant was bent over attempting to secure a drink of water from the spigot of a barrel placed on a concrete block. As claimant was bent over, a piece of concrete block, weighing 15 to 20 pounds, fell from a height of 35 to 40 feet, which is the height where blocklayers were laying blocks, and landed on the claimant in the middle part of his upper back just below the shoulder blades. This blow caused claimant to be “pretty well knocked out”.
While claimant was treated by the same company doctor who had treated him for the accident of June 10, 1957 and who found as a result of the second accident there were no broken bones, claimant suffered with the following (according to his undisputed testimony) symptoms continuously from the date of the second accident, i. e. June 18, 1957: “sore back”, “bad headaches”, insomnia, dizziness, nausea and vomiting. These symptoms are extremely important, first because they are uncontroverted and, second, because they must be considered in light of the type of treatment rendered the claimant and the opinions of the medical experts testifying at the hearings.
In the chronological course of events, this claimant, who was allowed to return to work by the original attending physician under the conditions testified to above, was working for Whitmore Electric Company on October 28, 1957 when he collapsed on the job experiencing a severe muscle spasm in the lower lumbo sacral area of his spine. Claimant’s employer paid for treatment by a naturopath and claimant was discharged as cured after being off work for about two weeks.
Claimant, still suffering from headaches, nausea, dizziness, and vomiting, returned [571]*571“to work for the Whitmore Electric Company, took aspirin and was given home therapy by his wife to keep going on the job. In spite of this, however, on May 6, 1959, about two years after the accidents •of June, 1957, claimant collapsed at home and had to be removed to the hospital in Key West. Claimant was again treated in the hospital by the original company doctor for twenty-seven days and, in a semi-paralyzed state from the hips down, was placed in traction and, while he was subjected to numerous tests, he was not then, nor had he theretofore been given a spinal tap. Claimant’s condition upon release from the hospital still remained undiagnosed and claimant requested the ■company doctor to give him the name of some doctor in Miami who could cure him.
The company doctor gave petitioner the name of a doctor in Miami, said latter doctor suggesting to claimant more x-rays be secured but rendering no treatment. Not having received any relief from any medical source, the claimant saw the operating physician who finally took a spinal tap and myelogram (both diagnostic procedures) and determined claimant was suffering from bilateral perineural cysts which, when decompressed operatively, brought relief to the claimant who, over a period of over two years previous to the operation subsequent to the accidents of 1957, had sought medical relief from bis suffering and finally found a doctor who discovered the cause of the suffering.
Because the employers both contended that claimant was not suffering from any disability causally related to the industrial accidents of 1957, that he was not in need ■of any remedial treatment and that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations, claimant initiated these proceedings.
The deputy commissioner found that claimant’s disability was due to his employment with both employers, and that the appearance of the perineural cysts was •causally connected with the two accidents. He awarded the claimant temporary total compensation benefits and ordered the same to be paid in equal shares by both employers. He reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of attorney’s fees at such time as claimant has reached maximum medical recovery and disability, if any. He also reserved jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of certain medical expenses.
The voluminous record in this case sets forth the depositions, statements and direct evidence of the several physicians and surgeons who testified in this case. As is usually the case, these opinions are in serious conflict. It is quite obvious, however, that the original treating physicians, including one who did not testify, not only failed to correctly diagnose the claimant’s illness but were not qualified so to do. One of the treating physicians, a naturo-path, stated that only a neurosurgeon could make a diagnosis of sacral nerve root cyst or perineural cyst. Another treating physician assumed that the claimant was suffering from a condition later revealed to be completely erroneous and was actually treating him for a considerable length of time therefor.
The question of weighing the conflicting opinions of medical experts has been considered by this Court on numerous occasions. In Andrews v. C. B. S. Division, 118 So.2d 206 (Fla.1960), we carefully and in detail laid down the rules by which such testimony should be weighed and evaluated and therein pointed out that it was the duty and responsibility of the deputy commissioner to reconcile such testimony if possible but where, as here, and as in so many cases, such testimony is irreconcilable, we said it lay within his province to accept the opinion of the expert or experts he determined to be com-portable with logic and reason, taking into consideration all of the other pertinent evidence he had before him. In that case we pointed out that, if he accepted the testimony of some and rejected that of others, it was necessary for him to explain why he did so in order to afford [572]*572the reviewing body a competent record for reaching the conclusion whether he departed from the essential requirements of the law in so doing.
In this case we are impressed with the thorough and conscientious analysis of the detailed and well prepared findings of the deputy commissioner.1 He was [573]*573careful to explain why he accepted the testimony of the operating neurosurgeon, stating among other things that the conclusion of such neurosurgeon with reference to the causal connection between the accidents of June 10 and June 18 and the perineural cysts was supported not only by the uncontradicted history of the claimant’s injuries and subsequent symptoms and evidence over a long period of time but also by the testimony of the expert produced by the carrier and admitted by the parties to be the world’s leading authority upon this particular subject.
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DREW, Justice.
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the full commission of the Florida Industrial Commission reversing an award of the deputy commissioner granting certain benefits to the petitioner.
The laical facts are undisputed. Petitioner was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with his employer, Lowry Electric Company, in Key West, Florida on June 10, 1957 when, while employed as a journeyman electrician, he sustained injury to his back while attempting to climb a scaffold. He was furnished medical care and attention by the company doctor for this injury.
Petitioner then went to work for the Whitmore Electric Company in Key West, Florida and on June 18th, eight days after the above accident, petitioner sustained another accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment as a journeyman electrician with the Whitmore Electric Company. This accident happened when the claimant was bent over attempting to secure a drink of water from the spigot of a barrel placed on a concrete block. As claimant was bent over, a piece of concrete block, weighing 15 to 20 pounds, fell from a height of 35 to 40 feet, which is the height where blocklayers were laying blocks, and landed on the claimant in the middle part of his upper back just below the shoulder blades. This blow caused claimant to be “pretty well knocked out”.
While claimant was treated by the same company doctor who had treated him for the accident of June 10, 1957 and who found as a result of the second accident there were no broken bones, claimant suffered with the following (according to his undisputed testimony) symptoms continuously from the date of the second accident, i. e. June 18, 1957: “sore back”, “bad headaches”, insomnia, dizziness, nausea and vomiting. These symptoms are extremely important, first because they are uncontroverted and, second, because they must be considered in light of the type of treatment rendered the claimant and the opinions of the medical experts testifying at the hearings.
In the chronological course of events, this claimant, who was allowed to return to work by the original attending physician under the conditions testified to above, was working for Whitmore Electric Company on October 28, 1957 when he collapsed on the job experiencing a severe muscle spasm in the lower lumbo sacral area of his spine. Claimant’s employer paid for treatment by a naturopath and claimant was discharged as cured after being off work for about two weeks.
Claimant, still suffering from headaches, nausea, dizziness, and vomiting, returned [571]*571“to work for the Whitmore Electric Company, took aspirin and was given home therapy by his wife to keep going on the job. In spite of this, however, on May 6, 1959, about two years after the accidents •of June, 1957, claimant collapsed at home and had to be removed to the hospital in Key West. Claimant was again treated in the hospital by the original company doctor for twenty-seven days and, in a semi-paralyzed state from the hips down, was placed in traction and, while he was subjected to numerous tests, he was not then, nor had he theretofore been given a spinal tap. Claimant’s condition upon release from the hospital still remained undiagnosed and claimant requested the ■company doctor to give him the name of some doctor in Miami who could cure him.
The company doctor gave petitioner the name of a doctor in Miami, said latter doctor suggesting to claimant more x-rays be secured but rendering no treatment. Not having received any relief from any medical source, the claimant saw the operating physician who finally took a spinal tap and myelogram (both diagnostic procedures) and determined claimant was suffering from bilateral perineural cysts which, when decompressed operatively, brought relief to the claimant who, over a period of over two years previous to the operation subsequent to the accidents of 1957, had sought medical relief from bis suffering and finally found a doctor who discovered the cause of the suffering.
Because the employers both contended that claimant was not suffering from any disability causally related to the industrial accidents of 1957, that he was not in need ■of any remedial treatment and that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations, claimant initiated these proceedings.
The deputy commissioner found that claimant’s disability was due to his employment with both employers, and that the appearance of the perineural cysts was •causally connected with the two accidents. He awarded the claimant temporary total compensation benefits and ordered the same to be paid in equal shares by both employers. He reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of attorney’s fees at such time as claimant has reached maximum medical recovery and disability, if any. He also reserved jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of certain medical expenses.
The voluminous record in this case sets forth the depositions, statements and direct evidence of the several physicians and surgeons who testified in this case. As is usually the case, these opinions are in serious conflict. It is quite obvious, however, that the original treating physicians, including one who did not testify, not only failed to correctly diagnose the claimant’s illness but were not qualified so to do. One of the treating physicians, a naturo-path, stated that only a neurosurgeon could make a diagnosis of sacral nerve root cyst or perineural cyst. Another treating physician assumed that the claimant was suffering from a condition later revealed to be completely erroneous and was actually treating him for a considerable length of time therefor.
The question of weighing the conflicting opinions of medical experts has been considered by this Court on numerous occasions. In Andrews v. C. B. S. Division, 118 So.2d 206 (Fla.1960), we carefully and in detail laid down the rules by which such testimony should be weighed and evaluated and therein pointed out that it was the duty and responsibility of the deputy commissioner to reconcile such testimony if possible but where, as here, and as in so many cases, such testimony is irreconcilable, we said it lay within his province to accept the opinion of the expert or experts he determined to be com-portable with logic and reason, taking into consideration all of the other pertinent evidence he had before him. In that case we pointed out that, if he accepted the testimony of some and rejected that of others, it was necessary for him to explain why he did so in order to afford [572]*572the reviewing body a competent record for reaching the conclusion whether he departed from the essential requirements of the law in so doing.
In this case we are impressed with the thorough and conscientious analysis of the detailed and well prepared findings of the deputy commissioner.1 He was [573]*573careful to explain why he accepted the testimony of the operating neurosurgeon, stating among other things that the conclusion of such neurosurgeon with reference to the causal connection between the accidents of June 10 and June 18 and the perineural cysts was supported not only by the uncontradicted history of the claimant’s injuries and subsequent symptoms and evidence over a long period of time but also by the testimony of the expert produced by the carrier and admitted by the parties to be the world’s leading authority upon this particular subject. Our examination of his findings with respect to this matter leads us to the conclusion that the findings of the deputy are not only supported by competent substantial evidence but are certainly the only logical and reasonable conclusion that could have been reached.2
[575]*575 The law does not require a claimant in a workmen’s compensation case to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.3 Insofar as causal relationship between an accident and a subsequent condition is concerned, this Court has long since laid down the rule that the medical evidence should establish such facts with reasonable medical certainty. In the case of Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Engineering, 126 So.2d 556, 561 (Fla.1961), in disposing of a factual situation quite analogous to that presented here, we said:
“ * * * Here there was an unbroken chain of events that directly connect the claimant’s accident with his subsequent condition of vascular debility. It is argued the evidence was inferential and speculative, but the findings of the deputy lucidly and without equivocation pointed out the factual basis necessary to support his order without drawing on inference or speculation. The undisputed hierarchy of facts consist of first, the accident; next, the unsuccessful operations; thirdly, the trying siege of electrical and needle physiotherapy resulting in high blood pressure due to the traumatic excitement of the treatment giving rise, according to the respondent’s doctor, to the cerebral thrombosis.
“The deputy commissioner considered all the evidence of the steady progression of events which allowed for reasonable explanation.”
This is simply another case where the full commission has stepped beyond the limits of its authority and pitted its findings on the evidence against that of the deputy. This it may not do.
The order of the full commission is quashed with directions to affirm the order of the deputy commissioner and to send the case back to him for the purpose of determining the unresolved questions of the reasonableness of the bill of Dr. Strain and the amount of attorneys’ fees.4
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, Acting C. J., and THOR-NAL, O’CONNELL and HOBSON (ret.), JJ., concur.