Reed v. Timmins

52 Tex. 84
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 29, 1879
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 52 Tex. 84 (Reed v. Timmins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. Timmins, 52 Tex. 84 (Tex. 1879).

Opinion

Gould, Associate Justice.

The questions presented in this case grow out of a contested settlement of the account of L. H. Reed, guardian of his niece, Belle R. Jones, the guardianship having commenced in December, 1865, when the ward was but five years of age, and terminating with her marriage, in September, 1876. In addition to several tracts of land (unimproved), the inventory of the guardian embraced a house and lot in the town of Rusk, and a note on Jesse Heath for $575, hearing ten per cent, interest from date, February 16, 1860. These two items were the only sources of income, as the unimproved lands were not sold, but were turned over on the ward’s marriage.

In January, 1867, Reed filed an exhibit showing that he had occupied the house and lot in Rusk during 1866, and asking that the use of the house for that year be allowed him as equivalent to the support and schooling of his ward and taxes on her property for the same period. This exhibit was approved. Ho exhibit of his subsequent transactions as guardian was made until after the marriage of his ward. In 1873, one of the sureties on his bond applied to be relieved, and the docket shows that Reed was restrained from further acting as guardian until he gave a new bond. Ho new bond was given. In March, 1877, Reed filed what purported to be his final account, which account was contested by his kite ward and her husband. The result of that contest was a restatement of the account in the County Court, showing a cash balance against the guardian of $864.19. Timmins and wife, not be[87]*87iug satisfied with this settlement, appealed to the District Court. In that court, numerous special issues were submitted to a jury, and, upon their findings, the court again restated the account, giving judgment against the guardian for a balance of §2,392.27; and the case is brought to this court by the guardian.

It would be impracticable to pass separately on all the numerous assignments of error, or even on all of the propositions submitted in appellant’s brief. Some of them, like the first, that the court erred in submitting the case to a jury, may be disposed of without further remark than that no such objection appears to have been made at the proper time in the court below. So of the objections to sundry special issues, and to omissions in the charge, we remark that the appellant does not appear to have suggested at the right time the points now made.

It is objected that a witness, being interrogated as to the solvency of Heath’s estate, answered in his deposition that it was solvent. We think that the answer was responsive to the question, and was not objectionable as a conclusion of law or fact. In regard to testimony objected to and admitted, to the effect that the services of Belle R. Jones were worth equally as much as her board, clothing, and schooling while she lived with L. H. Reed, we remark that it is not material to inquire whether the court erred in overruling the objection. Like testimony was given by other witnesses without objection.

With the exception of the finding on the eleventh special issue, which wall be noticed hereafter, we regard the findings of the jury as sufficiently supported by the evidence. According to these findings, the guardian, in December, 1866, compounded the Heath note by taking its face value in gold, being §391.47 less than was then due for accumulated interest: and it is also found by the jury that he could afterwards have loaned out this money at twelve per cent., and even, during the period when higher interest was legal, at fifteen per cent. They find that from 1866 to 1870 the board and care of the [88]*88ward were worth $132 per annum, and that after that period nothing should be allowed the guardian for board, clothing, and all other necessary expenditures, on the ground that the ward’s services to him and his family were • an equivalent therefor. The findings fix the rental of the house and lot during the years it was occupied by the guardian, and the rent collected when occupied by others, fixing all the receipts and expenditures of the guardian for each year. In restating the account, the court found the balance against the guardian at the end of each year, and charged him with interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent, for the ensuing year. The first year, 1867, the guardian is charged with the amount collected on the Heath note, (less a trivial sum accounted for,) $571.10, twelve per cent, interest thereon, and rent of house and lot for 1867. He is credited with expenditures for taxes, repairs on house, and maintenance of ward, and with commissions. In like manner the account is stated and balance struck each year. After 1870, the item for maintenance of ward disappears. The interest being thus compounded at the rate of twelve per cent., the result was a balance on September 26, 1876, of $1,694.28. To this the court added the amount due on the Heath note and not collected, $391.47, with eight per cent, interest from December 7, 1866, $306.62, which two items, added to the $1,694.28, made $2,392.37,.the total amount found due by the guardian on September 26, 1876.

The main question in the case is, Did the court err in compounding interest at the rate of twelve per cent, and in charging the guardian with the uncollected interest on the Heath note, and interest thereon ? In response to the eleventh issue, the jury found that the guardian could have put the money out at loan and collected it promptly, without delay or suit, so as to put it out again promptly and keep it steadily at interest from year to year. This finding is objected to as not supported by the evidence. The only witness who testified on the subject says that he had put his money at loan until he was out, not being able to collect. We think the issue one [89]*89which might well have been pretennitted, because it submitted to the jury a question more properly one for the court itself. On such a question the opinion of an experienced judge would scarcely be much aided by that of an ordinary jury. For this reason, and because the finding was unsupported by the evidence, we think it constituted no basis for the judgment compounding interest annually at twelve pier cent.

It is to be borne in mind that compound interest is allowed in settling the account of a guardian or other trustee, not with “the view to punish, but with a view to reach the profits” which under the facts he is presumed to have made. (Turney v. Williams, 7 Yerg., 214.) If he has used the trust fund in trade or in speculation, he will bo held to account for the profits or for interest, at the opition of the cestui que trust. (Hill on Trustees, [374,] 534.)

The guardian in this case was engaged, not in trade, but in farming, and there is nothing in the record to justify the inference that he realized anything more than ordinary interest or pirofit from his ward’s money. Assuredly the charge of compound interest at the rate of twelve per cent, cannot be justified as being no more than was probably realized by the guardian. “Simple interest,” it has been said by a court of high authority, “ is usually more than can be realized with the utmost diligence.” (Wright v. Wright, 2 McCord Oh., 185.) This is believed to be undoubtedly true here of such a rate of interest as twelve per cent., especially when the investment extends over a number of years.

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Bluebook (online)
52 Tex. 84, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-timmins-tex-1879.