Reed v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 24, 2025
• Docket: 302, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RALPH REED, § § Defendant Below, § No. 302, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 9911018706 (S) § Appellee. §

Submitted: September 16, 2025 Decided: October 24, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Ralph Reed, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State of Delaware

has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the grounds that it is manifest

on the face of Reed’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and

affirm.

(2) A Superior Court jury convicted Reed of first-degree murder and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”). The charges

arose from the fatal shooting of Gregory Howard in November 1999, when Reed was eighteen years old. The Superior Court sentenced Reed to life imprisonment

without parole for the murder conviction and twenty years of incarceration for the

firearm conviction. This Court affirmed on direct appeal.1

(3) In June 2025, Reed filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence. He

argued that his sentences were illegal under Erlinger v. United States2 because the

sentencing judge enhanced his sentences based on factual findings not made by a

jury. He also contended that his life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional

because he was between the ages of eighteen and twenty when he committed the

crimes. The Superior Court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for

abuse of discretion.3 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the

claim de novo.4 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the

Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which

it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by

statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of

conviction did not authorize.5

1 Reed v. State, 782 A.2d 266, 2001 WL 819587, at *1 (Del. July 12, 2001) (TABLE). 2 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 3 Fountain v. State, 100 A.3d 1021, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014) (TABLE). 4 Id. 5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 2 (5) As he did below, Reed argues that the Superior Court enhanced his

sentences without jury findings as required by Erlinger and that his life-without-

parole sentence was unconstitutional because he was an “emerging adult” between

the ages of eighteen and twenty at the time of the crimes.6 He also contends that the

indictment failed to include facts essential to the charged crimes and sentences, but

he did not raise this claim below and we will not consider it for the first time on

appeal.7

(6) In Erlinger, the United State Supreme Court considered a sentence

imposed under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act and stated that “[v]irtually

‘any fact’ that ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal

defendant is exposed’ must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable

doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).”8 Erlinger, as the Superior Court

recognized, did not apply in this case because the sentencing judge made no factual

determinations exposing Reed to a higher maximum or minimum sentence. At the

time Reed committed the crimes, the sentence for first-degree murder was death or

life imprisonment without parole.9 The sentencing range for PFDCF was three to

twenty years of Level V incarceration, with the three year-minimum increasing to

6 Op. Br. at 3. 7 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 8 Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 9 11 Del. C. § 4209(a) (1999). 3 five years for a defendant with two previous felony convictions.10 The Superior

Court sentenced Reed to life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder,

and the statutory maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for PFDCF. The

sentencing judge made no factual determinations exposing Reed to a higher

maximum or minimum sentence, and both sentences fell within the statutory ranges.

(7) As to Reed’s claim that his life-without-parole sentence is

unconstitutional because he was eighteen at the time of the crimes, the Court has

previously rejected this argument.11 The Superior Court did not commit reversible

error in denying Reed’s motion for correction of illegal sentence.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

10 11 Del. C. § 1447A(a)-(c) (1999) (defining PFDCF as a class B felony with a three-year minimum sentence increasing to five years for a defendant with two previous felony convictions); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (1999) (providing for a two to twenty year sentencing range for class B felonies). 11 See Reed v. State, 2024 WL 4457496, at *3 (Del. Oct. 9. 2024) (rejecting Reed’s argument that Section 4209 was “unconstitutional as applied to youthful offenders who, like him, were between the ages of eighteen and twenty when they committed their crimes”).