Reed v. Piper

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Reed v. Piper

243 S.E.2d 257, 145 Ga. App. 75, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1869

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 3, 1978

Docket55132

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 243 S.E.2d 257 (Reed v. Piper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Reed v. Piper, 243 S.E.2d 257, 145 Ga. App. 75, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1869 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinion

Webb, Judge.

1. "Where an automobile owner elects not to make repairs to his damaged vehicle, the measure of damages is the difference in market value before and after the collision.” Rutledge v. Glass, 125 Ga. App. 549, 550 (2) (188 SE2d 261) (1972) and cits.

2. In the instant personal injury and automobile damage case Piper, who had elected not to make repairs to his automobile, indicated in his testimony that it did have some post-collision value but had "no idea” as to the amount. In view of the failure of proof as to this matter the trial court erred in denying Reed’s motion for directed verdict as to the automobile claim. "The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict for special damages for the loss of the automobile, there being no evidence of its value after the collision, and no evidence sufficient to establish that it had been totally destroyed.” Reese v. Haggard, 75 Ga. App. 654 (1) (44 SE2d 290) (1947). Accordingly the general judgment in Piper’s favor must be reversed.

3. Remaining enumerations are without merit, and the judgment for Piper’s wife for loss of services and consortium is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Quillian, P. J., and McMurray, J., concur.

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Webb, Judge.

1. "Where an automobile owner elects not to make repairs to his damaged vehicle, the measure of damages is the difference in market value before and after the collision.” Rutledge v. Glass, 125 Ga. App. 549, 550 (2) (188 SE2d 261) (1972) and cits.

2. In the instant personal injury and automobile damage case Piper, who had elected not to make repairs to his automobile, indicated in his testimony that it did have some post-collision value but had "no idea” as to the amount. In view of the failure of proof as to this matter the trial court erred in denying Reed’s motion for directed verdict as to the automobile claim. "The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict for special damages for the loss of the automobile, there being no evidence of its value after the collision, and no evidence sufficient to establish that it had been totally destroyed.” Reese v. Haggard, 75 Ga. App. 654 (1) (44 SE2d 290) (1947). Accordingly the general judgment in Piper’s favor must be reversed.

3. Remaining enumerations are without merit, and the judgment for Piper’s wife for loss of services and consortium is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Quillian, P. J., and McMurray, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

243 S.E.2d 257, 145 Ga. App. 75, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1869, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-piper-gactapp-1978.

Opinion

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