232 F.2d 668
M. T. REED, T. L. Reed, Jr., Mrs. M. T. Reed, Mrs. T. L.
Reed, Jr., and Mrs. S. S. Hairston, co-partners
doing business as M. T. Reed
Construction Company, Appellants,
v.
Eugene M. MURPHY, Jr., et al., Appellees.
No. 15521.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
March 16, 1956.
Sherwood W. Wise, Jackson, Miss., Charles S. Corben, New York City, for appellants.
Bessie Margolin, Asst. Solicitor, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., J. W. Price, Oxford, Miss., English Lindsey, Bidwell Adam, R. W. Thompson, Jr., Gulfport, Miss., Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, Dept. of Justice, William W. Watson, Eugene R. Jackson, Attys., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., Beverley R. Worrell, Regional Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
BROWN, Circuit Judge.
A judgment awarding overtime wages, penalties and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 216(b), against appellants, Contractor for the United States Navy under two cost-plus-fixed-fee, wartime, contracts is again before us for review.
Since what it did, it did under the express direction of the United States Navy, the question is whether Contractor owes the overtime with like penalties for obeying these orders. More accurately, it is whether the public Treasury shall be required to pay since the cost, including litigation expense, if imposed, is fully reimbursable, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017. The case, which otherwise presents many complex, important additional matters of partial or complete defense not reached or passed on comes down to this because, in our judgment, it turns on the good faith escape provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Since the District Court held this defense was not made out, we must examine the evidence in some detail. Work under the construction contract began April-May 1942 and was completed April 6, 1943. Actual operations of the Advance Base Depot under the Management and Operating Contract began July 1, 1942. Only the period from July 8, 1942, to August 1943 is involved here.
Responsibility for such construction projects was in the Bureau of Yards and Docks which, acting for the Secretary of the Navy, had the full status of an Agency of the United States, 5 U.S.C.A. 429. The Bureau of Yards and Docks was represented by the Contracting Officer whose decision, for all practical purposes, was final. As the Contractor was certainly justified in carrying out their orders, the initial inquiry relates to the actions taken by the Bureau or its plenary agent.
It simplifies the problem to start with an agreed point and work back to the beginning. On May 17, 1943, the Bureau declared, and the Contractor was advised, categorically that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not apply to Government cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. There was nothing about that action, however, which indicated that that was the declaration of a new policy. On the contrary, it was merely the precise application of the policy long established.
Among those testifying were former naval officers having personal knowledge of these matters both in the Bureau and on this job. Commander Goodrich, an experienced lawyer, longtime employee of the United States Department of Labor, Assistant Director of the Labor Relations Division, Bureau of Yards and Docks, who had direct and immediate responsibility for these affairs and was in continuous contact with CPFF Navy projects throughout the United States and with all of the Executive Departments, was emphatic that, from the beginning, it was the Navy's policy that these contracts were not under the Act. He had, on many occasions, relayed that policy to contacting officers, including those on this project, and had himself prepared for the Bureau's signature these letter-rulings in April-May 1943. Commander Dickeman, Officer-in-Charge and Contracting Officer June 1, 1942 through November 25, 1942, on this project, from the beginning of the war had been on construction duty and knew that a firm policy was established. He had been on duty at Pearl Harbor where he first became aware of the dispatch by Admiral Moreell, Chief of the Bureau, and preparatory to his taking command in Gulfport had again been advised in the Bureau's office of this policy. And, straight from the Chief himself, came irrefutable proof. On February 21, 1941, Admiral Moreell sent a dispatch to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, stating:
'* * * Dept has just received from Dept of Labor opinion that construction of Naval Air Bases in Western Pacific is not within coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act X. Bureau interprets this to apply to all construction under fee contracts X. Comdt is authorized to proceed accordingly X.'
Admiral Moreell further testified that this was his interpretation on behalf of the Bureau and was the policy followed throughout his incumbency (up through November 30, 1945) on all such contracts and, at his direction, he ordered that all CPFF contractors be so advised. Moreover, this policy-practice did not rest upon the thin strand of one radiogram. It was reflected by many other contemporaneous and subsequent directives which by terms and practical operations were completely contrary to F.L.S.A.
Whatever uncertainty there might be concerning knowledge of it by the Contractor, there is none concerning the Bureau's policy and practice. The evidence, with overwhelming corroboration, is all one way.
We test the communication of this policy-practice to the Contractor in the general setting of the contract. This committed almost absolute rule to the Contracting Officer especially on matters requiring reimbursement. Without his approval, no cost would be repaid, and if repaid without adequate basis, a process of continuing audits assured the Government credit. The total labor cost, on this and similar projects, was of course a principal item. This in turn depended primarily on the scale of pay, the program for straight or overtime operations, and the method for determining overtime, if allowed.
On Commander Dickeman's assuming command, June 1942, as Officer-in-Charge (Contracting Officer), he immediately set about to assume his rightful responsibility. In conference soon after his arrival, on the matter of wages he informed the Contractor (both through one of the partners, Reed, and the Project Manager Schutt) of the Bureau's policy that F.L.S.A. did not apply. Both Reed and Schutt confirm the receipt of these instructions. Reed fixed it definitely right after Dickeman took over and before August-September 1942.
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232 F.2d 668
M. T. REED, T. L. Reed, Jr., Mrs. M. T. Reed, Mrs. T. L.
Reed, Jr., and Mrs. S. S. Hairston, co-partners
doing business as M. T. Reed
Construction Company, Appellants,
v.
Eugene M. MURPHY, Jr., et al., Appellees.
No. 15521.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
March 16, 1956.
Sherwood W. Wise, Jackson, Miss., Charles S. Corben, New York City, for appellants.
Bessie Margolin, Asst. Solicitor, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., J. W. Price, Oxford, Miss., English Lindsey, Bidwell Adam, R. W. Thompson, Jr., Gulfport, Miss., Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, Dept. of Justice, William W. Watson, Eugene R. Jackson, Attys., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., Beverley R. Worrell, Regional Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
BROWN, Circuit Judge.
A judgment awarding overtime wages, penalties and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, 216(b), against appellants, Contractor for the United States Navy under two cost-plus-fixed-fee, wartime, contracts is again before us for review.
Since what it did, it did under the express direction of the United States Navy, the question is whether Contractor owes the overtime with like penalties for obeying these orders. More accurately, it is whether the public Treasury shall be required to pay since the cost, including litigation expense, if imposed, is fully reimbursable, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017. The case, which otherwise presents many complex, important additional matters of partial or complete defense not reached or passed on comes down to this because, in our judgment, it turns on the good faith escape provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Since the District Court held this defense was not made out, we must examine the evidence in some detail. Work under the construction contract began April-May 1942 and was completed April 6, 1943. Actual operations of the Advance Base Depot under the Management and Operating Contract began July 1, 1942. Only the period from July 8, 1942, to August 1943 is involved here.
Responsibility for such construction projects was in the Bureau of Yards and Docks which, acting for the Secretary of the Navy, had the full status of an Agency of the United States, 5 U.S.C.A. 429. The Bureau of Yards and Docks was represented by the Contracting Officer whose decision, for all practical purposes, was final. As the Contractor was certainly justified in carrying out their orders, the initial inquiry relates to the actions taken by the Bureau or its plenary agent.
It simplifies the problem to start with an agreed point and work back to the beginning. On May 17, 1943, the Bureau declared, and the Contractor was advised, categorically that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not apply to Government cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. There was nothing about that action, however, which indicated that that was the declaration of a new policy. On the contrary, it was merely the precise application of the policy long established.
Among those testifying were former naval officers having personal knowledge of these matters both in the Bureau and on this job. Commander Goodrich, an experienced lawyer, longtime employee of the United States Department of Labor, Assistant Director of the Labor Relations Division, Bureau of Yards and Docks, who had direct and immediate responsibility for these affairs and was in continuous contact with CPFF Navy projects throughout the United States and with all of the Executive Departments, was emphatic that, from the beginning, it was the Navy's policy that these contracts were not under the Act. He had, on many occasions, relayed that policy to contacting officers, including those on this project, and had himself prepared for the Bureau's signature these letter-rulings in April-May 1943. Commander Dickeman, Officer-in-Charge and Contracting Officer June 1, 1942 through November 25, 1942, on this project, from the beginning of the war had been on construction duty and knew that a firm policy was established. He had been on duty at Pearl Harbor where he first became aware of the dispatch by Admiral Moreell, Chief of the Bureau, and preparatory to his taking command in Gulfport had again been advised in the Bureau's office of this policy. And, straight from the Chief himself, came irrefutable proof. On February 21, 1941, Admiral Moreell sent a dispatch to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, stating:
'* * * Dept has just received from Dept of Labor opinion that construction of Naval Air Bases in Western Pacific is not within coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act X. Bureau interprets this to apply to all construction under fee contracts X. Comdt is authorized to proceed accordingly X.'
Admiral Moreell further testified that this was his interpretation on behalf of the Bureau and was the policy followed throughout his incumbency (up through November 30, 1945) on all such contracts and, at his direction, he ordered that all CPFF contractors be so advised. Moreover, this policy-practice did not rest upon the thin strand of one radiogram. It was reflected by many other contemporaneous and subsequent directives which by terms and practical operations were completely contrary to F.L.S.A.
Whatever uncertainty there might be concerning knowledge of it by the Contractor, there is none concerning the Bureau's policy and practice. The evidence, with overwhelming corroboration, is all one way.
We test the communication of this policy-practice to the Contractor in the general setting of the contract. This committed almost absolute rule to the Contracting Officer especially on matters requiring reimbursement. Without his approval, no cost would be repaid, and if repaid without adequate basis, a process of continuing audits assured the Government credit. The total labor cost, on this and similar projects, was of course a principal item. This in turn depended primarily on the scale of pay, the program for straight or overtime operations, and the method for determining overtime, if allowed.
On Commander Dickeman's assuming command, June 1942, as Officer-in-Charge (Contracting Officer), he immediately set about to assume his rightful responsibility. In conference soon after his arrival, on the matter of wages he informed the Contractor (both through one of the partners, Reed, and the Project Manager Schutt) of the Bureau's policy that F.L.S.A. did not apply. Both Reed and Schutt confirm the receipt of these instructions. Reed fixed it definitely right after Dickeman took over and before August-September 1942. Nothing detracted from these positive assertions except the natural inability of these witnesses eight years later to pinpoint the precise date, time, or circumstance of these conferences and detail the exact words used. The plaintiffs urged that anything so important would have been in writing, and the absence of categorical written memorandum casts substantial doubt on the truthfulness of this testimony of oral communication. This would be, of course, a left-handed way of reading into the Portal-to-Portal escape the necessity of written evidence, a contention universally rejected. Compare § 9 with § 10; Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson, 9 Cir., 176 F.2d 984, 992, 21 A.L.R.2d 1313. And it completely ignores the atmosphere of a nation struggling, through a citizen armed force, impressed suddenly into new and strange responsibilities, to arm and equip itself with the greatest possible dispatch, with economy if possible, but with waste if necessary. Decisions on every level were made and communicated with informality and time-saving shortcuts. The possibilities of losses from non-use of the normal rigid procedures for the handling of Government business was itself one of the risks of waging war. The nation's business and industrial skill had immediately to be exploited. The urgency was to get, train, equip and move men to the fighting fronts. There was little opportunity for the nicer and safer procedures of peacetime. If a Squad Leader could commit his eight, a Platoon Leader his forty, a Company Commander his two hundred men to almost certain casualties by an oral command, certainly a Contracting Officer in Gulfport, Mississippi, could act by voice as well as hand.
Moreover, there is positive and overwhelming corroboration. Commander Dickeman's instructions had immediate, tangible manifestations. Establishing a Wage Board to recommend wage scales, he informed the Board that F.L.S.A. did not apply, and that the normal workweek would be 48 hours. On receipt of the Board's report and recommendation, he promulgated by formal directive a wage scale and labor policy effective July 8, 1942, which, plainly contrary to F.L.S.A., if it applied, forbade overtime at all, and, in November allowed 'overtime' at straight time rates.
The plaintiffs must be the last to challenge that this was done in fact, or that it was an effective determination that F.L.S.A. did not apply, for their very claims arose because of the wage policy change established by that order. And, contemporaneously, writings made years before the Portal-to-Portal Act was passed, or its defense of good faith reliance was ever heard of, show that this directive was the means by which Commander Dickeman made the Bureau's policy on non-overtime effective. Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson, supra, 176 F.2d at page 922; Northwest Air Lines v. Jackson, 8 Cir., 185 F.2d 74, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 812, 72 S.Ct. 26, 96 L.Ed. 614.
These decisive actions completely refute the idea implicit in the District Court's findings that prior to July 11, 1942, no discussions were had between the Contracting Officer and Contractor on the inapplicability of F.L.S.A., the matter of no overtime and the Bureau's refusal to allow it.
This brings it down, then, to the contention that these directives were not a sufficient declaration. It is to say that for the agency action to be ground for the escape, it must have been expressed in terms specifically rejecting the Fair Labor Standards Act by name. We find nothing in the Portal-to-Portal Act to sustain that artificial view; and, on the contrary, find much to refute it.
Congress, by the use of the words, 'any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of any agency of the United States, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of any such agency * * *,' risked redundancy to make it certain that the availability of Governmental action as the reason for the employer's act or omission should not depend upon its form. Likewise, the last sentence of Section 9, 29 U.S.C.A. § 259, continuing the defense even though the ruling policy or practice is subsequently 'determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect' indicates that the legality of the order is altogether irrelevant. If an order naming the F.L.S.A. and giving a wrong interpretation of the Act is available as the escape, if followed, then the addition or deletion, the statement, partial or complete, of reasons underlying the order becomes quite unimportant. The order or ruling was to be judged solely in the light of its command and effect and not upon its apparent reasonableness or correctness. If the necessary consequence of the instruction was to cause a course of action either contrary to F.L.S.A. or in conflict with its requirements, then that edict amounted, at least, to an agency practice.
This analysis, with the rejection, detailed above, of the trial judge's so-called fact finding that the Bureau's policy had never been orally communicated to the Contractor thus affords a dual basis for our decision. We think that the directive of July 11, 1942 (and its amendments) was all that was required. It certainly established the practice by the Bureau that the overtime required by F.L.S.A. would not be paid. Since it was the Bureau which set labor policies for its CPFF contractors, all that the Contractor needed to know was the decision. Whether it was wise, or unwise, was not for it. It needed to know only what it could pay, for that which it could pay, it could get back.
The good faith reliance of Contractor is not really open to question. What was it to do? Had it paid F.L.S.A. overtime, it would have violated the July 11, 1942 directive. This would have been a flagrant disobedience subjecting it to the peril of contract penalties or forfeiture. More important, the Contracting Officer's approval to the claims for payroll reimbursement, withheld because of his directive, would have left Contractor paying them out of its own funds. Whether it was mistaken or not, the Contracting Officer's act, there being no suggestion of conscious wrongdoing or fraud, was absolutely binding, United States v. Wunderlich, supra; United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 70 S.Ct. 288, 94 L.Ed. 256, and the contract 30-day appeal would have been unavailing since the Bureau's policy was then and continued long to be fixed.
The plaintiffs acknowledged on argument that good faith did not require that the employer bear these costs out of its own funds. They insisted, though, that it was Contractor's duty to remonstrate with these Governmental agencies. It is absurd to say that it is the citizen who must prick the sovereign's conscience to advise it what its own law is and means. And if it had to, what was it to do? Must it have borne counsel fees for research and the inevitable and almost continuous conferences held for several years on this engaging subject by the Labor, Justice, War, Navy and other Executive Departments? Had the Contractor made his plea, what evidence is there to indicate that it would have been of any value? What reason is there to suppose that if pressed by Contractor in July 1942, the Navy Department's answer would have been any different from the April-May 1943 letters? What reason was there for the Contractor thinking, in the first place, that F.L.S.A. did apply? Certainly, there was nothing but confusion in the Executive Branch. And in the Judiciary, as late (1948) as our decision in this very case, we thought these contracts were immune. The Supreme Court avoided decision that same year, Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 68 S.Ct. 1031, 92 L.Ed. 1347, and it was not settled until 1950 by Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017.
The Contractor was entitled to look to the Navy for its instructions. The Navy gave positive directives in keeping with its general interpretive policy. The Contractor relied upon instructions which were unequivocal. If it desired to remain as Contractor, it had no alternative but to comply, and Section 9 for prior acts in contrast to Section 10 for future acts gave no preeminence to the letter from the Wage and Hour Division expressing in April 1943 a view contrary to the Navy directives, Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson, supra; Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, supra; Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., supra. Carrying out orders under such circumstances when there was nothing else to do is bound to be in good faith whether tested by the objective, Campbell v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., D.C.W.D.Pa., 96 F.Supp. 189, Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, supra, or a more subjective, Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., supra, standard.
The defense under Section 9 was amply sustained, and it validly extinguishes all liability. Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 3 Cir., 174 F.2d 711. The consideration of this whole record leaves us with the certain and definite impression that the trial judge's decision is not the truth and right of the case. Both by the intrinsic analysis which we have made and by the overriding impression of an injustice from the result, the fact findings and conclusions based on them will not withstand the scrutiny of F.R.C.P. 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A., and we reject them as clearly erroneous. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746; Sanders v. Leech, 5 Cir., 158 F.2d 486, 487; Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 217.
Section 9 extinguishes the entire claim and makes it, strictly speaking, unnecessary to discuss Section 11, 29 U.S.C.A. § 260. Since it presents a matter closely related to Section 9, we think it appropriate to make clear that, independent of our decision on Section 9, Wolferman, Inc., v. Gustafson, 8 Cir., 169 F.2d 759; Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., supra, we would reverse and render for the appellants the judgment awarding penalties and attorneys' fees on the penalties. In contrast to Section 9 which requires good faith reliance upon an administrative regulation, order, ruling, or practice, Section 11 demands only that the act was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing it was not in violation. This inquiry is committed to the 'sound discretion' of the trial court, a decision which we would alter only on most compelling circumstances.
While the employer does not need the administrative ruling, policy or practice as a condition to the relief under this section, the existence of it is a factor bearing on his conduct. Surely, it is a reasonable thing for a Contractor, faced with a fiat forbidding the payment of overtime, to obey it when it emanates from a responsible, authoritative representative of the United States Government. And, as we have pointed out, a belief that CPFF contracts were not under F.L.S.A., while eight years and two courts later was finally held to be erroneous, certainly had 'reasonable grounds.' The suggestion that records were false or inaccurately kept is without any foundation. Detailed records were kept intended honestly to reflect the actual hours of work. To be sure there was a refusal to pay F.L.S.A. overtime, but it was an outright, candid position, forthrightly taken without stealth, subterfuge, or furtive machinations to make the facts appear to be something other than what they were.
We take it that the discretion under Section 11, while giving the widest latitude, yet imposes on the trial judge the duty of a reasoned, articulate judgment. To allow penalties here is to defy reason: whether the directive of July 11, 1942 was, or was not, a Section 9 ruling or practice, what could the Contractor have done in the face of it? Did he not have to obey it in fact if he were to retain the contract and was he not entitled to assume that he could place faith in the legal correctness of information coming from the branch of his Government responsible for this contract rather than some other?
The judgment is reversed and here rendered for Appellants.
Reversed and rendered.