Reed v. MacPheat
This text of 2016 MT 76N (Reed v. MacPheat) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
March 29 2016
DA 15-0622 Case Number: DA 15-0622
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 76N
MARY E. REED,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM R. MACPHEAT,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-15-75 Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William R. MacPheat (Self-Represented), Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Joshua S. Van de Wetering, Van de Wetering Law Offices, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 24, 2016
Decided: March 29, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 This case arises from a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) obtained by Mary
Reed (“Reed”) against William MacPheat (“MacPheat”). Reed petitioned for a TRO
with assistance from the Missoula Crime Victim Advocate Program on December 24,
2014. A hearing was held on January 8, 2015, in Missoula Municipal Court, and the
petition for the TRO was granted. MacPheat filed an appeal to Missoula District Court,
and a hearing was held on February 20, 2015. The Missoula District Court affirmed the
Municipal Court Order. MacPheat filed a notice of appeal to the Montana Supreme
Court on October 15, 2015. We affirm.
¶3 We review an order to amend a temporary restraining order for abuse of
discretion. Lockhead v. Lockhead, 2013 MT 368, ¶ 12, 373 Mont. 120, 314 P.3d 915.
¶4 Reed was MacPheat’s mental health provider for several months until October
2014. Between October and December 2014, MacPheat repeatedly contacted Reed
through text messages and letters. This continuous contact after Reed terminated the
client relationship occasioned the eventual TRO petition. The record in this case was
developed during the January 8, 2015 hearing in Missoula Municipal Court. Prior to the
2 hearing, MacPheat conversed with opposing counsel and reached an agreement regarding
the TRO. Thereafter, MacPheat attended the hearing, and when opposing counsel
introduced the negotiated agreement, MacPheat interjected to clarify elements of the
proposal. At the end of the hearing, the judge invited him to add to the arrangement he
had actively participated in developing. MacPheat declined to further modify the TRO
and agreed to its final structure.
¶5 A few weeks after the January 8 hearing, MacPheat appealed; the District Court
affirmed based on the record. Now, over a year after he had agreed to the TRO in
Municipal Court, MacPheat appeals the TRO to this Court, and raises nine separate
issues, some of which are novel and all of which are unsupported by the record.
¶6 Parties to a case are entitled to seek review of a municipal court order in district
court, but are bound by the record developed in the lower court. Section 3-11-110(1),
MCA. Further, as we have said repeatedly, as a general rule, we will not consider novel
issues, or new arguments on appeal. Siebken v. Voderberg, 2015 MT 296, ¶ 19, 381
Mont. 256, 359 P.3d 1073; Day v. Payne, 280 Mont. 273, 276, 929 P.2d 864, 866 (1996).
This rule exists to protect the integrity of the trial courts and the appeals process, and to
ensure the fairness of litigation between parties to a suit. The rule is a hallmark of the
American justice system because:
[i]t is based on the principle that it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider. Furthermore, it is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.
3 Payne, 280 Mont. at 276-77, 929 P.2d at 866. Here, MacPheat’s appeal runs afoul of this
rule. The electronic recording from the Municipal Court shows not only that MacPheat
failed to record his objections for the court to properly address them, but also that he
conclusively consented to the TRO. Consequently, there is no factual or legal basis for
his appeal. As a result, we are obliged to decline to address his arguments, and based on
our review of the record, we cannot agree that an abuse of discretion has occurred.
¶7 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, this case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of applicable standards of review.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ BETH BAKER /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ JIM RICE
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2016 MT 76N, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-macpheat-mont-2016.