Reed v. Edwards

101 F.2d 550, 26 C.C.P.A. 901, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 98
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 6, 1939
DocketNo. 4081
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 101 F.2d 550 (Reed v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. Edwards, 101 F.2d 550, 26 C.C.P.A. 901, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 98 (ccpa 1939).

Opinion

LeNroot, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding wherein the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirmed a decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention to appellee with respect to the two counts in issue.

The interference is between a patent, No. 1,936,643, issued to appellant on November 28, 1933, upon an application filed December 10, 1929, and an application filed by appellee on September 16, 1933, the same being a division of an application filed by him on November 16, 1926, upon which a patent, No. 1,927,310, was issued September 19, 1933.

The involved counts read as follows:

1. A device of the character described including a slotted hollow circular mandrel, cutting members disposed in said slots, co-operating faces on the edges of the slotted portions of said mandrel and said members whereby said members are advanced toward the hollow portion of said mandrel, and a tongue and groove construction between the edges of the slots in said mandrel and said members to limit the rate of travel thereof to a direct proportion of the move' ment of said mandrel.
2. An outside pipe cutter including in combination cutters to engage the pipe, a vertically movable mandrel to actuate said cutters, and means on said mandrel to lock said cutters in retracted position when said mandrel is retracted, said means including co-operating beveled faces on said cutters and said mandrel adapted for separation upon operation of the cutter.

The subject matter of the invention is a device adapted for use-in cutting and removing pipe lodged in deep oil wells. The device is designed to telescope over the outside of the pipe to be cut; cutters are provided which, when released for engagement with the pipe; sever the same upon rotation of the device. The details of the device-are sufficiently described in the counts.

Both of the counts were copied by appellee from appellant’s patent for purposes of interference.

Originally only co.unt 1 was involved in the interference.

Both parties filed preliminary statements. Appellant alleged conception of the invention and disclosure to others in April, 1923, and reduction to practice in July, 1929. Appellee alleged conception of [903]*903tlie invention in June, 1921, disclosure to others in March, 1923, and diligence in perfecting it until November 16, 1926, when he constructively reduced it to practice by filing his said parent application.

Thereafter appellant moved to dissolve the interference upon two grounds: 1, that appellee had no right to make the count of the interference, and, 2, that the device disclosed in the application of appellee is inoperative.

Appellee opposed said motion to dissolve, and at the same time proposed to add new counts, being claims copied from appellant’s patent. It also appears from the decision of the Primary Examiner upon said motion that appellee also moved to shift the burden of proof to appellant, basing his motion iipon the disclosure of the involved invention in his parent application, the filing date of which antedated the filing date of appellant’s application. While this motion does not appear in the record, it does appear that the Primary Examiner granted the same, and no claim is made that such decision was erroneous. By virtue of such decision appellant became the junior party.

In said decision of the Primary Examiner upon said motions, appellant’s motion to dissolve was denied, and appellee’s motion to add counts to the interference was also denied. Appellee appealed from the denial of the motion to add counts to the interference. The Board of 'Appeals affirmed the decision of the Primary Examiner as to three counts, but reversed him upon one count, which is count 2 before us.

A preliminary statement was filed by appellant with respect to count 2 wherein he alleged conception of the invention set forth in said count, and disclosure to others, in April, 1923, and reduction to practice in July, 1929. The record does nojt show that any preliminary statement was filed by appellee with respect to count 2.

No testimony was taken by either party, and on July 31, 1936, the Examiner of Interferences issued an order to show cause why judgment upon the record should not be entered against appellant. Thereafter appellant moved for leave to take testimony to show the inoperativeness of appellee’s device and that said device will not support the counts of the interference; attached to said motion were several affidavits in support thereof. Appellee opposed this motion and he also filed several affidavits. The Examiner of Interferences denied this motion upon the ground that the showing in support of the motion was insufficient to justify the granting thereof, and upon appeal to the commissioner this decision was affirmed.

Appellee also filed certain other motions, which were denied; in view of the conclusion which we have reached it is unnecessary to make further reference to them.

[904]*904On February 6, 1937, the Examiner of Interferences entered judgment on the record awarding priority of invention to appellee with respect to both counts. Upon appeal the Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Examiner of Interferences, and appellant has appealed to this court.

Before us there are but two questions to be considered; 1, whether appellee’s disclosure supports the involved counts, and, 2, whether the device disclosed in appellee’s application is inoperative.

The brief for appellant also contends that he should have been permitted to take testimony relative to the inoperativeness of ap-pellee’s structure. As hereinbefore stated, a motion fojr that purpose was made by appellant and was denied, but such denial is not included in the reasons for appeal filed by appellant, and that question will not be considered by us.

There have been three decisions of the Patent Office tribunals sustaining appellee’s right to make the claims corresponding to the counts, two by the Primary Examiner (the second being in response to. a mqtion by appellant for reconsideration of the first decision on appellant’s motion to dissolve) and one by the Board of Appeals. The question involved is technical and before we would be justified in reversing the board upon this ground it should clearly appear that its decision was erroneous.

It is elementary that the counts qf an interference must be interpreted as broadly as their terms will reasonably permit, and that, in case of ambiguity in the counts, resort should be had to the patent or application where the counts originated.

It is appellant’s principal contention that appellee’s specification discloses only one of the following elements of count 1, viz., “co-operating faces on the edges of the slotted portions of said ihandrel and said members,” etc., and “a tongue and groove construction between the edges of the slots in said mandrel and said members.” Appellant admits that appellee does disclose a tongue and groove construction, but insists that the same element must be relied upon for the cooperating faces on the edges of the slotted portions of the mandrel and the cutting members.

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Bluebook (online)
101 F.2d 550, 26 C.C.P.A. 901, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-edwards-ccpa-1939.