Reed (Joe) v. State

Nevada Supreme Court

Reed (Joe) v. State

DecidedSeptember 19, 2014

Docket65219

StatusUnpublished

This text of Reed (Joe) v. State (Reed (Joe) v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Reed (Joe) v. State, (Neb. 2014).

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(2008) (quoting State v. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473, 1479, 930 P.2d 701, 705 (1996)). At English common law a plea of nob o contendere was distinguished from a jury verdict of guilty because "in the former the defendant could introduce evidence of innocence in mitigation of punishment, whereas in the latter such evidence was precluded by the finding of actual guilt." Alford, 400 U.S. at 36 n.8. A similar rationale distinguishes Alford pleas and guilty pleas in Nevada. See generally NRS 1.030 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the Constitution and laws of this State, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this State."). A defendant is generally precluded from offering evidence of innocence during a sentencing hearing pursuant to a guilty plea because such evidence would directly contradict the basis for his plea: his admission of guilt. See generally Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133, 825 P.2d 600, 604 (1992). An Alford plea is different. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Lee maintained his innocence but concluded that his interests required the entry of a guilty plea because there was sufficient evidence of his guilt. More specifically, Lee believed a jury would credit his codefendant's testimony against him rather than his own testimony, in part, because of his lengthy criminal history. Evidence of Lee's innocence was not necessarily irrelevant to the mitigation of his punishment. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion and violated NRS 176.015(2) by prohibiting Lee from presenting evidence of his

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e innocence in mitigation of punishment during his sentencing hearing, and we ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this order.

/ Hardesty

, J. Douglas Cherry

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge Julie Raye Law, LLC Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A 4482174

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(2008) (quoting State v. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473, 1479, 930 P.2d 701, 705 (1996)). At English common law a plea of nob o contendere was distinguished from a jury verdict of guilty because "in the former the defendant could introduce evidence of innocence in mitigation of punishment, whereas in the latter such evidence was precluded by the finding of actual guilt." Alford, 400 U.S. at 36 n.8. A similar rationale distinguishes Alford pleas and guilty pleas in Nevada. See generally NRS 1.030 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the Constitution and laws of this State, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this State."). A defendant is generally precluded from offering evidence of innocence during a sentencing hearing pursuant to a guilty plea because such evidence would directly contradict the basis for his plea: his admission of guilt. See generally Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133, 825 P.2d 600, 604 (1992). An Alford plea is different. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Lee maintained his innocence but concluded that his interests required the entry of a guilty plea because there was sufficient evidence of his guilt. More specifically, Lee believed a jury would credit his codefendant's testimony against him rather than his own testimony, in part, because of his lengthy criminal history. Evidence of Lee's innocence was not necessarily irrelevant to the mitigation of his punishment. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion and violated NRS 176.015(2) by prohibiting Lee from presenting evidence of his

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e innocence in mitigation of punishment during his sentencing hearing, and we ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this order.

/ Hardesty

, J. Douglas Cherry

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge Julie Raye Law, LLC Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A 4482174

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