IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
REED JASSMANN, ) ) No. 74964-1-1 Appellant, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) NORTHWEST INTERIORS & DESIGN, ) LLC, a Washington limited liability ) company; RANDY LEE OLIVER and ) MARCIE OLIVER, husband and wife; ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and AMERICAN CONTRACTORS ) INDEMNITY COMPANY, Bond ) FILED: March 27, 2017 account no. 100238900, ) ) Respondents. ) )
BECKER, J. — Appellant contends the trial court should have awarded him
the attorney fees he incurred in enforcing a settlement agreement with his former
employer. Neither the settlement agreement nor statutes cited by the appellant
authorize an award of attorney fees for enforcing an agreement in which the
employee waived all claims and the employer admitted none of the allegations.
We affirm.
Appellant Reed Jassmann sued his former employer, Northwest Interiors
& Design LLC, along with its owners and its surety. Jassmann alleged that the
company did not pay wages and commissions owed to him for work performed
on construction projects in 2014. No. 74964-1-1/2
The defendants denied Jassmann's claims. They alleged counterclaims
against Jassmann for fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. Trial
was scheduled for October 19, 2015.
According to unchallenged findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
parties reached a settlement on October 8, 2015. On that date, at 10:51 a.m.,
the defendants made an offer of settlement to Jassmann. The offer was for
payment to Jassmann in the amount of $15,000, with the following terms: "agree
to a settlement for $15k. The normal waiver of any and all claims, known or
unknown, the parties enter into this to settle the dispute without admission to any
allegations, payment in thirty days." About an hour later, at 11:59 a.m.,
Jassmann accepted the offer, stating "so the offer is accepted."
At 12:57 p.m., Jassmann sent a draft settlement agreement to the
defendants. His draft included an attorney fee clause. A right to attorney fees
was not a term that had previously been discussed, and it never became one of
the terms of the agreement.
The defendants had second thoughts about how much time they wanted
before they would make full payment of the settlement amount to Jassmann. At
3:31 p.m., they proposed to modify the payment term so their last payment to
Jassmann would not occur until more than one year later. Jassmann did not
accept the proposed modification. He responded by asking the defendants to
"honor the deal."
The defendants did not pay in 30 days. They took the position that an
enforceable settlement agreement did not exist because Jassmann had No. 74964-1-1/3
countered their offer. Jassmann insisted that an agreement was formed upon his
acceptance at 11:59 a.m., enforceable as a CR 2(a) agreement. He told them he
expected the court would award him the attorney fees he would incur if he had to
enforce it.
On October 21, 2015, Jassmann moved to enforce the settlement. The
defendants opposed the motion. Litigation continued for several months.
Jassmann continued to incur attorney fees, allegedly more than $13,000 by
November 10, 2015, and more than $20,000 by February 11, 2016.
On February 9, 2016, the court resolved the dispute after an evidentiary
hearing. The court concluded that an enforceable settlement agreement was
formed by the parties at 11:59 a.m. on October 8, 2015, on the terms then stated:
a settlement of $15,000 by November 9, 2015; without admission to any
allegations; and the normal waiver of any and all claims.
Jassmann argued that he was entitled to an award of attorney fees under
RCW 49.48.030 and RCW 49.46.090. The court concluded that neither party
was entitled to attorney fees under the settlement agreement. The court
reserved ruling on Jassmann's claim that he was entitled to an award of the
attorney fees he incurred in litigating after the defendants repudiated the
settlement they agreed to on October 8, 2015.
On March 14, 2016, the court entered a judgment of $15,000 plus $537.42
in interest against Northwest Interiors and its owners. The court crossed out
those portions of Jassmann's proposed judgment that requested attorney fees
and a judgment against the surety.
3 No. 74964-1-1/4
Jassmann appeals. He contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for an award of the attorney fees he incurred in enforcing the settlement
agreement after October 8, 2015.
Whether a contract or statute authorizes an award of attorney fees is a
question of law reviewed de novo. McGuire v. Bates, 169 Wn.2d 185, 189, 234
P.3d 205(2010). Washington generally follows the "American rule," where each
party in a civil action pays its own attorney fees and costs. Cosmo. Eng'g Grp.,
Inc. v. Ondeo Deqremont, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 292, 296, 149 P.3d 666(2006). A
party may recover attorney fees when authorized by statute, a recognized ground
of equity, or agreement of the parties. Niccum v. Enquist, 175 Wn.2d 441,446,
286 P.3d 966 (2012).
The terms of the settlement agreement did not provide for attorney fees.
Jassmann contends that because his claims were for unpaid wages, he has a
statutory entitlement to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, RCW 49.46.090,
and RCW 49.52.070. An award of attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030,for
example, requires that the employee "is successful in recovering judgment for
wages or salary owed to him."
The problem with Jassmann's argument is that he did not recover a
judgment for a wage claim for wages or salary owed to him. One of the terms of
the settlement agreement was "normal waiver of any and all claims." Another
was "without admission to any allegations."
Normal contract principles apply to the interpretation of a CR 2A
settlement agreement. Morris v. Maks,69 Wn. App. 865, 868-69, 850 P.2d
4 No. 74964-1-1/5
1357, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1020(1993); Condon v. Condon, 177 Wn.2d
150, 162, 298 P.3d 86(2013). In Washington, the court determines the intent of
the parties based on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than
any unexpressed subjective intent of the parties. Condon, 177 Wn.2d at 162. It
is the duty of the court to declare the meaning of what is written, and not what
was intended to be written. Condon, 177 Wn.2d at 162.
The plain language of the settlement agreement stated that Jassmann
waived all claims, including his wage claims—not that he prevailed on them.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
REED JASSMANN, ) ) No. 74964-1-1 Appellant, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) NORTHWEST INTERIORS & DESIGN, ) LLC, a Washington limited liability ) company; RANDY LEE OLIVER and ) MARCIE OLIVER, husband and wife; ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION and AMERICAN CONTRACTORS ) INDEMNITY COMPANY, Bond ) FILED: March 27, 2017 account no. 100238900, ) ) Respondents. ) )
BECKER, J. — Appellant contends the trial court should have awarded him
the attorney fees he incurred in enforcing a settlement agreement with his former
employer. Neither the settlement agreement nor statutes cited by the appellant
authorize an award of attorney fees for enforcing an agreement in which the
employee waived all claims and the employer admitted none of the allegations.
We affirm.
Appellant Reed Jassmann sued his former employer, Northwest Interiors
& Design LLC, along with its owners and its surety. Jassmann alleged that the
company did not pay wages and commissions owed to him for work performed
on construction projects in 2014. No. 74964-1-1/2
The defendants denied Jassmann's claims. They alleged counterclaims
against Jassmann for fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. Trial
was scheduled for October 19, 2015.
According to unchallenged findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
parties reached a settlement on October 8, 2015. On that date, at 10:51 a.m.,
the defendants made an offer of settlement to Jassmann. The offer was for
payment to Jassmann in the amount of $15,000, with the following terms: "agree
to a settlement for $15k. The normal waiver of any and all claims, known or
unknown, the parties enter into this to settle the dispute without admission to any
allegations, payment in thirty days." About an hour later, at 11:59 a.m.,
Jassmann accepted the offer, stating "so the offer is accepted."
At 12:57 p.m., Jassmann sent a draft settlement agreement to the
defendants. His draft included an attorney fee clause. A right to attorney fees
was not a term that had previously been discussed, and it never became one of
the terms of the agreement.
The defendants had second thoughts about how much time they wanted
before they would make full payment of the settlement amount to Jassmann. At
3:31 p.m., they proposed to modify the payment term so their last payment to
Jassmann would not occur until more than one year later. Jassmann did not
accept the proposed modification. He responded by asking the defendants to
"honor the deal."
The defendants did not pay in 30 days. They took the position that an
enforceable settlement agreement did not exist because Jassmann had No. 74964-1-1/3
countered their offer. Jassmann insisted that an agreement was formed upon his
acceptance at 11:59 a.m., enforceable as a CR 2(a) agreement. He told them he
expected the court would award him the attorney fees he would incur if he had to
enforce it.
On October 21, 2015, Jassmann moved to enforce the settlement. The
defendants opposed the motion. Litigation continued for several months.
Jassmann continued to incur attorney fees, allegedly more than $13,000 by
November 10, 2015, and more than $20,000 by February 11, 2016.
On February 9, 2016, the court resolved the dispute after an evidentiary
hearing. The court concluded that an enforceable settlement agreement was
formed by the parties at 11:59 a.m. on October 8, 2015, on the terms then stated:
a settlement of $15,000 by November 9, 2015; without admission to any
allegations; and the normal waiver of any and all claims.
Jassmann argued that he was entitled to an award of attorney fees under
RCW 49.48.030 and RCW 49.46.090. The court concluded that neither party
was entitled to attorney fees under the settlement agreement. The court
reserved ruling on Jassmann's claim that he was entitled to an award of the
attorney fees he incurred in litigating after the defendants repudiated the
settlement they agreed to on October 8, 2015.
On March 14, 2016, the court entered a judgment of $15,000 plus $537.42
in interest against Northwest Interiors and its owners. The court crossed out
those portions of Jassmann's proposed judgment that requested attorney fees
and a judgment against the surety.
3 No. 74964-1-1/4
Jassmann appeals. He contends the trial court erred in denying his
request for an award of the attorney fees he incurred in enforcing the settlement
agreement after October 8, 2015.
Whether a contract or statute authorizes an award of attorney fees is a
question of law reviewed de novo. McGuire v. Bates, 169 Wn.2d 185, 189, 234
P.3d 205(2010). Washington generally follows the "American rule," where each
party in a civil action pays its own attorney fees and costs. Cosmo. Eng'g Grp.,
Inc. v. Ondeo Deqremont, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 292, 296, 149 P.3d 666(2006). A
party may recover attorney fees when authorized by statute, a recognized ground
of equity, or agreement of the parties. Niccum v. Enquist, 175 Wn.2d 441,446,
286 P.3d 966 (2012).
The terms of the settlement agreement did not provide for attorney fees.
Jassmann contends that because his claims were for unpaid wages, he has a
statutory entitlement to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, RCW 49.46.090,
and RCW 49.52.070. An award of attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030,for
example, requires that the employee "is successful in recovering judgment for
wages or salary owed to him."
The problem with Jassmann's argument is that he did not recover a
judgment for a wage claim for wages or salary owed to him. One of the terms of
the settlement agreement was "normal waiver of any and all claims." Another
was "without admission to any allegations."
Normal contract principles apply to the interpretation of a CR 2A
settlement agreement. Morris v. Maks,69 Wn. App. 865, 868-69, 850 P.2d
4 No. 74964-1-1/5
1357, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1020(1993); Condon v. Condon, 177 Wn.2d
150, 162, 298 P.3d 86(2013). In Washington, the court determines the intent of
the parties based on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than
any unexpressed subjective intent of the parties. Condon, 177 Wn.2d at 162. It
is the duty of the court to declare the meaning of what is written, and not what
was intended to be written. Condon, 177 Wn.2d at 162.
The plain language of the settlement agreement stated that Jassmann
waived all claims, including his wage claims—not that he prevailed on them.
Jassmann's request to include an attorney fee clause as a term of the settlement
did not become part of the agreement. The e-mails that formed the agreement
did not objectively manifest the parties' intention that Jassmann would be entitled
to attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement.
Parol evidence is not admitted for the purpose of showing intention
independent of the instrument. Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657,669, 801
P.2d 222(1990). Jassmann's complaint and his declaration are not admissible
to show that the underlying dispute was a wage claim, as this would contradict
the term of the agreement stating that his claims were waived. Nor are they
admissible for the purpose of showing that the intent of the parties, separate from
what is shown by the agreement, was to settle a wage claim.
Jassmann makes a belated argument that the defendants' offer of
settlement should be treated like an offer of judgment. When a defendant makes
an offer of judgment under CR 68 and does not expressly state that the offer
includes attorney fees, a plaintiff may obtain an award of attorney fees in addition
5 No. 74964-1-1/6
to the amount offered in judgment if the relevant fee statute does not define
attorney fees as costs. See e.g., Lietz v. Hansen Law Offices, PSC, 166 Wn.
App. 571, 271 P.3d 889 (2012). Because the outcome in such a case turns on
the word "costs" in CR 68, we do not see the CR 68 cases as analogous.
Instead, we rest our decision on the settlement language. It was agreed that
Jassmann waived all claims and the defendants admitted none of his allegations.
His claimed entitlement to an award of attorney fees did not survive that
agreement. The trial court correctly refused Jassmann's request for an award of
attorney fees.
Jassmann contends that the court should have entered a judgment
against American Contractors Indemnity Company under RCW 18.27.040. This
statute requires that a contractor file a bond issued by a surety to secure
payment to persons "performing labor." RCW 18.27.040(1). Because Jassmann
cannot establish that the judgment of $15,000 paid him for performing labor, the
trial court correctly refused to enter a judgment against American Contractors
Indemnity Company.
The defendants request attorney fees on appeal for having to defend
against a frivolous appeal. Jassmann's appeal is not frivolous. The request is
denied.
6 No. 74964-1-1/7
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
c(Tee-- , ""•C-,--% .) 1 : .