Reed, Jamal Anton

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 6, 2015
DocketWR-40,571-02
StatusPublished

This text of Reed, Jamal Anton (Reed, Jamal Anton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed, Jamal Anton, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

uo, 611/01

cAUsE No. wR-40,571-02

EX PARTE IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF

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AUSTIN/ TEXAS

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APPLIcANT*s PRoPosED FINDiNGs oF FA@W ' IN oBJEcTIoNS 'Io sTATE's REsPol\Ts§"`*'®[':"‘T op CR-WFNAL APPEALS .QUL 03 2015

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NOW COMES, Jamal `Anton Reed, Applicant in' the above mentioned cause

JAMAL ANTON REED

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:

hereby files this Proposed Findings of Facts in Objections.to State's Response in accordance with Article ll;O7 of the Texas Code: of Criminal Procedure

and would like to present to this Court the following:

FACTS TO SUPPORT OBJECTIONS

(l). The State is quick to state that these allegations are to be denied since they were not brought up on Direct Appeal.-The ruling majority continues to chastise any applicant from raising issues on a Writ of_Habeas Corpus _ that could have abeen raised on direct appeal. But, is the applicant to be chasitsed and punish aaplicant.when it was his attorney's job to raise those issues and is the applicant to suffer for his appellate cpounsel's failure to do so?

(2). Applicant has‘ trying from day one of his incarceration trying to obatin a copy of his psychological report from Dr, Burns but has been impeded by' the` state and appellate court from obtaining.such evidence and now the State has graciously provided him a copy which makes this newly discovered evidence.

In the report on page 3.it shown that the applicant was taking medication orhad taken medication for the symptoms during the time of his alleged offense. It. was for a sexually transmitted disease and the court failed to bring this evidence to light since the victim never shown any such symptoms if the appli~

cant was indeed part of the criminal act.

l.

(3). The applicant was lnot accused by the victim as being one of the assailants during her trying 'ordeal. He was either suspect l or suspect 27 since neither_ party had been unmasked to bee identified. His accuser was

e \l3-year old informant who was arrested for cutting off his monitor and made. a- statement”;n Then released _and arrested again and made a different Statement. This information wast not brought forth neither was the informant who made the statement by the state in order to prove identity. This was in a

direct violation of the.confrontation clause.

(4). The confession .of the.applicant is null and void since there was so much durress and coercion iused by the detectives by taking the applicant from one place to another and overbaring his will by not giving him any rest or a chance to be with his mother or attorney during the interrogation process.

See Affidavit in appl ication.

(5). On March 'lO, 1994 Cause .number 52783~J was dismissed since the applicant was certified in cause number 52784-J. This causeznumber dealt with section 22.021 and 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code. See Exhibit One. Once the l district court1 was' given jurisdiction-the sexual assault case was given a seperate indictment number' and the robbery a seperate indictment number. The sexual assault charge was.split.between 52783-J and 52784~J which indicated

two seperate sexual assaultsr_but only one incident.

(6). OnO4-l9-94 DNA test were run on parts of evidence in question were. the tests shown that the semen collected was not that of the applicant and there were 5 men tested and the only two that had matching issues was Atrice Oliver and Donald Bolden; There was not enough evidence to do extensive testing; See exhibit two.

"Test number two perfromed on April> 9, v2012 shown that the applicant . is to not be excluded. The. spemn fraction of the oral swabs from the victim z is a mixture of at least two individuals, including at least one male. But, yet two males and one woman is to not be excluded. Yet, there was concrete

evidence that the applicant was one of the actors. See Exhibit three.

(7). On March'lO, 1994, the juvenile court granted ststaeis motion to waive jurisdictin and transferred applicnt's case to the 297th Judicial Dis- ' trict oourt. ' '

The trial court entered a verdict of guilty and punishment of eighty (80) years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Corre- ctional Division ~on March l7, 1995. He was convicted of aggravated robbery with av deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, and aggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapn, to wit: a firearm.

'His appeal was filed then affirmed on January 15,'2004, according to the State, 9 years after the verdict. `

On this Habeas-Application the applicant contends that the Court erred' in waiving jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that the juvenile court ` abused ith discretion.because (l) it failed to provide a specific statement of its reasons for waiver to certify its fact'findings: (2) it misunderstood and misapplied the factors it uwas required ‘to consider in deciding to waive jurisdiction; (3) the finding related to applicant's sophistication and matur- itywas unsupported by the evidence; (4) its finding vrelated to adequate_ protection ’of the public and unlikelihood of rehabilitation was unsupported nby the evidence; and (5) it vbased its decision on factors .that are not proper 'considerations' in the waiver analysis; (6) failed to render a service ' of summons upon the applicant. n

-The State however, argues that the juvenile court followed proper proced~

ures in reaaching its decision and the evidence supported the court's find- ings. ` t In Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct:GlO45, 16 L.Ed; 2nd 84 (1966), the United States Supreme -Cburt"stated that "[i]t id clear beyond dispute that the lwaiver -of jurisdiction is a 'critically importsant' action determining vitally important statutory rights ofl the juvenile."id. at 556. The Court lcharacterized the "decision' as 'to waiver of jurisidiction and-transfer of the matter to the District Court [as] potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years imprisonment and a death sentence." id at557. '_ " ` , In Hildago v. State, 983 S§W.Zd 746 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), this Court, likewise recognized that Vtransfer to criminal district court for adult pros- ecution is 'the single most serious act the juvenile court can perform...because` oncel waiver of jurisdiction occurs,' they child loses all protective and rehabilative possibilities available§'" id¢'at 755. This Court held in Hidalgo, that "transfer. was intended to be used only

in exceptional circumatances" and that "[t]he philosophy was that whenever

possible, children 'should be protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected toy the harshness of' the criminal system' because 'children, all children are worth redeeming.'”_id. at 754(citation omitted). 4

Section 54.02»'of the- Family Code authorizes.a juvenile court to waive its exclusive, original .jurisdiction and to transfer a child to a criminal district court if: a

(1), the child. is alleged vto have committed a felony: (2) the child was fourteen“ years 'of age or older if the alleged offense is a first degree felony or fifteen years of age or older if the alleged offense is a second degree felony: and (3) after a full investigation and hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is a probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the juvenile, the welfare of the commun- ity requires criminal proceedings.

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Related

Kent v. United States
383 U.S. 541 (Supreme Court, 1966)
United States v. John Doe
871 F.2d 1248 (Fifth Circuit, 1989)
Apolinar v. State
820 S.W.2d 792 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
In re J. R. C.
522 S.W.2d 579 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1975)
In re J.T.H.
779 S.W.2d 954 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1989)
H.R.A., Matter Of
790 S.W.2d 102 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1990)
Nyberg v. Florida Department of Corrections
493 U.S. 917 (Supreme Court, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
Reed, Jamal Anton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-jamal-anton-texapp-2015.