Redwine v. Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschinen Industriegesellschaft, M.B.H.

794 F. Supp. 1062, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12029, 1992 WL 185049
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJuly 7, 1992
DocketCiv. A. 90-1503-C
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 794 F. Supp. 1062 (Redwine v. Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschinen Industriegesellschaft, M.B.H.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redwine v. Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschinen Industriegesellschaft, M.B.H., 794 F. Supp. 1062, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12029, 1992 WL 185049 (D. Kan. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BELOT, District Judge.

This action comes before the court on defendant Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschi-nen Industriegesellschaft’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 42) for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff brought this action seeking recovery under products liability law and the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. Defendant contends that extending personal jurisdiction over it would violate due process.

By its Memorandum and Order of June 3,1992, this court deferred ruling on defendants’ motion to allow the parties to take discovery limited to issues relating to jurisdiction. The court directed counsel to advise the court before June 19, 1992, whether they intended to pursue such discovery and stated that if the parties did not so advise the court, the motion would be decided on the pleadings. Counsel has not responded and accordingly, the court is prepared to rule.

The principles followed in evaluating a motion to dismiss were restated in Johnson v. Goodyear S.A. Colmar Berg, 716 F.Supp. 531 (D.Kan.1989):

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. ... Prior to trial, however, when a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing.... The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits.... If the parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, and the plaintiff’s prima facie showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party....

716 F.Supp. at 532 (quoting Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010, 105 S.Ct. 1879, 85 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)).

Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschinen Indus-triegesellschaft is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the Republic of Austria. It designed and partially manufactured the ballast cleaning machine at issue in this case. The machine was sold by defendant Plasser Theurer to Speno Rail Services in Syracuse, New York, and *1064 shipped FOB from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Portsmouth, Virginia.

Plaintiff and Speno Rail Services, Inc. were hired by defendant Union Pacific to clean a stretch of railroad track near Marysville, Kansas. Plaintiff was injured on the job while using the ballast cleaning machine.

In considering questions of personal jurisdiction, the court follows a two-step analysis. First, the court determines whether the defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b). If the long-arm statute is satisfied, the court then determines if the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the constitutional and statutory requirements for personal jurisdiction are satisfied. Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 682 F.Supp. 42, 43 (D.Kan.1988) (citing Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F.Supp. 687, 691 (D.Kan.1978)).

K.S.A. 60-308(b) provides in part:

Any person, whether or not a citizen or a resident of this state, who in person or through an agent or instrumentality does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits the person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of these acts:
(7) causing to persons or property within this state any injury arising out of an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant if, at the time of the injury either (A) the defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or (B) products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade or use ...

K.S.A. 60-308(b)(7) was intended to provide jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers in products liability cases. Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 647, 438 P.2d 128 (1968). The case at bar fits this description. The defendant has manufactured a product outside of Kansas whose manufacture and design has allegedly caused injury to a person within this state. The long-arm statute therefore covers the defendant’s acts.

The court must then determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. The Tenth Circuit has endorsed a three-pronged analysis for use when examining whether a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy constitutional requirements. See Rambo v. American Southern Insurance Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1419 n. 6 (10th Cir.1988):

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities.
(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Defendant places reliance upon World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a new Audi automobile from a dealer in New York. The following year, they planned a trip to Arizona. As they passed through Oklahoma, their Audi was struck by another car, causing a fire that severely burned the plaintiff and her two children. The plaintiff thereafter brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma against the Audi’s manufacturer, its importer, its regional distributor (WorldWide Volkswagen), and the retail dealer (Seaway). World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway entered special appearances to contest personal jurisdiction.

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794 F. Supp. 1062, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12029, 1992 WL 185049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redwine-v-franz-plasser-bahnbaumaschinen-industriegesellschaft-mbh-ksd-1992.