Redman v. Ford Motor Co.

170 S.E.2d 207, 253 S.C. 266, 1969 S.C. LEXIS 177
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedSeptember 25, 1969
Docket18964
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 170 S.E.2d 207 (Redman v. Ford Motor Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redman v. Ford Motor Co., 170 S.E.2d 207, 253 S.C. 266, 1969 S.C. LEXIS 177 (S.C. 1969).

Opinion

Littlejohn, Justice.

The plaintiff brought two actions: one for wrongful death, and the other for pain and suffering, damage to property, and funeral expenses under the survival statute. The two actions were tried together by consent. This appeal involves, and the exceptions apply to, both cases. The plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of his deceased son who, while driving an automobile manufactured by the defendant, Ford Motor Company, was killed in a one-car accident. The jury returned verdicts for actual damages for the plaintiff in both suits. Post-trial motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and for a new trial were overruled by the presiding judge, and the defendant appealed. In its appeal the defendant challeges the admissibility of certain expert testimony and the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence on the question of negligence.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that his intestate purchased a new 1958 Ford automobile on March 14, 1958; that on March 22, 1958, while the intestate was driving the automobile on U. S. Highway 52 north of Darlington, South Carolina, one of the rear wheels suddenly came loose and the left rear axle shaft came out, causing the automobile to become uncontrollable and to roll and turn over with the intestate inside; and that the intestate was fatally injured thereby. It was alleged that the defendant failed to use due care in the manufacture of the automobile and that such negligence, carelessness, and willfulness on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury and death of the plaintiff’s intestate.

By answer the defendant (1) interposed a general denial, (2) alleged sole negligence, recklessness, and willfulness on the part of plaintiff’s intestate, and (3) plead contributory negligence, recklessness, and willfulness on the part of plaintiff’s intestate.

The one-car accident occurred while the deceased was traveling alone between midnight and two o’clock A.M., and *270 when the automobile was only eight days old and had been driven 644 miles. The automobile was completely demolished as a result of its having apparently turned over several times.

The point at which the car was found was approximately the beginning of a substantial curve to the right for traffic traveling north from Darlington. The car was found lying on its side about 25 feet from the paved surface of the highway, and the unrecognizable body of the deceased was several feet from the car. The weather was clear, the highway was dry, and there were no skid marks on the road. There was a ditch approximately eight to ten feet from the highway which the Redman car presumably crossed. The highway patrolman who investigated the accident stated that the distance between a point on the right side of the road “where it looked like a car had gone off the road” and the place at which the car had come to rest on the left side of the road was 400 feet. There were marks of some kind indicating the line of travel of the car, but no skid marks. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.

Circumstantial evidence was relied on heavily by the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. The basic contention of the plaintiff was that the left rear axle shaft and wheel assembly became disengaged from the car and caused it to become uncontrollable to such an extent that it ran off the highway and overturned. The plaintiff contended further that an axle shaft would not come loose and separate from its anchorage while in operation if it was manufactured, assembled, and inspected properly.

Mr. Motte Pearce, a wrecker service operator who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, testified that the left rear wheel assembly and axle were loose and dangling from the car outside the fender well. The axle was not broken, but was bent at an angle of approximately 30°. He said that he lifted the loose assembly and axle out of the axle housing and placed them in the car. The car was then taken to his junk yard and put under lock and key, but the *271 assembly and axle disappeared a couple of days later. This disappearance was never explained.

Both the investigating officer and Mr. Pearce testified that the emergency hand brake on the automobile was pulled all the way up into the “on” position. Mr. Pearce testified that sometime after dawn be examined the left rear wheel braking mechanism and found the brake shoes had expanded well beyond the point to which they could have expanded if the wheel drum had been in its normal position when the brake was applied.

As a part of his circumstantial evidence case, the plaintiff relied heavily on the deposition testimony of V. D. Ackerman, whose opinion testimony was admitted by the lower court. Three of the questions raised by the defendant on this appeal relate to Mr. Ackerman’s testimony.

The first challenges the entire deposition and the deponent’s qualifications as an expert in the field of automobile mechanics. It is argued that his background and qualifications are not such that his testimony should be considered as that of an expert. The adequacy of a witness’s qualifications as an expert is largely a matter of discretion for the trial judge. Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S. C. 461, 141 S. E. (2d) 129 (1965). Mr. Ackerman testified that he was 71 years of age and had been actively engaged in the field of automotive mechanics for more than 50 years. Fie stated that he was a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers and the Automotive Engine Rebuilders Association of America; that he had served as repair and maintenance manager for two large transportation services in the United States; and that many thousands of pressure-fitted axles and bearings, including those for 1958 Fords, had been disengaged under his supervision. He further testified that this procedure for the bearings on axles is and has been for many years the standard one for all American cars, regardless of the make.

Although the witness admittedly had never removed the bearing from the axle of a new 1958 Ford automobile, a reading of the testimony permits no doubt *272 that Mr. Ackerman possesses knowledge, skill, and information acquired by study, investigation, observation, practice, and experience about the construction, fitting and utilization of axles and bearings not likely possessed by the ordinary juror. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s ruling that Ackerman could testify as an expert on the matters at issue in this case referred to in more detail later.

After the trial judge refused to exclude the deposition of Mr. Ackerman in its entirety on the ground, among others, that he was not qualified as an expert, counsel objected from time to time as the deposition was presented to the jury to various parts of the tesimony, some of which objections were sustained, but most of which were overruled. The alleged errors on the part of the trial judge are summarized in two questions posed in the defendant’s brief. One is the contention that Ackerman’s testimony should have been excluded because it “contained conclusions that were conjectural and speculative,” and the other is that it contained “conclusions as to the very issue to be decided by the jury, and, therefore, invaded the province of the jury.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
170 S.E.2d 207, 253 S.C. 266, 1969 S.C. LEXIS 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redman-v-ford-motor-co-sc-1969.