Redleaf v. Redleaf

807 N.W.2d 731, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 149, 2011 WL 6141628
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedDecember 12, 2011
DocketNos. A11-202, A11-496
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 807 N.W.2d 731 (Redleaf v. Redleaf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redleaf v. Redleaf, 807 N.W.2d 731, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 149, 2011 WL 6141628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge.

Appellant challenges the rate of post-judgment interest that the district court imposed on judgments entered as a result of appellant’s failure to make required property-distribution payments following the dissolution of his marriage to respondent.

FACTS

Appellant, Andrew Redleaf, and respondent, Elizabeth Redleaf, agreed to dissolve their marriage in a Marriage Termination Agreement (MTA) in February 2008. The parties’ primary marital assets were appellant’s ownership interests in Whitebox Ad-visors, LLC, AJR Financial, LLC, and Whitebox Intermarket Fund, LP. To effectuate a division of these assets, the MTA provided that respondent would waive her interest in the businesses in exchange for $140,750,000 in cash payments. The payment schedule called for two lump-sum payments totaling $20,750,000 on or before February 15, 2008, and one lump-sum payment of $80,000,000 on March 15, 2013. The remainder was to be paid in monthly installments of $1,500,000 over a five-year period beginning on March 15, 2008. Appellant personally secured the property settlement and the MTA was silent as to the rate of interest to be applied in the event appellant defaulted on his obligation. On February 20, 2008, the district court entered a judgment and decree dissolving the marriage and adopting the MTA’s property-settlement terms.

For several months, appellant complied with the terms of the property settlement. He made the initial lump-sum payments in February 2008 and was current on the monthly-installment payments through January 2009. Alleging a decline in income, appellant missed payments from February 2009 through March 2010. Respondent subsequently obtained judgments totaling $21,000,000.

In May 2009, appellant moved to reopen the judgment, arguing that it was no longer equitable for the decree to have prospective application because of the change in his financial circumstances. The district court denied his motion, and this court affirmed. See Redleaf v. Redleaf, Nos. A09-1805, A09-2360, A10-10, 2010 WL 3543458, at *4 (Minn.App. Sept. 14, 2010). Appellant paid respondent $21,000,000 in arrears, but again missed payments for July, August, and September 2010.

Respondent moved for judgment in the amount of $4,500,000 and appellant opposed entry of judgment on the grounds that it was inequitable in light of his substantial performance and full performance was impossible. He also requested that if the court granted judgment to respondent, it limit the rate of interest to a simple rate of four percent per annum because the ten percent rate mandated on judgments over $50,000 by the post-judgment interest statute, Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(2) (Supp.2009), was inequitable in light of the market interest rate.

On October 4, 2010, the district court issued an order to enter and docket judgment in respondent’s favor in the amount of $4,500,000. Over appellant’s objection, [733]*733the district court awarded respondent interest at the statutory rate of ten percent, concluding that it “must apply the 2009 version of Minn.Stat. § 549.09 which was in effect at the commencement of this action. To do otherwise, the [cjourt would be abrogating the clear intent of the ... [legislature.” In the months following, respondent obtained additional judgments totaling $4,500,000 for October through December 2010, $3,000,000 for January and February 2011, and $1,500,000 for March 2011. These judgments also bear the statutory post-judgment interest rate. The appeals from these judgments were consolidated.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in concluding that it was bound to apply the post-judgment interest rate provided for in Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(2)?

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly concluded that Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(2), deprived it of discretion to set post-judgment interest at some rate other than ten percent. The application and interpretation of a statute are questions of law which we review de novo. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn.2008).

When a judgment or award is for the recovery of money, Minnesota law provides that “interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance of the judgment or award from the time that it is entered or made until it is paid.” Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 2 (2010), see id., subd. 1(a). Until 2009, section 549.09 imposed post-judgment interest at a variable rate that mirrored the market rate of interest. 1979 Minn. Laws ch. 105, § 1, at 148; see Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c) (2008) (establishing a variable rate of interest “based on the secondary market yield of one year United States Treasury bills”). But in 2009, the legislature added a new provision setting a fixed rate of interest on large judgments. 2009 Minn. Laws ch. 83, art. 2, § 35. Now, “[f]or a judgment or award over $50,000, ... the interest rate shall be ten percent per year until paid.” Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(2).

This statutory provision is unambiguous. By using the term “shall” in setting the rate of interest, the legislature mandated that the district court set a rate of ten percent when a judgment amount exceeds $50,000. See Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2010) (stating that the word “shall” is mandatory when used in Minnesota statutes). And we have previously held that the pre-2009 version of this statute applies to marriage-dissolution judgments. Riley v. Riley, 385 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Minn.App.1986); see also Fernandez v. Fernandez, 373 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Minn.App.1985) (reversing the district court’s award of 14% post-judgment interest on a dissolution judgment because the statutory rate was 9%).

Our decision in Riley was informed by a related statutory provision that mandated pre-judgment interest on all judgments but excluded judgments in “‘dissolution, annulment, or legal separation actions.’ ” 385 N.W.2d at 888 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(2) (1984)). We reasoned that the absence of such an exclusion in the post-judgment provision “indicates that awards of interest on dissolution judgments are included in the post[-]judgment interest provisions.” Id. (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.19 (1984) (stating that “[ejxceptions expressed in a law shall be construed to exclude all others”)). Although the legislature has since removed this exclusion from the pre-judgment interest provision, the reasoning of Riley [734]*734remains persuasive; if the legislature intended to exempt marital-dissolution judgments from the statutory rate of post-judgment interest, it could have drafted such an exclusion.

Appellant argues that neither the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(2), nor our precedent interpreting it, is dispositive here. Appellant contends that the district court’s statutory obligation under Minn.Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, to divide marital assets in a just and equitable manner requires the district court to exercise discretion and set an equitable interest rate. He contends that this obligation supersedes the mandatory interest rate set by section 549.09, subdivision 1(c)(2).

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Bluebook (online)
807 N.W.2d 731, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 149, 2011 WL 6141628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redleaf-v-redleaf-minnctapp-2011.