Redin v. St. Joseph Hospital Eureka

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 29, 2022·No. 5:22-cv-00776·Unknown

Opinion

CHRISTOPHER REDIN, Case No. 22-cv-00776 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND v.

HUMBOLDT COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, who appears to be a pretrial detainee currently confined at the Humboldt County Correctional Facility, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against various Defendants in Humboldt County.1 Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate order. A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff names the following as defendants in this action: (1) St. Joseph’s Hospital in Eureka, California; (2) Eureka Police Department; (3) Officer Leonard La France; (4) Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office; (5) Maggie Fleming (D.A.); (6) Capt. Christian of the Humboldt County Jail; and (7) Arcata Police Department. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. In the complaint’s “statement of claim,” Plaintiff asserts that the Humboldt County District Attorney’s office has engaged in misconduct, including “cover-ups, over-charging, malicious abuse of process, faulty investigations and pre-trial tactics, and illegitimate extraditions.” Id. Plaintiff refers to a withdrawn plea in 2017, and new charges being filed in 2020. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also claims that the Eureka Police Department made two warrantless arrests, and that the Arcata Police Department made a false arrest and were negligent in 2019. Id. Plaintiff claims that St. Joseph’s Hospital falsely reported a fracture as bruise. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that he was harassed while in custody, including unreasonable strip search and interference with legal counsel visitation. Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks “federal oversight on current charges/matters, review of my commitments, cases, conditions of custody as well as malicious prosecution tactics employed against me for several years; expunged record restoring my citizen (and employment) status, allegations, it appears that there may be ongoing state criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-74 (1971). Younger abstention is required when: (1) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). All three elements must be present. Agriesti v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (abstention improper where arrest and issuance of citation were executive acts not judicial in nature, and only potential for future state judicial proceedings existed). A fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth Circuit: that “the federal court action would enjoin the state proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). There is insufficient information in the complaint for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee with criminal proceedings pending against him or a convicted felon serving a sentence. If the former, Younger abstention may apply. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend to allege sufficient facts for the Court to make this determination. He is advised that if there are ongoing criminal proceedings against him, he must show that extraordinary circumstances warrant federal intervention to overcome Younger abstention. On the other hand, if Plaintiff has been convicted and is challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, a § 1983 action is not the appropriate may be challenged in federal habeas corpus once state remedies have been exhausted. See Nelson v. Sandritter, 351 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, although a district court may construe a habeas petition by a prisoner attacking the conditions of his confinement as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), the opposite is not true: A civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief should be dismissed without prejudice to bringing it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, if Plaintiff is seeking to challenge his state conviction and sentence, this action should be dismissed without prejudice to his refiling as a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He must make his status clear in an amended complaint. Furthermore, if Plaintiff is seeking damages for the wrongful conviction, he must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Accordingly, Plaintiff must first succeed in a habeas action before he can pursue a § 1983 action for damages for the unlawful conviction. Lastly, Plaintiff

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