Red Fish Boat Company v. Jarvis Press, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Texas

Red Fish Boat Company v. Jarvis Press, Inc.

361 S.W.2d 588, 1962 Tex. App. LEXIS 1900

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedOctober 12, 1962

Docket16081

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 361 S.W.2d 588 (Red Fish Boat Company v. Jarvis Press, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Red Fish Boat Company v. Jarvis Press, Inc., 361 S.W.2d 588, 1962 Tex. App. LEXIS 1900 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962).

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Opinion

DIXON, Chief Justice.

Red Fish Boat Company, a corporation, has appealed from a judgment overruling its plea of privilege.

The Jarvis Press, Inc. appellee, sued appellant in a District Court in Dallas County, Texas. The suit is based on an alleged written contract for the printing of 250,-000 catalogues at a price of $98.40 per thousand.

Appellant is a resident of Red River County and seeks to have the suit transferred to that County for trial.

In its controverting affidavit appellee alleges that the written contract is by its express terms collectible in Dallas County, and that the contract arose in Dallas County; therefore venue properly lies in Dallas County under subds. 5 and 23 of Art. 1995, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.

Appellant presents only one point on appeal, which is as follows: “The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s plea of privilege”.

The point is much too general and indefinite to require our consideration. White v. Great American Reserve Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 342 S.W.2d 793; Tindall v. Tacconelly, Tex.Civ.App., 328 S.W.2d 909; Rosenfield v. Hull, Tex.Civ.App., 304 S.W.2d 571; In re Martin’s Estate, Tex.Civ.App., 284 S.W.2d 279; Miguez v. Miguez, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W.2d 293; Rule 418, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; 4 Tex. Jur.2d 155.

However, we gather from appellant’s brief as a whole that it bases its appeal on two contentions: (1) that appellee’s Exhibits Numbered 1, 2 and 3 do not constitute a written contract, and (2) that no evidence was introduced that Herman P. Walters who signed the Exhibit Numbered 3, was authorized to bind appellant as its agent. We shall therefore proceed to consider said contentions. Moore & Moore Drilling Co. v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 345 S.W.2d 550; Walker v. Bedell, Tex.Civ.App., 320 S.W.2d 913.

There is no merit to appellant’s first contention. Exhibits Numbered 1 and 2 are 1 *590 a letter with 2 enclosed specifications constituting a written offer from appellee to appellant.

The letter is dated July 26, 1960. Its second paragraph is as follows: “We would appreciate very much if you would send us a formal purchase order or a confirming letter.” Also the letter contained an offer in substance as follows: if appellant would make a payment of $7,100 in advance on the contract, the catalogues would be hilled to appellant at $70 per thousand once a month as shipments were made. If such advance payment could not be made, the catalogues would be billed to appellant at $98.40 per thousand as shipped.

Exhibit Numbered 2, which accompanied the above letter went into greater detail as to the terms. We quote from the Exhibit:

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