Reberger v. Minev

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 14, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01250
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITEDSTATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OFNEVADA 3 4 LanceReberger, CaseNo.2:21-cv-01250-JAD-VCF 5 Plaintiff v. OrderGrantingin Partand Denyingin 6 PartMotion toExclude Casefrom Michael Minev,et.al., Mediation and GrantingApplication to 7 Proceed in FormaPauperis Defendants 8 (ECFNos.1,25) 9 PlaintiffLanceReberger brings this civil-rights lawsuit toredress constitutional 10 violations heclaims tohavesufferedwhileincarceratedat HighDesert StatePrison(HDSP). In 11 screeningReberger’s complaint, Iallowedhim to proceedontwoEighthAmendment deliberate- 12 medical-indifferenceclaims andgrantedhim leavetoamendsomeofhis otherclaims.1 Ialso 13 deferredadecisiononReberger’s applicationtoproceedinformapauperis (IFP).2 When 14 Rebergerdeclinedtofile anamended complaint,MagistrateJudge Ferenbachstayed this casefor 15 90days andorderedthat it bereferredtothe court’s InmateEarlyMediation(IEM)Program.3 16 JudgeFerenbachdidnot makeadecisionabout Reberger’s IFP status at that time. 17 Defendants nowmoveto excludethis casefrom the IEM Program,denyReberger’s 18 applicationfor IFP status,anddismiss his claimswithprejudice.4 Reberger applies for IFP 19 status andasks that “mediationbeleft openat alaterdate.”5 Idenydefendants’requests to 20 21 1 ECFNo.6at 15–16. 2 Id.at 16n.84. 22 3 ECFNo.19at 2. 23 4 ECFNo.25. 5 ECFNos.1,28. 1 dismiss Reberger’s claims anddenyhim IFP status becausetheirmotionforthat reliefis 2 procedurallydeficient. But Idosowithoutprejudicetodefendants’abilitytoraisetheir 3 arguments innewmotions. Igrant defendants’ request toremovethis case from the IEM 4 program. AndbecauseRebergerhas sufficientlypledthat hewas inimminent dangerofserious 5 physical injurywhenhefiledhis complaint,Igrant his applicationfor IFP status eventhoughhe

6 hadthreepriorlawsuits that weredismissedongrounds that theywere frivolous ormalicious or 7 failedtostateclaims uponwhichreliefmaybegranted. 8 I. Defendants’motion forvarious relief[ECFNo. 25] 9 Defendants moveto excludethis casefrom the IEM Program,denyReberger IFP status, 10 anddismiss his claims withprejudice.6 Defendants’secondandthird requests areprocedurally 11 improperfortwo reasons. First,theywerefiledin violationofJudgeFerenbach’s orderstaying 12 this casewithlimitedexceptions.7 Second,defendants’motionisn’t styledas oneseeking 13 dismissal oranevidentiaryhearingonReberger’s imminent-dangerallegations; it’s entitled 14 “Special AppearingDefendants’MotiontoExempt from Mediation.” Neitherthecaptionofthe

15 motionnorthedocket text alert thereadertothe otherrelief requestedinthemotion. 16 What theseomissions mean is that defendants’motiondoes not complywithNevada 17 Local Rule IC 2-2(b), whichsays that ifanelectronicallyfileddocument has morethanone 18 purpose,“[f]or eachtype ofrelief requestedorpurposeofthedocument, aseparatedocument 19 must befiledandaseparateevent must beselectedforthat document.” As aresult,thecourt did 20 not giveRebergerits standardnoticeofthemotionundertherequirements ofRandv.Rowland, 21 154F.3d952,955–56(9thCir.1998),and Klingelev.Eikenberry,849 F.2d 409,411–12(9th 22 6 ECFNo.25. 23 7 SeeECFNo.19 at 2–3(stayingthecase except forReberger’s emergency motions andany party’s motiontoexcludeit from the IEM Program). 1 Cir.1988). Becausethe court didnot issuethat notice,Rebergerhas not beenproperlyalerted to 2 thefact that Icouldtreat defendants’motionas oneseekingsummaryjudgment. SoIdeny 3 defendants’ request todismiss Reberger’s claimswithout prejudicetotheir abilitytoreurgethat 4 request inanew,properlysupportedmotionthat complies withLR IC 2-2(b). Ialsodeny 5 defendants’ request todenyReberger IFP statusforthesamereason,but Iaddress that request in

6 moredetail laterinthis order. 7 Inext considerdefendants’request toremovethis actionfrom the IEM Program.8 8 Rebergeropposes therequest,asking“that mediationbeleft openat alater date.”9 The IEM 9 Program’s goal is tosave resources byreferringtheparties insomeprisonercivil-rights cases to 10 mediationearlyinacase. Thecourt,of course,maychoosenot torefer acasetomediationto 11 preservelimitedjudicial resources. Rebergerhas filedthree emergencymotions forinjunctive 12 reliefinthis case, all of whichhavebeenset for oral argument.10 Giventheprocedural posture 13 ofthis caseandthe court’s limitedresources, Ideterminethat it wouldnot beaproductiveuseof 14 thecourt’s resources toset this casefor amediationsession at this time. Ithereforegrant

15 defendants’ request toexcludethis casefrom the IEM Program. 16 II. Reberger’s application for, and defendants’motion against,IFPstatus [ECFNo.1] 17 A. Legal standard 18 “IFP status is not aconstitutional right.”11 “Congress created[it]toassist indigent 19 persons inbringinglegitimateclaims inthelate1800s.”12 Because“IFP status is not 20 21 8 Id.at 4. 9 ECFNo.28at 4. 22 10 ECFNos. 2,5,35(motions); ECFNos.14,21,35(orders settinghearing). 23 11 Rodriguez v.Cook,169 F.3d1176,1180(9thCir. 1999). 12 Id. 1 constitutionallymandated[,]”[it] canbe extended orlimitedbyCongress.”13 Congress infact 2 limitedthat status whenit enactedthe28 U.S.C.§1915,thefiling-feeprovisionofthePrison 3 LitigationReform Act (PLRA). 4 “[N]icknamedthe‘three-strikes rule,’”§1915(g) ofthePLRAmakes IFP status 5 unavailableifaprisoner has “‘on3ormoreprior occasions,whileincarceratedordetainedin

6 anyfacility,brought an actionorappeal inany court oftheUnitedStates that was dismissedon 7 thegrounds that it is frivolous,malicious,orfails tostateaclaim uponwhichreliefmaybe 8 granted.’”14 Therule’s purposeis to“preclude[]prisoners withahistoryofabusingthelegal 9 system from continuingtoabuseit whileenjoyingIFP status. Althoughprisoners areentitledto 10 meaningful access tothe courts,courts arenotobligedtobeaplayground whereprisoners with 11 nothingbettertodocontinuouslyfilefrivolous claims.”15 “Onlyafterdemonstratinganinability 12 tofunction withinthejudicial system is anindigent inmateaskedtopayfor access tothe 13 courts.”16 14 TheNinthCircuit fleshedout inAndrews v.Kinghowthethree-strikes rule applies. The

15 court explainedthat “althoughprisoners must demonstratethat theyarenot abletopaythefiling 16 feewithan affidavit and submissionoftheirprisontrust records,Congress didnot require 17 prisoners todeclarethat §1915(g)does not bartheirrequest toproceed IFP.”17 But,theNinth 18 Circuit held,“ifdefendants challengeaprisoner-plaintiff’s IFP status,thentheinitial production 19 20 21 13 Id. 14 Andrews v.Cervantes,493F.3d1047,1049(9th Cir.2007)(quoting28U.S.C.§1915(g)). 22 15 Rodriguez,169F.3dat 1180. 23 16 Id. 17 Andrews v.King,398F.3d1113,1119(9thCir.2005). 1 burdenrests withthedefendants.”18 Inthat circumstance,“thedefendants must produce 2 documentaryevidencethat allows thedistrict court toconcludethat theplaintiffhas filedat least 3 threeprior actions that weredismissedbecausetheywerefrivolous,malicious[,]orfailedtostate 4 aclaim.”19 “[T]heburden thenshifts totheprisoner,whomust attempt torebut thedefendants’ 5 showingbyexplainingwhyapriordismissal shouldnot count as astrike.”20

6 But this ruleis not acompletebarto IFP status for prisoners whohavethreepriorstrikes. 7 Bakedintotheruleis an exceptionfor cases inwhich“theprisoneris under imminent dangerof 8 serious physical injury.”21 TheNinthCircuit explainedinAndrews v.Cervantes that “the 9 availabilityoftheexceptionturns ontheconditions aprisonerfaced at thetimethecomplaint 10 was filed,not at someearlierorlaterdate.”22 Becausethethree-strikes ruleis merely“a 11 screeningdevicethat does not judgethemerits of[aprisoner’s]lawsuit[,]” ifaprisonerplausibly 12 alleges that heis inimminent dangerofserious physical injury,thenthedistrict court must 13 accept theprisoner’s lawsuit without demanding an upfront payment ofthe filing fee.23 14 B. Analysis

15 Basedonthefinancial informationprovided, Ifindthat Rebergeris indigent andcannot 16 affordtoprepaythe filingfeeinthis action.24 Ordinarily,this findingwouldqualifyReberger 17 18 19 18 Id.at 1120. 20 19 Id.(internal quotationandbrackets omitted). 21 20 Id. 21 28U.S.C.§1915(g). 22 22 Cervantes,493F.3d at 1053. 23 23 Id.at 1050,1055. 24 SeeECFNo.1. 1 for IFP status. But Rebergerhas accumulatedthreepriorstrikes underthe PLRA.25 Sobefore I 2 canaccordReberger IFP status,Imust determinethat theimminent-danger exceptionapplies. 3 Reberger alleges that heis HIVpositiveandtakes protease-inhibitingmedications to 4 thwart thedevelopment ofacquiredimmunodeficiencysyndrome (AIDS).26 Becausedefendants 5 routinelyfail totimelyorderReberger’s medications,hehas gone“oneweekout ofeachmonth”

6 without his HIVmedications,andthis occurredfor manymonths.27 Reberger alleges that 7 inconsistentlymedicatinghis HIVinfectionhas causedit toprogress intoAIDS.28 Reberger’s 8 symptoms nowincludepaininhis knees,back,liver,andkidneys andbloodblisters onhis 9 tongue.29 Defendants have preventedRebergerfrom seeinganHIVspecialist whocomes to the 10 prisonandhavenot routinelydrawnhis bloodtomonitorhis condition.30 11 Reberger’s allegations that his conditionhas progressedtoAIDS andhis symptoms have 12 worsened,iftrue,“more thanplausiblyraisethespecterofserious physical injury.”31 HIV and 13 AIDS “quiteobviouslycauseserious healthproblems andcan result indeath.”32 AndReberger’s 14 allegationthat thefailure tomonitorandtreat his conditionis ongoingmeets the“imminent

15 16 17 18 25 Reberger v. Baker,657 Fed.App’x681,683–84 (9thCir.2016)(unpublished). 19 26 ECFNo. 7 at 5. 27 Id. 20 28 Id.at 6. 21 29 Id. 22 30 Id.at 7. 31 Cf.Cervantes,493F.3d at 1055(tensealtered) (findingallegations that inmateis “at riskof 23 contractingHIVorhepatitis C”plausiblyallegeserious physical injury). 32 Cf.id. (referringtoHIV andhepatitis C)(comma omitted). 1 danger”prongofthe exception.33 Soit wouldseem that Rebergerhas plausiblyallegedthat he 2 was inimminent danger ofserious physical injury whenhefiledhis complaint. 3 Defendants disagree,arguingthat “Rebergerhimselfacknowledges that thereis no 4 imminent threat byrequestinga45-dayextension tofileareply”insupport ofhis emergency 5 motionforinjunctivereliefanddidnot complainabout thedatethat Judge Ferenbachset tohear

6 oral argument onthat motion.34 Thesearguments miss themarkbecausethey concern events 7 that occurredafterthecomplaint was filed,not theconditions that Reberger alleges existedwhen 8 hefiledhis complaint. Ithereforedisregardthese irrelevant points. 9 Defendants alsoarguethat theevidence—medical records defendants producedand a 10 declarationfrom theirmedical expert—“irrefutablyestablishes nodangerofserious physical 11 injurybecauseReberger’s current regimenis effective.”35 “Rebergeris alay witness withno 12 medical trainingsufficient tocontradict thesemedical facts.”36 “Without contrarymedical 13 evidence,”defendants continue,“Rebergershould not begranted informa pauperisstatus,he 14 shouldbeforcedtopaythefilingfee, andthis Court shouldnot proceedanyfurtherinthis case

15 until suchrequirements aremet.”37 But defendants don’t provideanyauthoritystatingthat they 16 canmount anevidentiary challengetoReberger’s imminent-dangerallegations. 17 TheNinthCircuit has not yet heldthat adefendant canchallengeaprisoner’s imminent- 18 dangerallegations oradistrict court’s determination that thoseallegations areplausible. Given 19 20 33 Seeid.at 1056(explainingthat “imminent”“does not referonlytoevents that arealready taking place,but tothose events ‘readytotakeplace’or ‘hangingthreateninglyoverone’s 21 head”). 34 ECFNo.25at 5. 22 35 Id. 23 36 Id. 37 Id. 1 theNinthCircuit’s statements inKing andCervantes,Idoubt it wouldrequire,as defendants 2 suggest intheirmotion,that anindigent prisoner-plaintiffproduce “contrarymedical evidence” 3 at this thresholdstageof acase38 toget past thethree-strikes “screeningdevice.” In anyevent, 4 several othercircuit courts haveaddressedthis issue. Thestandarddistilledfrom thosecourts 5 focuses onthe credibilityoftheprisoner’s imminent-danger allegations,ratherthanthefull-

6 blownmerits disputedefendants envision. 7 TheSecondCircuit recountedinShepherdv.Annucci that fourofits sister courts “have 8 heldthat district courts—uponchallengeby adefendant—mayconduct anarrow evidentiary 9 inquiryintotheprisoner-litigant’s fearofimminent danger.”39 TheSecondCircuit “agree[d]that 10 courts mayreexaminea provisional determinationthat acomplainant is in‘imminent dangerof 11 serious physical injury’ when,afterbeingserved withthecomplaint,adefendant challenges that 12 determination.”40 It alsorationalizedthat nothingintheNinthCircuit’s decisioninCervantes 13 “purports tosay...that defendants cannot mount alimitedfactual challengetoadistrict court’s 14 provisional determinationthat aprisonersatisfies theimminent-dangerexception,orthat district

15 court’s hands aretiedinresolvingthis conflict.”41 AccordingtotheSecond Circuit,“Andrews 16 17 18 38 AlthoughIalreadyscreenedReberger’s complaint,this caseis still inits infancybecause JudgeFerenbach stayed it pending possiblemediationunderthecourt’s IEM Program,andthe 19 court has not yet ordered formal serviceofthe complaint onanydefendant. 20 39 Shepherdv.Annucci,921F.3d89,94–95(2dCir. 2019)(citingcases from Fourth,Seventh, Tenth,and ThirdCircuits). 21 40 Id.at 95. 41 Id.at 95–96; accord McLeod v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corr.,778Fed.App’x 663,665(10thCir. 22 2019)(unpublished)(citingShepherdwithapproval forthepropositionthat “[o]nceadistrict court has made aninitial findingofimminent danger,it retains theauthoritytorevisit that 23 determinationandrevoke IFP status whennewevidencebearingonthe IFP determinationcomes tolight”). 1 onlycautions—and[the court]agree[s]—that any suchinquiryshouldbenarrow”and“not 2 metastasizeintoafull-scalemerits review.”42 3 TheThirdCircuit similarlyheldinGibbs v.Roman that “acomplaint allegingimminent 4 danger—evenifbrought afterthepriordismissal ofthreefrivolous complaints—must becredited 5 as havingsatisfiedthethresholdcriterionof§1915(g)unless the‘imminent danger’ element is

6 challenged.”43 “Ifthedefendant,afterservice,challenges theallegations ofimminent danger, 7 ...thedistrict courtmustthendeterminewhether theplaintiff’s allegation ofimminent dangeris 8 credible” as ofthedateofthecomplaint inordertoproceed IFP.44 ThirdCircuit instructedthat 9 inmakingthis determination,“thedistrictcourt mayrelyuponevidencesuppliedbysworn 10 affidavits ordepositions, or,alternatively,mayholdahearing.”45 11 This discussionis merelyacademicbecause Ihave alreadydenieddefendants’request to 12 denyReberger IFP status becausetheirmotionfor that reliefis procedurallydeficient. So Ineed 13 not anddonot considerdefendants’ evidenceindeterminingwhethertheimminent-danger 14 exceptionapplies here. Ifindthat Reberger’s allegations plausiblystatethat hewas inimminent

15 dangerofserious physical injurywhenhefiledhis complaint. In fact, apanel oftheNinth 16 Circuit foundthat similarallegations byReberger satisfiedtheimminent-dangerexception.46 I 17 42 Shepherd,921F.3d at 96(internal quotationomitted). 18 43 Gibbs v.Roman,116F.3d 83,86(3dCir.1997),overruledinpart byAbdul-Akbar v. 19 McKelvie,293 F.3d307, 312(3dCir.2001)(overrulingthepart ofGibbs findingthat the imminent dangerfacedbytheprisonermust beat thetimeoftheallegedincident andholding 20 that,likeintheNinthCircuit,imminent dangeris determined“at thetimethecomplaint is filed”). 21 44 Id. 45 Id. 22 46 SeeReberger v. Dzurenda,816Fed.App’x173, 173–74(9thCir.2020)(unpublished)(finding 23 Reberger’s allegations that “prolongedisolationinadministrativesegregationis causinghim physical injuries,heis unabletoaccess his HIVmediationas prescribed,andhis wateris 1} therefore grant Reberger’s application to proceed IFP. But to be clear, I do not resolve whether 2\| defendants can challenge Reberger’s IFP status, now that it has been accorded, with evidence to 3]| show that his imminent-danger allegations are not credible. If defendants wish to raise that issue, they must do so in a new, properly supported motion. Conclusion 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF 7|| No. 1] is GRANTED. This status doesn’t relieve Reberger of his obligation to pay the full $350 8|| filing fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in installments. And the full $350 9|| filing fee will remain due and owing even if this case gets dismissed or 1s otherwise 10|| unsuccessful. 11 To ensure that the Reberger pays the full filing fee, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 12|| Nevada Department of Corrections must pay to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 13]| District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the account of Lance Reberger, #39494 (in months that the account exceeds $10) until the full $350 filing fee 15|| has been paid for this action. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to exclude this case from the JEM 17|| Program and for other relief [ECF No. 25] is GRANTED IN PART: 18 ° This case is excluded from the IEM Program; 19 ° Defendants’ request to dismiss Reberger’s claims is DENIED WITHOUT 20 PREJUDICE to their ability to reurge that request in a new, properly supported 21 motion that complies with the court’s local rules; and 22 23 contaminated with chemicals and is undrinkable” are “sufficient to satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception”). 10

1 ° Defendants’ request to deny Reberger’s application for IFP status is DENIED. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 3 ° Service must be perfected within 90 days from the date of this order as required 4 under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(m); 5 ° Subject to the findings of the screening orders (ECF Nos. 6, 19), within 21 days of 6 the date of entry of this order, the Attorney General’s Office must file a notice 7 advising the court and Reberger whether it accepts service on behalf of the 8 defendants. If the Attorney General’s Office cannot accept service on behalf of 9 any defendant, the Office must file under seal, but must not serve the inmate 10 Reberger, with the defendant’s last known address. If the defendant’s last known 11 address is a post office box, the Attorney General's Office must attempt to obtain 12 and provide the defendant’s last known physical address; 13 ° If service cannot be accepted for a defendant, Reberger must file a motion 14 requesting issuance of a summons and specifying a full name and address for the 15 defendant. If the Attorney General has not provided last-known-address 16 information, Reberger must provide the full name and address for the defendant; 17 ° If the Attorney General accepts service of process for any defendant, that 18 defendant must file and serve an answer or other response to the complaint (ECF 19 No. 7) within 60 days from the date of this order; and 20 ° Reberger must serve upon defendant or, if an appearance has been entered by 21 counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion or other 22 document submitted for consideration by the court. If Reberger electronically 23 files a document with the court’s electronic-filing system, no certificate of service

1]

1 is required.” However, if Reberger mails the document to the court, he must 2 include with it a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the 3 document was mailed to the defendant or counsel for the defendant. If counsel 4 has entered a notice of appearance, Reberger must direct service to the individual 5 attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the physical or electronic address 6 stated therein. The court may disregard any document received by a district judge 7 or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any document 8 received by a district judge, magistrate Judge, or the Clerk that fails to include a 9 certificate showing proper service when required. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of this action is LIFTED. 11 Finally, the Clerk of Court is directed to 12 ° SEND a copy of this order (1) to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office and 13 (2) to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of 14 Corrections, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702; and 15 ° SERVE a copy of this order and a copy of Reberger’s complaint (ECF No. 7) on 16 the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, which has already been 17 added to the docket sheet. This does not indicate acceptance of service. 18 Dated: February 14, 2022

US. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey 20 21 22 23 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1)(B); Nev. Loe. R. IC 4-1(b); Nev. Loc. R. 5-1. 12