Reberger v. Minev

Opinion

LanceReberger, CaseNo.2:21-cv-01250-JAD-VCF Plaintiff v. OrderGrantingin Partand Denyingin PartMotion toExclude Casefrom Michael Minev,et.al., Mediation and GrantingApplication to Proceed in FormaPauperis Defendants (ECFNos.1,25) PlaintiffLanceReberger brings this civil-rights lawsuit toredress constitutional violations heclaims tohavesufferedwhileincarceratedat HighDesert StatePrison(HDSP). In screeningReberger’s complaint, Iallowedhim to proceedontwoEighthAmendment deliberate- medical-indifferenceclaims andgrantedhim leavetoamendsomeofhis otherclaims.1 Ialso deferredadecisiononReberger’s applicationtoproceedinformapauperis (IFP).2 When Rebergerdeclinedtofile anamended complaint,MagistrateJudge Ferenbachstayed this casefor 90days andorderedthat it bereferredtothe court’s InmateEarlyMediation(IEM)Program.3 JudgeFerenbachdidnot makeadecisionabout Reberger’s IFP status at that time. Defendants nowmoveto excludethis casefrom the IEM Program,denyReberger’s applicationfor IFP status,anddismiss his claimswithprejudice.4 Reberger applies for IFP status andasks that “mediationbeleft openat alaterdate.”5 Idenydefendants’requests to 1 ECFNo.6at 15–16. 2 Id.at 16n.84. 3 ECFNo.19at 2. 4 ECFNo.25. 5 ECFNos.1,28. dismiss Reberger’s claims anddenyhim IFP status becausetheirmotionforthat reliefis procedurallydeficient. But Idosowithoutprejudicetodefendants’abilitytoraisetheir arguments innewmotions. Igrant defendants’ request toremovethis case from the IEM program. AndbecauseRebergerhas sufficientlypledthat hewas inimminent dangerofserious physical injurywhenhefiledhis complaint,Igrant his applicationfor IFP status eventhoughhe

hadthreepriorlawsuits that weredismissedongrounds that theywere frivolous ormalicious or failedtostateclaims uponwhichreliefmaybegranted. I. Defendants’motion forvarious relief[ECFNo. 25] Defendants moveto excludethis casefrom the IEM Program,denyReberger IFP status, anddismiss his claims withprejudice.6 Defendants’secondandthird requests areprocedurally improperfortwo reasons. First,theywerefiledin violationofJudgeFerenbach’s orderstaying this casewithlimitedexceptions.7 Second,defendants’motionisn’t styledas oneseeking dismissal oranevidentiaryhearingonReberger’s imminent-dangerallegations; it’s entitled “Special AppearingDefendants’MotiontoExempt from Mediation.” Neitherthecaptionofthe

motionnorthedocket text alert thereadertothe otherrelief requestedinthemotion. What theseomissions mean is that defendants’motiondoes not complywithNevada Local Rule IC 2-2(b), whichsays that ifanelectronicallyfileddocument has morethanone purpose,“[f]or eachtype ofrelief requestedorpurposeofthedocument, aseparatedocument must befiledandaseparateevent must beselectedforthat document.” As aresult,thecourt did not giveRebergerits standardnoticeofthemotionundertherequirements ofRandv.Rowland, 154F.3d952,955–56(9thCir.1998),and Klingelev.Eikenberry,849 F.2d 409,411–12(9th 6 ECFNo.25. 7 SeeECFNo.19 at 2–3(stayingthecase except forReberger’s emergency motions andany party’s motiontoexcludeit from the IEM Program). Cir.1988). Becausethe court didnot issuethat notice,Rebergerhas not beenproperlyalerted to thefact that Icouldtreat defendants’motionas oneseekingsummaryjudgment. SoIdeny defendants’ request todismiss Reberger’s claimswithout prejudicetotheir abilitytoreurgethat request inanew,properlysupportedmotionthat complies withLR IC 2-2(b). Ialsodeny defendants’ request todenyReberger IFP statusforthesamereason,but Iaddress that request in

moredetail laterinthis order. Inext considerdefendants’request toremovethis actionfrom the IEM Program.8 Rebergeropposes therequest,asking“that mediationbeleft openat alater date.”9 The IEM Program’s goal is tosave resources byreferringtheparties insomeprisonercivil-rights cases to mediationearlyinacase. Thecourt,of course,maychoosenot torefer acasetomediationto preservelimitedjudicial resources. Rebergerhas filedthree emergencymotions forinjunctive reliefinthis case, all of whichhavebeenset for oral argument.10 Giventheprocedural posture ofthis caseandthe court’s limitedresources, Ideterminethat it wouldnot beaproductiveuseof thecourt’s resources toset this casefor amediationsession at this time. Ithereforegrant

defendants’ request toexcludethis casefrom the IEM Program. II. Reberger’s application for, and defendants’motion against,IFPstatus [ECFNo.1] A. Legal standard “IFP status is not aconstitutional right.”11 “Congress created[it]toassist indigent persons inbringinglegitimateclaims inthelate1800s.”12 Because“IFP status is not 8 Id.at 4. 9 ECFNo.28at 4. 10 ECFNos. 2,5,35(motions); ECFNos.14,21,35(orders settinghearing). 11 Rodriguez v.Cook,169 F.3d1176,1180(9thCir. 1999). 12 Id. constitutionallymandated[,]”[it] canbe extended orlimitedbyCongress.”13 Congress infact limitedthat status whenit enactedthe28 U.S.C.§1915,thefiling-feeprovisionofthePrison LitigationReform Act (PLRA). “[N]icknamedthe‘three-strikes rule,’”§1915(g) ofthePLRAmakes IFP status unavailableifaprisoner has “‘on3ormoreprior occasions,whileincarceratedordetainedin

anyfacility,brought an actionorappeal inany court oftheUnitedStates that was dismissedon thegrounds that it is frivolous,malicious,orfails tostateaclaim uponwhichreliefmaybe granted.’”14 Therule’s purposeis to“preclude[]prisoners withahistoryofabusingthelegal system from continuingtoabuseit whileenjoyingIFP status. Althoughprisoners areentitledto meaningful access tothe courts,courts arenotobligedtobeaplayground whereprisoners with nothingbettertodocontinuouslyfilefrivolous claims.”15 “Onlyafterdemonstratinganinability tofunction withinthejudicial system is anindigent inmateaskedtopayfor access tothe courts.”16 TheNinthCircuit fleshedout inAndrews v.Kinghowthethree-strikes rule applies. The

court explainedthat “althoughprisoners must demonstratethat theyarenot abletopaythefiling feewithan affidavit and submissionoftheirprisontrust records,Congress didnot require prisoners todeclarethat §1915(g)does not bartheirrequest toproceed IFP.”17 But,theNinth Circuit held,“ifdefendants challengeaprisoner-plaintiff’s IFP status,thentheinitial production 13 Id. 14 Andrews v.Cervantes,493F.3d1047,1049(9th Cir.2007)(quoting28U.S.C.§1915(g)). 15 Rodriguez,169F.3dat 1180. 16 Id. 17 Andrews v.King,398F.3d1113,1119(9thCir.2005). burdenrests withthedefendants.”18 Inthat circumstance,“thedefendants must produce documentaryevidencethat allows thedistrict court toconcludethat theplaintiffhas filedat least threeprior actions that weredismissedbecausetheywerefrivolous,malicious[,]orfailedtostate aclaim.”19 “[T]heburden thenshifts totheprisoner,whomust attempt torebut thedefendants’ showingbyexplainingwhyapriordismissal shouldnot count as astrike.”20

But this ruleis not acompletebarto IFP status for prisoners whohavethreepriorstrikes. Bakedintotheruleis an exceptionfor cases inwhich“theprisoneris under imminent dangerof serious physical injury.”21 TheNinthCircuit explainedinAndrews v.Cervantes that “the availabilityoftheexceptionturns ontheconditions aprisonerfaced at thetimethecomplaint was filed,not at someearlierorlaterdate.”22 Becausethethree-strikes ruleis merely“a screeningdevicethat does not judgethemerits of[aprisoner’s]lawsuit[,]” ifaprisonerplausibly alleges that heis inimminent dangerofserious physical injury,thenthedistrict court must accept theprisoner’s lawsuit without demanding an upfront payment ofthe filing fee.23 B. Analysis

Basedonthefinancial informationprovided, Ifindthat Rebergeris indigent andcannot affordtoprepaythe filingfeeinthis action.24 Ordinarily,this findingwouldqualifyReberger 18 Id.at 1120. 19 Id.(internal quotationandbrackets omitted). 20 Id. 21 28U.S.C.§1915(g). 22 Cervantes,493F.3d at 1053. 23 Id.at 1050,1055. 24 SeeECFNo.1. for IFP status. But Rebergerhas accumulatedthreepriorstrikes underthe PLRA.25 Sobefore I canaccordReberger IFP status,Imust determinethat theimminent-danger exceptionapplies. Reberger alleges that heis HIVpositiveandtakes protease-inhibitingmedications to thwart thedevelopment ofacquiredimmunodeficiencysyndrome (AIDS).26 Becausedefendants routinelyfail totimelyorderReberger’s medications,hehas gone“oneweekout ofeachmonth”

without his HIVmedications,andthis occurredfor manymonths.27 Reberger alleges that inconsistentlymedicatinghis HIVinfectionhas causedit toprogress intoAIDS.28 Reberger’s symptoms nowincludepaininhis knees,back,liver,andkidneys andbloodblisters onhis tongue.29 Defendants have preventedRebergerfrom seeinganHIVspecialist whocomes to the prisonandhavenot routinelydrawnhis bloodtomonitorhis condition.30 Reberger’s allegations that his conditionhas progressedtoAIDS andhis symptoms have worsened,iftrue,“more thanplausiblyraisethespecterofserious physical injury.”31 HIV and AIDS “quiteobviouslycauseserious healthproblems andcan result indeath.”32 AndReberger’s allegationthat thefailure tomonitorandtreat his conditionis ongoingmeets the“imminent

25 Reberger v. Baker,657 Fed.App’x681,683–84 (9thCir.2016)(unpublished). 26 ECFNo. 7 at 5. 27 Id. 28 Id.at 6. 29 Id. 30 Id.at 7. 31 Cf.Cervantes,493F.3d at 1055(tensealtered) (findingallegations that inmateis “at riskof contractingHIVorhepatitis C”plausiblyallegeserious physical injury). 32 Cf.id. (referringtoHIV andhepatitis C)(comma omitted). danger”prongofthe exception.33 Soit wouldseem that Rebergerhas plausiblyallegedthat he was inimminent danger ofserious physical injury whenhefiledhis complaint. Defendants disagree,arguingthat “Rebergerhimselfacknowledges that thereis no imminent threat byrequestinga45-dayextension tofileareply”insupport ofhis emergency motionforinjunctivereliefanddidnot complainabout thedatethat Judge Ferenbachset tohear

oral argument onthat motion.34 Thesearguments miss themarkbecausethey concern events that occurredafterthecomplaint was filed,not theconditions that Reberger alleges existedwhen hefiledhis complaint. Ithereforedisregardthese irrelevant points. Defendants alsoarguethat theevidence—medical records defendants producedand a declarationfrom theirmedical expert—“irrefutablyestablishes nodangerofserious physical injurybecauseReberger’s current regimenis effective.”35 “Rebergeris alay witness withno medical trainingsufficient tocontradict thesemedical facts.”36 “Without contrarymedical evidence,”defendants continue,“Rebergershould not begranted informa pauperisstatus,he shouldbeforcedtopaythefilingfee, andthis Court shouldnot proceedanyfurtherinthis case

until suchrequirements aremet.”37 But defendants don’t provideanyauthoritystatingthat they canmount anevidentiary challengetoReberger’s imminent-dangerallegations. TheNinthCircuit has not yet heldthat adefendant canchallengeaprisoner’s imminent- dangerallegations oradistrict court’s determination that thoseallegations areplausible. Given 33 Seeid.at 1056(explainingthat “imminent”“does not referonlytoevents that arealready taking place,but tothose events ‘readytotakeplace’or ‘hangingthreateninglyoverone’s head”). 34 ECFNo.25at 5. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id. theNinthCircuit’s statements inKing andCervantes,Idoubt it wouldrequire,as defendants suggest intheirmotion,that anindigent prisoner-plaintiffproduce “contrarymedical evidence” at this thresholdstageof acase38 toget past thethree-strikes “screeningdevice.” In anyevent, several othercircuit courts haveaddressedthis issue. Thestandarddistilledfrom thosecourts focuses onthe credibilityoftheprisoner’s imminent-danger allegations,ratherthanthefull-

blownmerits disputedefendants envision. TheSecondCircuit recountedinShepherdv.Annucci that fourofits sister courts “have heldthat district courts—uponchallengeby adefendant—mayconduct anarrow evidentiary inquiryintotheprisoner-litigant’s fearofimminent danger.”39 TheSecondCircuit “agree[d]that courts mayreexaminea provisional determinationthat acomplainant is in‘imminent dangerof serious physical injury’ when,afterbeingserved withthecomplaint,adefendant challenges that determination.”40 It alsorationalizedthat nothingintheNinthCircuit’s decisioninCervantes “purports tosay...that defendants cannot mount alimitedfactual challengetoadistrict court’s provisional determinationthat aprisonersatisfies theimminent-dangerexception,orthat district

court’s hands aretiedinresolvingthis conflict.”41 AccordingtotheSecond Circuit,“Andrews 38 AlthoughIalreadyscreenedReberger’s complaint,this caseis still inits infancybecause JudgeFerenbach stayed it pending possiblemediationunderthecourt’s IEM Program,andthe court has not yet ordered formal serviceofthe complaint onanydefendant. 39 Shepherdv.Annucci,921F.3d89,94–95(2dCir. 2019)(citingcases from Fourth,Seventh, Tenth,and ThirdCircuits). 40 Id.at 95. 41 Id.at 95–96; accord McLeod v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corr.,778Fed.App’x 663,665(10thCir. 2019)(unpublished)(citingShepherdwithapproval forthepropositionthat “[o]nceadistrict court has made aninitial findingofimminent danger,it retains theauthoritytorevisit that determinationandrevoke IFP status whennewevidencebearingonthe IFP determinationcomes tolight”). onlycautions—and[the court]agree[s]—that any suchinquiryshouldbenarrow”and“not metastasizeintoafull-scalemerits review.”42 TheThirdCircuit similarlyheldinGibbs v.Roman that “acomplaint allegingimminent danger—evenifbrought afterthepriordismissal ofthreefrivolous complaints—must becredited as havingsatisfiedthethresholdcriterionof§1915(g)unless the‘imminent danger’ element is

challenged.”43 “Ifthedefendant,afterservice,challenges theallegations ofimminent danger, ...thedistrict courtmustthendeterminewhether theplaintiff’s allegation ofimminent dangeris credible” as ofthedateofthecomplaint inordertoproceed IFP.44 ThirdCircuit instructedthat inmakingthis determination,“thedistrictcourt mayrelyuponevidencesuppliedbysworn affidavits ordepositions, or,alternatively,mayholdahearing.”45 This discussionis merelyacademicbecause Ihave alreadydenieddefendants’request to denyReberger IFP status becausetheirmotionfor that reliefis procedurallydeficient. So Ineed not anddonot considerdefendants’ evidenceindeterminingwhethertheimminent-danger exceptionapplies here. Ifindthat Reberger’s allegations plausiblystatethat hewas inimminent

dangerofserious physical injurywhenhefiledhis complaint. In fact, apanel oftheNinth Circuit foundthat similarallegations byReberger satisfiedtheimminent-dangerexception.46 I 42 Shepherd,921F.3d at 96(internal quotationomitted). 43 Gibbs v.Roman,116F.3d 83,86(3dCir.1997),overruledinpart byAbdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,293 F.3d307, 312(3dCir.2001)(overrulingthepart ofGibbs findingthat the imminent dangerfacedbytheprisonermust beat thetimeoftheallegedincident andholding that,likeintheNinthCircuit,imminent dangeris determined“at thetimethecomplaint is filed”). 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 SeeReberger v. Dzurenda,816Fed.App’x173, 173–74(9thCir.2020)(unpublished)(finding Reberger’s allegations that “prolongedisolationinadministrativesegregationis causinghim physical injuries,heis unabletoaccess his HIVmediationas prescribed,andhis wateris 1} therefore grant Reberger’s application to proceed IFP. But to be clear, I do not resolve whether 2\| defendants can challenge Reberger’s IFP status, now that it has been accorded, with evidence to 3] show that his imminent-danger allegations are not credible. If defendants wish to raise that issue, they must do so in a new, properly supported motion. Conclusion IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED. This status doesn’t relieve Reberger of his obligation to pay the full $350 filing fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in installments. And the full $350 filing fee will remain due and owing even if this case gets dismissed or 1s otherwise unsuccessful. To ensure that the Reberger pays the full filing fee, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Nevada Department of Corrections must pay to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 13] District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the account of Lance Reberger, #39494 (in months that the account exceeds $10) until the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to exclude this case from the JEM Program and for other relief [ECF No. 25] is GRANTED IN PART: ° This case is excluded from the IEM Program; ° Defendants’ request to dismiss Reberger’s claims is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their ability to reurge that request in a new, properly supported motion that complies with the court’s local rules; and contaminated with chemicals and is undrinkable” are “sufficient to satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception”). 10

° Defendants’ request to deny Reberger’s application for IFP status is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: ° Service must be perfected within 90 days from the date of this order as required under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(m); ° Subject to the findings of the screening orders (ECF Nos. 6, 19), within 21 days of the date of entry of this order, the Attorney General’s Office must file a notice advising the court and Reberger whether it accepts service on behalf of the defendants. If the Attorney General’s Office cannot accept service on behalf of any defendant, the Office must file under seal, but must not serve the inmate Reberger, with the defendant’s last known address. If the defendant’s last known address is a post office box, the Attorney General's Office must attempt to obtain and provide the defendant’s last known physical address; ° If service cannot be accepted for a defendant, Reberger must file a motion requesting issuance of a summons and specifying a full name and address for the defendant. If the Attorney General has not provided last-known-address information, Reberger must provide the full name and address for the defendant; ° If the Attorney General accepts service of process for any defendant, that defendant must file and serve an answer or other response to the complaint (ECF No. 7) within 60 days from the date of this order; and ° Reberger must serve upon defendant or, if an appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion or other document submitted for consideration by the court. If Reberger electronically files a document with the court’s electronic-filing system, no certificate of service

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is required.” However, if Reberger mails the document to the court, he must include with it a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the defendant or counsel for the defendant. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, Reberger must direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the physical or electronic address stated therein. The court may disregard any document received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any document received by a district judge, magistrate Judge, or the Clerk that fails to include a certificate showing proper service when required. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of this action is LIFTED. Finally, the Clerk of Court is directed to ° SEND a copy of this order (1) to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office and (2) to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702; and ° SERVE a copy of this order and a copy of Reberger’s complaint (ECF No. 7) on the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, which has already been added to the docket sheet. This does not indicate acceptance of service. Dated: February 14, 2022

US. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1)(B); Nev. Loe. R. IC 4-1(b); Nev. Loc. R. 5-1. 12