Rebekah Sherrill v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 19, 2024
DocketDA-0752-22-0271-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Rebekah Sherrill v. United States Postal Service (Rebekah Sherrill v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rebekah Sherrill v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

REBEKAH SHERRILL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-22-0271-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: March 19, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Michael Johnson , Edmond, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

Theresa M. Gegen , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed the agency’s removal action based on the sustained charges of unacceptable conduct and failure to follow instructions. On petition for review, the appellant reargues her case and the facts underlying the charges; reargues facts related to her affirmative defenses; conducts her own penalty analysis and raises claims of harmful error and disparate penalties; and submits additional 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

evidence. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. 2 Except as expressly MODIFIED to correct the analytical framework applied to the appellant’s Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) retaliation claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision. In the administrative judge’s discussion of the appellant’s claim that the agency removed her in retaliation for taking FMLA-protected leave, the administrative judge stated that such retaliation is a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) and cited Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 95 M.S.P.R. 493, ¶ 11 (2004), which analyzed a claim of FMLA retaliation as protected activity 2 The appellant’s petition for review contains over 60 pages of documents that, for the most part, predate the close of the record before the administrative judge or are already part of the record. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 29-64. We find that these documents are not a basis for granting the petition for review. The Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The appellant has not alleged that any of the newly submitted documents were unavailable to her before the record closed. To the extent that some of the documents are already in the record, they are not “new” evidence for purposes of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. See Meier v. Department of the Interior , 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980). In any event, none of the documents contain information of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(1). 3

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), for the proposition that, to establish such a claim, the appellant must show that: (a) she engaged in protected activity; (b) she was subsequently treated adversely; (c) the deciding official had actual or constructive knowledge of the protected activity; and (d) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the personnel action. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 23, Initial Decision (ID) at 12. The administrative judge found the first three criteria satisfied but found that the appellant failed to establish a causal connection between her protected FMLA activity and her removal because, among other things, she failed to show that her supervisor was motivated by retaliatory animus related to her FMLA activity, the removal closely followed her misconduct, and the appellant acknowledged the alleged misconduct for the sustained charges. ID at 12-13. The administrative judge therefore found that the appellant failed to establish this affirmative defense. ID at 12-13. However, after the initial decision was issued, the Board expressly overruled Doe in Marcell v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 33, ¶¶ 7-8. In Marcell, the Board found that FMLA leave requests are not protected activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), but could form the basis for another affirmative defense, such as a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10), which makes it a prohibited personnel practice to “discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or the performance of others.” Marcell, 2022 MSPB 33, ¶¶ 7-8. Accordingly, we modify the initial decision to analyze the appellant’s FMLA retaliation claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). However, under such an analysis we also find that the appellant did not establish that she was removed because of, or “on the basis of,” her use of FMLA-protected leave. We agree with the administrative judge’s observations on this issue noted above and in the initial decision, and we find that there is no evidence that the fact that the appellant took FMLA leave was part of the charges or was considered by the 4

deciding official. See ID at 12-13; IAF, Tab 6 at 28-46. Although some of the appellant’s misconduct at issue here occurred while she was out on FMLA leave, which she stresses on petition for review, the simple fact of this alone does not establish that she was removed because of her FMLA leave. See Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7.

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Robert Marcell v. Department of Veterans Affairs
2022 MSPB 33 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Rebekah Sherrill v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rebekah-sherrill-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2024.